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From Victory to Defeat: The Chinese Mission in Japan, 1946-1952
Kan Lee
Abstract
Through the lens of the Chinese Mission in Japan, this dissertation explores how
the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek adjusted to the
post-war international order between 1945 and 1952. The history the governmental
delegation representing the Republic of China (ROC) in Tokyo during the allied
occupation of Japan reveals a hitherto overlooked aspect of post-war China and East
Asia’s Cold War history, one coinciding with the seven-year period that witnessed the
military defeat of the Kuomintang. As the Kuomintang fought to retain control of the
Chinese mainland between 1945 and 1949, the Chinese Mission vied for influence in
Japan with the three leading Allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union—and participated in trying war criminals, obtaining reparations,
and concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. The Chinese Mission thus
endeavoured to be an active member of the “Big Four” as envisaged by President
Franklin Roosevelt in the final years of World War II.
However, the standing and eminence of the Chinese Mission in Japan ebbed away
as the Kuomintang lost ground in the Chinese Civil War and eventually retreated to
the island of Taiwan in 1949. Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in October of that year, the fundamental legitimacy of the Chinese Mission
came under threat as the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union continuously
challenged its position in Japan. Despite the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace
Treaty in 1952, which officially ended the war between China and Japan and
recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government in the eyes of Japan, the
perception of the ROC in the minds of most Japanese, in comparison to the new
regime in Beijing, was little different to that of any other defeated power. The title of
this dissertation “From Victory to Defeat” not only characterises the history of the
Chinese Mission in Japan, but also alludes to the fate of the Kuomintang and ROC
during those seven years.
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INTRODUCTION: POSTWAR CHINAAND POSTWAR JAPAN
On February 15, 1952, Ho Shailai (何世禮 ), head of the Chinese Mission in
Japan, attended a memorial service held for George VI, the King of the United
Kingdom who had died a week or so earlier, on February 6.1 Held at Tokyo’s Holy
Trinity Church, the sombre ceremony was a significant event that attracted a number
of important guests. Amongst the people paying tribute to the late King were heads of
various foreign missions to Japan and General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander of
the United Nation Forces in Korea and the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers in Japan.2 As another of the commemoration’s noted attendees, Ho later
recounted an episode in his diaries:
At 11 am I attended the memorial service for the British monarch George VI at
Holy Trinity Church. It was organized by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. At
first, I was extremely reluctant to go. Upon my arrival, I was guided into the
auditorium by staff from the Australian Embassy, and everything was fine. As the
service ended, ambassadors of these countries stood at the front door, where
Denning, the UK ambassador, stood between the heads of the Canadian and
Australian missions. After I shook hands with the Canadian, I was lucky that I did
not reach out my hands towards when Denning [Dening] - when he saw me he
immediately turned his face away. I took his behavior as being very mean. I was
invited by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and I was polite enough to attend.
I did not anticipate that the UK ambassador would behave in this way, which lost
the manner of such a big country.3
This episode happened at a special moment and spoke volumes about the status of
the Republic of China (ROC) in 1952. The UK government, along with the
governments of the other allied countries who had fought Japan during the Second
World War, had just signed a peace treaty with their former enemy the previous year,
in 1951, while a separate treaty between China and Japan remained under negotiation.
1 Chinese names in this dissertation have been transliterated using the internationally accepted pinyin
system of romanization. An exception has been made for some names more widely recognized by other
forms. For example: Chiang Kai-shek is used rather than Jiang Jieshi, and Ho Shailai is used rather
than He Shili.
2 “World Bows in Tribute to Britain’s Late Ruler,” February 16, 1952, Nippon Times.
3 Diaries of Ho Shailai (DHSL), February 15, 1952. The diaries are now in the author’s possession in
Taipei. They are available for other researchers upon request.
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The difficulty faced by negotiators of that unresolved issue centered on which
Chinese government - either the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or the Republic of
China- the Japanese should conclude the treaty with. As the first Western European
country to recognize the Chinese Communist regime in 1950, the UK hoped to have
Japan conclude the treaty with the PRC, while the US favored the other claimant,
based in Taiwan. Facing strong pressure from Washington, the Japanese government
reluctantly obeyed the Americans. It was against this background that Esler Dening,
the British Political Representative to Japan, belittled his counterpart from the ROC
with the unkinglike refusal of a handshake at the service honoring the recently
departed monarch. This episode was typical in the way it symbolized the
contemporaneous status of the ROC not only in Japan, but also in the world.
Using the lens provided by the history of the governmental delegation
representing the ROC in Tokyo during the allied occupation of Japan, this dissertation
explores how the ROC adjusted to the postwar international order between 1945 and
1952. The history of the ROC’s Chinese Mission in Japan (Chinese Mission, hereafter)
reveals a hitherto overlooked aspect of postwar China and East Asia’s Cold War
history, one coinciding with the seven-year period that witnessed the military defeat
of the Kuomintang (KMT) amidst the final phase of its incessant struggles with the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For as the KMT fought to retain control of the
Chinese mainland, the Chinese Mission at the same time vied for influence in Japan
with the three leading Allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union—and participated in trying war criminals, obtaining reparations, and
concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. In this way the Chinese Mission
endeavored to make China become an active member of the “Big Four” as envisaged
by President Franklin Roosevelt in the final years of WWII. However, as the KMT
began to lose the Chinese Civil War and was eventually driven to the island of Taiwan
by the CCP in 1949, the Chinese Mission’s standing and eminence in Japan gradually
ebbed away. Following the establishment of the PRC in October of that year, the
fundamental legitimacy of the Chinese Mission was threatened as it was challenged
continuously by the CCP and the Soviet Union. Despite the signing in 1952 of the
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agreement which officially ended the war between China and Japan and also
recognized the ROC as the legitimate Chinese government in the eyes of its Japanese
counterpart, to most Japanese the genuine image of the ROC, in comparison to the
new regime in Beijing, was little different to that of any defeated power. The title of
this dissertation “From Victory to Defeat” not only alludes to the history of the
Chinese Mission in Japan, then, but characterizes the fate of the KMT and ROC
during those seven years as well.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES ON POSTWWAR CHINA, 1945-1952
Scholarship generally fits Chinese history after the start of the Chinese Civil War
in 1945 into the standard, post-Second World War Cold War framework. This
approach has typified chronological narratives written in both Chinese (produced in
either Taiwan or mainland China) and Western historiography.4 However, the general
classification of Chinese history in this period as a part of a broader Soviet-American
Cold War history overlooks the role of the country that probably had the biggest and
most influential impact on China in the early twentieth century: Japan. As a result, and
following its capitulation in 1945, Japan’s role in Chinese history during the
immediate postwar years is largely invisible, and Japan only becomes discernable
again after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952. In writings
concerned with the Chinese Civil War, Japan’s relevance to those events are barely
considered. Where Japan does appear in discussions of the period, it is in relation to
the two core issues which have most interested scholars of those immediate postwar
years. First, those concerning Japanese reparations, and, second, the Military Tribunal
for the Far East (Tokyo Trial). But both those important histories have, by and large,
been portrayed in isolation, as events that only have limited, if any, links to the Civil
4 E. R. Hooton, The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War, 1936-49 (London: Brassey’s, 1991); Odd
Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil
War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters:
the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Zhang Xianwen (張憲
文), Zhonghua Minguo Shi (中華民國史) [The History of the Republic of China] (Nanjing: Nanjing
Daxue Chubanshe, 2006), vol. 4.
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War then unfolding in China.5 There are, however, stories of much historical interest
awaiting to be written if the typical Cold War framework used to look at China’s
immediate postwar history (dominated, of course, by the Civil War) is adjusted to
incorporate the nation who waged war against her for much of the previous two
decades. As Hans van de Ven has demonstrated, China’s war with Japan did not end
formally in 1945, but continued until a peace deal was signed seven years later, and
only after the bilateral relationship between the two neighbors had become
increasingly entwined within a geopolitical environment in which representatives of
both sides struggled for agency and influence.6 The history of the Chinese Mission in
Japan thus serves as an alternative and multivalent body for understanding postwar
Chinese history by means of its links to both Japan and the larger regional and
international contexts.
Essentially, the Chinese Civil War coincided with the Allied occupation of Japan
after the Second World War. These two contrasting histories—one of war and one of
postwar reconstruction—have rarely been juxtaposed by historians of China’s modern
history. In his study of the Chinese Civil War, a conflict which began almost
immediately after China’s victory over Japan in 1945, Arne Westad procedurally
places the Chinese Civil War into the framework of postwar US-Soviet rivalry and
argues that significant decisions of both the CCP and KMT leaderships were linked to
the attitudes and desires of the powerful supporters guiding the two sides from behind
the curtain.7 Typically regarded as the origin of the Cold War in China, is the struggle
between the KMT and CCP for control of Northeast China, as Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬)
records.8 Not long after war between the two militarized political parties broke out,
5 In recent years, China’s participation in the Tokyo Trail has generated new scholarship, including the
Shanghai Trial prior to the Tokyo Trial. See Timothy Brook, “The Shanghai Trials, 1946: Conjuring
Postwar Justice” (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015). For China’s subsidiary role in the Tokyo
Trial, see Barak Kushner,Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).
6 Hans van de Ven, China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).
7 Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950.
8 Jiang Yongjing (蔣永敬), Jiang Jieshi Mao Zedong de Tanda yu Juezhan (蔣介石毛澤東的談打與
決戰) [The Negotiations and Fighting between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong] (Taipei: Taiwan
Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2014)
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General Marshall was dispatched by Washington in late 1945 to mediate between
them, albeit in vain. The KMT then began to lose its predominant position as the Civil
War progressed and spread across Chinese territory. After becoming Secretary of State
upon his return to the USA, Marshall’s “Europe Centric” policy and frustration with
Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime then had an undoubted effect on the White House’s
China policy and the direction of the civil war.9 Indeed, there was a divergence in
opinion within the US government in 1948 on whether or not Washington should
assist Chiang’s Nationalist government—in favor of supporting the Nationalists were
the so-called “Far Eastern faction” (Douglas MacArthur and Albert C. Wedemeyer),
while the “Europe faction” (Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Marshall) opposed
providing the KMT with further backing.10 The quarrel would not end with the
victory of the CCP in 1949, but lasted until the outbreak of the Korean War the
following year. In the meantime, there were also internal disputes over whether the
United States should rebuild Japan so that it might replace China as the bastion from
where burgeoning communism in East Asia could be contained. As this dissertation
will demonstrate, events occurring in China and US policy directed towards the
divided Chinese people were not limited to China itself, but also deeply influenced the
postwar occupation of Japan, and vice versa — what happened in Japan impacted
events as they unfolded in China.
Immediately after the Second World War the ROC under KMT leadership was
designated to become a major participant in rebuilding the new postwar order in East
Asia. As Rana Mitter has noted, the Sino-Japanese War “earned China the right to
help shape the postwar world.”11 The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), a consultative
committee composed of representatives from the ROC, United States, United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union, was endowed to lead the ambitious task. However, as
Michael Schaller and many scholars have pointed out, the occupation of Japan was a
9 George C. Marshall and Lyman P. Van Slyke, Marshall’s Mission to China, December 1945-January
1947 : The Report and Appended Documents (Arlington: University Publications of America, 1976)
10 Lin Tongfa (林桶法), Yijiusijiu Dachetui (一九四九大撤退) [The Great Retreat in 1949] (Taipei:
Lianjing Chubanshe, 2009), 75.
11 Rana Mitter, “The Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance
in Contemporary East Asia” (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015), 2.
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“nominally Allied but de facto American Occupation.”12 Melvyn Leffler also
determines that Japan was “firmly in the grasp of US occupation authorities under
General Douglas MacArthur”.13 “One of the most pernicious aspects of the
occupation,” wrote John Dower in his renowned book Embracing Defeat: Japan in
the Aftermath of World War II, “was that the Asian peoples who had suffered most
from imperial Japan’s depredations – the Chinese Koreans, Indonesians, and Filipinos
– had no serious role, no influential presence at all in the defeated land.”14 As a
consequence, memoirs published by SCAP officials and scholarship dealing with the
occupation of Japan have barely noted the role of the Chinese representative to the
ACJ.15 Moreover, despite the fact that recent years have witnessed increasing interest
in studies of the occupation, the role of Chinese activity in Japan is still scarcely
touched upon.16 One scholar, Nathaniel Thayer, points out that the goal of the
Chinese Mission was, very simply, to “put priority on disarming Japan and bringing
war criminals to trial”.17 Most Chinese historians also perpetuate the straightforward
image that the function of the Chinese Mission was to deal with Japanese reparations
and the Tokyo Trial.18 Such presumptions, though, obstruct a deeper and more
nuanced understanding of the interaction between postwar China and occupied Japan.
CHINAAND THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
12 Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert A.
Wampler eds., Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001 (London : Kodansha International,
2001), 34.
13 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945-1952”, in Melvyn P.
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), Vol. 1, 77.
14 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (London: Penguin Books,
2000), 27.
15 Except for those in SCAP who had dealt with affairs involving China, very few people even
mentioned the Chinese representative’s existence. One exception is William Sebald, the State
Department officer attached to General MacArthur’s staff in Japan, who discusses interactions with the
Chinese representative in his memoir. See William Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan; a Personal
History of the Occupation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965)
16 Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,” in Melvyn P.
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1, 246-251.
17 Nathaniel Thayer, “The American Ambassadors, 1945-72,” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler
eds., Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001, 63.
18 Lu Fangshang (呂芳上) ed., Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzhengshi Xinbian (中國抗日戰爭史新編) [New
History of China’s War of Resistance against Japan] (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2015).
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The scarcity of research on China’s role in Japan after the Second World War
drew to a close is not difficult to understand on the grounds that the Allied occupation
was de facto dominated by the Americans, and especially by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur himself.19
Yet for the Chinese, taking part in the occupation alongside the other allies was a real
feather in the Nationalist government’s cap, and the KMT was eager to wield some
power in helping to demilitarize and transform Japan. But the Chinese Mission in
Japan, set up in May 1946, was almost immediately forced to concede that its voice
amongst the Tokyo-based occupiers was negligible. As several scholars have noted,
Soviet Russia’s late entry into the war against Japan diminished its bargaining
position with the Americans, blunting their efforts to help plan and then enact
occupation policy. By the same token, though China had borne the brunt of Japan’s
aggression before the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the Americans into the war, its
efforts were not viewed as the main cause of Japan’s surrender. Additionally, China’s
internal chaos deriving from the Civil War meant Japanese affairs were put on the
back burner by Nationalist officials after 1945. Thus, not only the Chinese Mission,
but Chiang Kai-shek himself, soon realized that China had little option but to
wholeheartedly support US policy in Japan, instead of naively believing that the ROC
was genuinely one of the “Big Four” powers sharing equal status with the United
States. Domestic concerns also prodded the KMT to side with the United States so as
to counter the Soviet Union’s support for the CCP threat. It was against this
background that Zhu Shiming（朱世明） , the first head of the Chinese Mission,
actively echoed General MacArthur’s policy line in order to give a helping hand to the
Americans in their own attempts to contain Russian influence in Japan. By doing so,
Zhu believed he could improve the Chinese Mission’s status in Japan as well as aid
the civil war effort at home. Observing the subtleties of this relationship, William
MacMahon Ball, head of the British Mission in Tokyo, noted in his diaries that
19 For studies on the occupation of Japan, see Grant K. Goodman, America’s Japan: The First Year,
1945-1946 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Roger Buckley, Occupation Diplomacy:
Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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“[a]pparently the Americans feel that they can generally rely on Chu’s [Zhu’s] support
and are very anxious to be able to isolate the Russians.”20 The US political advisor to
General MacArthur, William Sebald, also described his impression of Zhu:
Lieutenant General Chu Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming], the Chinese representative,
was an erect and proper professional military man. Although the only
non-American member on whom SCAP could count at that time for support, he
also had moments of protest. General Chu [Zhu] usually remained quiet and
impassive during fiery debate, regarding the proceedings with an air of detached
boredom. Yet he was quickly conscious of prerogative, and his smooth, rather
youngish face did not always hide the disdain he appeared to harbor for the
diplomatic spectacle he was obliged to witness.21
At certain points, and to avoid infuriating the Russians, the Chinese Mission
sought to ride the narrows between the world’s two emerging superpowers and not be
dashed against the rocky outcrops of either shore. Yet in general, the Chinese Mission
cooperated with US representatives and SCAP over most issues, especially after the
KMT’s defeat in the Civil War in 1949 prompted the Chinese Mission to again
demand US support. Still, even though the direction and content of occupation policy
was firmly controlled by General MacArthur, the Chinese Mission did have important
concerns in Japan outside of the well-known war crime trials and reparations issues.
The Chinese Mission’s agenda also included concerns about a new “Japanese history
textbook” and how the Japanese were looking to interpret the Sino-Japanese War in
the realm of education. Besides this particular matter, the Chinese Mission was
interested in a number of miscellaneous issues like land reform, the new Japanese
Constitution (promulgated in January 1947), parliamentary elections, and the
dissolution of Japan’s zaibatsu, its industrial and commercial conglomerates. The staff
of the Chinese Mission diligently submitted reports on all of these occupation issues,
but, as far as archival materials have demonstrated to date, SCAP mostly ignored the
input of the Chinese when making and implementing decisions. For many historians
20 William MacMahon Ball, Intermittent Diplomat: the Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. MacMahon
Ball (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1988), 36.
21 William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 128-129.
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and people who experienced the Allied occupation of Japan, the Chinese Mission and
its contributions to that history are seemingly viewed as being of little importance.
However, as contemporary scholars struggle to construct a more nuanced examination
of postwar China from an international perspective, the history of the Chinese
Mission in Japan is actually of immense significance.
That significance comes mostly from the fact that the Chinese Mission allows
historians to glimpse how, post-Second World War, China and Japan were not only
two separate countries striving for revival after suffering horror and destruction on
unprecedented levels, but were neighbors and former-enemies whose present and
future remained unavoidably intertwined. For instance, historians might be in
agreement that the founding of the PRC in 1949 was “one of the dividing points in
world history and its repercussions spread over the whole of East Asia.”22 And it is
viewed almost without controversy that Nationalist China’s muddle in the Civil War
shifted US policy-maker attitudes towards favoring Japan and encouraging her rapid
economic revival. These events, which undid restrictive policies directed against the
Japanese as support in Washington for the KMT dwindled, had an incalculable impact
on fate of both nations. Unsurprisingly, some people blamed the United States for
abandoning its Nationalist China ally in favor of Japan, its former enemy, and
inevitably contributing to the decline of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. The outbreak of
the Korean War then strengthened Japan’s position at the forefront of
anti-communism efforts in East Asia. Though the ROC, after being restricted
territorially to Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese mainland, benefited from the first
heating-up of the new Cold War, its strategic value to the United States had declined
sharply. The interpretation of these historical events brings up the value of combining
the research on postwar China and the US occupation of Japan within a framework of
international Cold War studies.
The fact that the US government appointed staff to serve in Tokyo who possessed
working experience in China further illustrates this point. On September 7, 1945, the
22 Ian Nish ed, The British Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952: Personal
Encounters and Government Assessments (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 7.
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Chinese newspaper Dagongbao (大公報 ) noted that the United States would put
George Atcheson, Jr, and John Service in charge of US Far Eastern Policy, especially
towards Japan.23 Atcheson was the first chairman of the ACJ who spoke fluent
Chinese and had worked in China prior to being assigned to Tokyo in 1945. In China,
Atcheson had been in sharp conflict with Patrick Hurley, US Ambassador to China
from January to September of 1945, over China policy and was later accused by
Hurley as being a CCP-sympathizer.24 As Michael H. Hunt noted, “Hurley had struck
Mao a blow by publicly announcing exclusive American political, economic, and
military support for the Nationalist government. And somewhat earlier, Hurley had
begun what was in time to become a full-scale purge of the government’s China
experts, whom Mao and his colleagues had carefully cultivated.”25 It was largely this
purge that had brought both Atcheson and John Service to Japan. Service had served
in the US Consulate in Chongqing during the war and participated in the Dixie
Mission, a United States Army Observation Group aiming to establish relations with
the CCP in Yen’an started in 1944. Service was accused of divulging secret
intelligence and was recalled to Washington, but later being dispatched to Japan. In
addition, US diplomat John K. Emmerson became the “official contact man with the
Japanese communists” in SCAP, owing to his experience at Yen’an in 1944
interrogating Japanese prisoners of war in the CCP’s hands and befriending future
Japanese communist leaders there.26 The commission of these US officials to Japan
was never coincidental, for MacArthur was in huge demands of US specialists on
Japan, most of whom were transferred to China during the war. Their sympathies lay
with China, either to the KMT or CCP. This caused them to support strict occupation
policies for the defeated Japanese as a result. For instance, Willliam Sebald
23 “Mei Chongni Yuandong Zhengce (美重擬遠東政策) [Redesigning US Far Eastern Policy],”
September 7, 1945, Dagongbao(Chongqing) (大公報) .
24 Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1981), 217.
25 Michael H. Hunt, “Mao and Accommodation with the U.S.,” in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs
eds., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980), 195.
26 Roger Bowen, E. H. Norman: His Life and Scholarship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016),
7. For Emmerson’s personal account, see John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S.
Foreign Service (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978).
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summarized Atcheson’s views:
Inevitably, George A. carried his China background and sympathies into the
Occupation. Although he was quick to size up factual situations and usually was
correct in his analyses, he represented at that time the “old China hand” belief in
a tough policy for Occupied Japan. Another official sharing this viewpoint, John
Stewart Service, was executive officer of the mission. Born in China, thirty-six
years earlier, Jack Service also spoke Chinese fluently and had served most of his
career in that country. During the war he was political officer on the staff of
General Joseph W. (“Vinegar Joe”) Stilwell. Service was a man of quick
perception and prodigious output.27
However, some Chinese Nationalists were dissatisfied with this arrangement. In
their eyes, a CCP-sympathizer sitting in the ACJ office in Tokyo might inconvenience
the Chinese Mission. Shen Jinding (沈覲鼎), a consultant to the Chinese Mission in
Japan, recounted his reaction when he saw Atcheson in an ACJ meeting. Shen asked
how could a person expressing such obvious sympathies for the CCP be endowed
with such a crucial position in Tokyo. Zhu Shiming responded that Atcheson’s old
colleagues were here as well because the State Department believed them to be
“China experts” and China was important with regard to Japanese problems. Shen
speculated that Atcheson played a role in things like the release of Japanese
Communists from detention, and his attitude towards such issues must be noted.28
Despite these doubts by the Nationalists over his credibility, Atcheson’s reputation for
being a Far-Eastern specialist was well-known and widely accepted. For instance,
Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂 ), who later became Japanese premier between 1946 and
1947 and once again between 1948 and 1954, expressed his own admiration for
Atcheson in his memoir:
Mr Atcheson was a career diplomat who had been stationed for many years in
China and had a reputation in the U.S State Department as a specialist on Far
27 William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 43.
28 Zhongguoguomindang Zhongyangweiyuanhui Dangshiweiyuanhui (中國國民黨中央委員會黨史
委員會) [Party History Committee of the KMT Central Committee] ed, Zhonghuaminguo
Zhongyaoshiliao Chubian (ZHMGZYSLCB, hereafter) (中華民國重要史料初編) [Preliminary
Compilation of Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China], Series 7, Vol. 4, 656.
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Eastern questions. He was a man of sterling qualities and, since he lived in the
former mansion of the Sumitomo family quite near to my official residence
during the time that I was Foreign Minister, we became very friendly.29
Tragically, Atcheson died in an air crash in 1947, after which Shang Zhen (商震),
the second head of the Chinese Mission, expressed the “profound sympathy of the
Chinese people.”30 It is impractical to evaluate the full extent to which the likes of
Atcheson and John Service influenced United States policy toward China and Japan,
as the Dagongbao had sanguinely anticipated that Atcheson would “explain Chinese
people’s viewpoints toward Japan to General MacArthur.”31 It is also difficult to
gauge whether MacArthur’s attitude towards China was influenced by them, given the
fact that from the beginning of the occupation he had been keeping his eyes on events
playing out there. Evidently, their backgrounds in China no doubt played a role in
their appointment to occupy Japan. The point is, the idea of appointing “Old China
Hands” to Japan reflects how deeply postwar US policies to Japan and China were
interconnected.
In the meantime, some of MacArthur’s policies were in part responses to events
in China. For instance, actions forbidding Japanese workers from striking in 1948
were caused by the increasing likelihood of the CCP’s military success in China. As
Gary D. Allinson noted, Macarthur was “also growing distressed by the influence of
Communists in Japan at a time when the Cold War was intensifying and Communists
in China were nearing a takeover of the mainland. In his mind these conditions called
for order and stability, rights be damned.”32 From an economic perspective, trade
between China and Japan in the postwar era was viewed as an important part of
revitalizing their war-ravaged commercial and industrial bases. For instance,
silk-production areas in China’s Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces suffered substantial
losses of silkworms and mulberry plants during the war, and productivity was reduced
29 Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1973), 56.
30 “Allied Council Pays Tribute ToAcheson,” August 21, 1947, The New York Times,
31 “Meichongni Yuandong Zhengce,” September 7, 1945, Dagongbao (Chongqing).
32 Gary D. Allinson, Japan’s Postwar History (London: UCL Press, 1997), 71.
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to 10% and 20%, respectively, of the prewar period. New silkworms and mulberry
plants were sent by SCAP from Japan to help revive Chinese production.33 The
abovementioned examples show just some of the connections between postwar China
and Japan that involved the United States and its occupation authority in Tokyo.
Japan and Germany have been regarded as two of the most important outposts at
the inception stage of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In focusing on China’s role in the occupation, I have no intention to detract from the
paramountcy of the United States in the occupation of Japan, nor do I endeavor to
overestimate China’s role in the occupation of Japan. In other words, examining the
Chinese Mission’s role during the occupation and several fateful events expands our
historical grasp of how the international order in East Asia was formed. The Chinese
Mission Japan was a microcosm of the ROC’s postwar fate in a way similar to how
the ACJ was for Cold War history in East Asia. As Gordon Daniels points out:
No one would claim that the Allied Council for Japan was a major agency of
international co-operation. General MacArthur and the Kleig lights [might refer
to SCAP] saw to that. Nevertheless its history is a significant litmus of changing
antagonisms in East Asia. In particular the alienation of the Chinese delegate
from his people, is a powerful allegory of Nationalist decline.34
LITERATURE REVIEW
Due to China’s apparently limited contribution to the Allied Occupation of Japan,
previous scholarship on the topic has barely taken China’s role into consideration. In
fact, the term ‘Chinese Mission in Japan’ has rarely appeared in published research.
Gordon Daniels, for example, delineated the KMT’s policies toward Japan under the
occupation in his article published in 1976 using the records of the ACJ.35 The
utilization of ACJ materials certainly opens another window onto the landscape of
33 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 471.
34 Gordon Daniels, “Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52,” The
Hokkaido Law Review, vol. 27, no. 2 (November 1976), 183.
35 Gordon Daniels, “Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946-52,”
165-188.
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postwar China-Japan history, but without using Chinese sources I contend that one
could sufficiently outline KMT policy by simply relying upon ACJ records.
Also, in Chinese-language scholarship, the Chinese Mission in Japan rarely
appears. The only publications are a book edited by the Chinese Mission itself dealing
with its struggle to obtain reparations from the Japanese and an analysis of the
Japanese textile industry.36 Accounts and memoirs about people inside the Chinese
Mission are relatively scarce. Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen apparently left nothing
behind, while only two other members of staff included something in their memoirs.
Shen Jingding published a long article sketching out the major contributions of the
Chinese Mission. And Zhong Hanbo（鍾漢波）, a military attaché, published a memoir
in which he focused on the restitution of looted Chinese items.37 Some overseas
Chinese stationed in Japan during the Occupation left many stories, but the Chinese
Mission is only briefly mentioned and its staff are generally dismissed as little more
than “redundant personnel”.38
The first scholarly study of the Chinese Mission was published in 2009. In it,
Taiwanese scholar Yang Zizhen (楊子震) sketched out its functions by using archival
materials located in Taiwan and Japan.39 Yang places the Chinese Mission into a
binary, China-Japan and Taiwan-Japan, structure and argues that through the lens of
the Chinese Mission one can discover the fact that postwar China-Japan relations in
36 Zhonghuaminguo Zhuridaibiaotuan (中華民國駐日代表團) [The Chinese Mission in Japan] ed.,
Zairi Banli Peichang Guihuan Gongzuo Zongshu (在日辦理賠償歸還工作綜述) [Overview of
Dealing With Reparations and Restitution in Japan] (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1980);
Zhonghuaminguo Zhuridaibiaotuan Riben Peichang ji Guihuan Wuzi Jieshou Weiyuanhui (中華民國
駐日代表團日本賠償暨歸還物資接收委員會) [Committee of Receiving Japanese Reparations and
Restitution of the Chinese Mission in Japan] ed., Riben Fangzhi Gongye zhi Fazhan ji qi Waixiao zhi
Yingxiang (日本紡織工業之發展及其外銷之影響) [The Development of Japanese Textile Industry
and Its Effect on Export] (Taipei: publisher unknown, 1950).
37 Zhong Hanbo (鍾漢波), Zhuwai Wuguan de Shiming—Yiwei Haijun Junguan de Huiyi (駐外武官的
使命：一位海軍軍官的回憶) [The Missions of a Military Attaché - Memoir of a Naval Officer] (Taipei:
Maitian Chubanshe, 1998).
38 Tian Baodai (田寶岱), Tian Baodai Huiyilu (田寶岱回憶錄) [Memoir of Tian Baodai] (Taipei:
Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2015).
39 Yang Zizhen (楊子震), “Zhongguo Zhuridaibiaotuan zhi Yanjiu: Chutan Zhanhou Zhongri Tairi
Guanxi zhi Eryuan Jiagou（中國駐日代表團之研究：初探戰後中日台日關係之二元架構）[A Study
of the Chinese Mission in Japan: The Binary Structure of the Relationship of China-Japan and
Taiwan-Japan in the Postwar Period],” Bulletin of Academia Historica, vol. 19, 47-85.
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fact overlapped with Taiwan-Japan relations, laying the foundation for the ROC’s
reincarnation on Taiwan after 1949. In all, Yang illuminates the contours of the history
of the Chinese Mission in Japan previously ignored, yet leaving much room for more
detailed study.
Recent anglophone scholarship on postwar East Asia has also begun to notice the
significance of China’s early postwar period, during which the role of the Chinese
Mission has slowly come to the surface. In Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the
United States and the Making of Taiwan, published in 2016, Lin Hsiao-ting
demonstrates that a series of accidental events led to an “unexpected” fate for Taiwan.
By exploring masses of archival material in the United States, Lin introduces the role
played by SCAP in influencing US Taiwan policy and KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek,
as well as the Chinese Mission’s role in coordinating communication between Taipei
and SCAP. In Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese
Justice, Barak Kushner examines how the KMT and CCP utilized their trials of
Japanese war criminals for military and propaganda purposes. Kushner points out that
the function of the Chinese Mission in Japan was to assist the extradition of Japanese
criminals and support the secret White Group mission. As to other functions of the
Chinese Mission in Japan, Lin focuses on its cooperation with General MacArthur
and SCAP, while Kushner stresses its participation in the repatriation of Japanese
charged with war crimes. In The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the
Korean War, David Cheng Chang brings up the Chinese Mission’s subsidiary role
during the Korean War, especially in arranging Chinese linguists to South Korea to
participate in psychological warfare.40 These studies have opened a door through
which new studies of the Chinese Mission, like the present one, might now appear.
While the Japan policy of the United States form the nucleus of studies on the
occupation of Japan, in recent years historians have begun to examine the relations
between Japan and the other countries which took part in the occupation. Most works
have focused on the nations of the British Commonwealth, especially the dominant
40 David Cheng Chang, The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2020), 125.
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role of the United Kingdom. However, diverse attitudes taken by Commonwealth
countries towards postwar Japan, especially those of Australia and New Zealand, have
generated studies on the unique relations between Japan and countries separate from
the Commonwealth as a whole.41 In general, the focus of such studies has been how
those Commonwealth countries eagerly dispatched troops to Japan, the war crimes
trials, and the conclusion of the peace treaty.42 A parallel might be found for the
present study in writing on the UK’s involvement in the occupation of Japan, since
many matters that concerned the British overlapped with those of the Chinese. But the
stories of China’s occupation in Japan are undoubtedly far more multi-faceted due to
the unique and historic relationship between the East Asian neighbors.
GENERAL HO SHAILAI
General Ho Shailai（何世禮）, also named Robert Shai Lai, is the protagonist of
this dissertation. Born in 1906 in Hong Kong, Ho was the third son of Sir Robert Ho
Tung (何東 ), an extremely influential Eurasian merchant in Hong Kong who had a
close relationship with the British ruling class.43 Ho received home tutoring in
English and Chinese and attended Diocesan Girls’ School from the age of eight. In
1925 Ho became a student at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and was
admitted to the Second Battalion of the Royal Tank Corps at Farnborough in Great
Britain before returning to China to join Zhang Xueliang’s (張學良) army in 1930.44
41 Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China, and
Korea, 1948-1953 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Ian Nish, The British
Commonwealth and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952; Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan,
1945-1952: the Occupation and the Peace Treaty (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).
42 Peter Bates, Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, 1946-52 (London: Brassey’s,
1993); Laurie Brocklebank, Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan, 1945-48
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997); James Wood, The Forgotten Force: the Australian Military
Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952 (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1998).
43 For introduction of Robert Ho Tung, see John Mark Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and
British Colonials in Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2005); Irene
Cheng, Clara Ho Tung: A Hong Kong Lady, Her Family and Her Times (Hong Kong: Chinese
University of Hong Kong, 1976); May Holdsworth and Christopher Munn eds., Dictionary of Hong
Kong Biography (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).
44 The Sphere, February 14, 1931; “Robert Ho Tung to Mr. J. H. Thomas,” UK National Archives, CO
17
After Zhang’s political downfall following the Xian Incident in 1936, Ho joined a
military corps under General Xue Yue (薛岳), a Cantonese general, and was sent to
Hong Kong to work in the intelligence service. When the United States joined the
Chinese theatre of war in the early 1940s, Chinese generals with an English
background like Ho’s were in high demand. Moreover, Ho had personal ties with
several US Military Officers with whom he had befriended during his years at the
military academy. With these advantages, Ho was dispatched to Kunming to
participate in the operation of the Chinese Expeditionary Forces to Burma under the
command of General Joseph W. Stilwell. Despite openly expressing his disdain for
Chiang Kai-shek, Stilwell described Ho years later as the “ablest logistics man in
China.”45
Owing to his incessant disputes and increasing misunderstandings with Chiang,
Stilwell was replaced by Albert C. Wedemeyer in late 1944. Ho got along well with
Wedemeyer and assisted him in securing US aid to China and improving the logistical
system of the Chinese army. As a result of his effectiveness, Ho was promoted the
Vice Commander of Logistics Bureau with Lieutenant General military rank in 1945.
In the aftermath of the war, Ho was then dispatched to Northern China to conduct
repatriation affairs. First, Ho was appointed Port Commander of Huludao (葫蘆島 )
and Qinhuangdao (秦皇島 ), two ports in Northern China, and placed in charge of
arranging the repatriation of 1,000,700 Japanese soldiers over a period of nine months.
Moreover, he was put in charge of conducting KMT troops in battle against the CCP
in the north region. In 1949, Ho returned to Southern China to coordinate logistical
operations for transference of materials to Taiwan. In 1950, Ho was then promoted to
Vice Minister of National Defense and sent to Japan to lead the Chinese Mission.
According to Ho’s son:
“Chiang said to my father: ‘You go to Japan.’ Soon after that the Korean War
broke out. General MacArthur was the top man in Japan then and my father
448/36/26.
45 “Chinese Captives Held Nationalists,” November 23, 1950, The Baltimore Sun.
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became very friendly with him. MacArthur was much more senior than my father
but treated him like a protégé. I only met MacArthur once. He would always call
my father ‘Ho’. Never by his first name.”46
Ho left Japan in 1952 after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty. One year later,
he was appointed as ROC’s representative to the United Nations’ Military Staff
Committee. During the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, Ho was entrusted to utilize his
connections to American officials to purchase ammunitions for KMT troops. As Ho’s
son recounted:
"Oh yes, my father played an important role on both the military and political
side for Taiwan. He got the US to agree to supply aid at the beginning and then
the ammunition to repel an attack from the communists across the Strait. They
were using artillery to bomb some of the islands and my father got the weapons to
return the fire. It’s a long complicated story. But he did get what his government
wanted.”47
Ho retired in 1962 and returned to manage his family business in Hong Kong. He
then travelled frequently between Hong Kong and Taipei. In Taipei, General Ho and
my family became neighbors in the same building, where I met him when I was very
young. The impressions I have of him are that he was tall and sturdy, and I remember
how, because I was a child unused to seeing foreigners, Ho’s striking Eurasian
appearance left me somewhat startled. Before he passed away in 1998, Ho handed his
diaries to my father, a man who was one of his most trusted friends, and gave him
permission to use the contents of them for future academic research. The diaries were
then preserved on my father’s bookshelves for twenty years, until I read them before
coming to the University of Cambridge to pursue my PhD. Over the years, my father
also received many letters from General Ho and listened to many of his stories. For
instance, General Ho once told my father that when he served as a lieutenant to Zhang
46 “Family History: General Robert Ho Shai Lai and Hesta Hung,”
http://www.roberthnho.com/en/FamilyHistory/The-Ho-Tung-Family/General-Robert-Ho-Shainbsp-Lai-
and-Hesta-Hung




Xueliang’s Army in the Northeast, Zhang’s soldiers laughed at his Cantonese-style
Mandarin accent when he was giving orders on the parade ground. Ho also said that
the reason why he became the ROC’s representative to the United Nations Military
Council in 1953 was because American officials had argued on his behalf by saying
that “Ho Shailai is not corrupt.” Those stories may not have appeared in Ho’s son’s
own reminiscence of the past, but certainly such anecdotes add color to and enrich
people’s understandings of modern Chinese history.
It is meaningful to compare the three heads of the Chinese Mission in terms of
their previous backgrounds. Zhu Shiming was China’s military attaché to Moscow.48
Shang Zhen was a seasoned general who studied in Japan and possessed experiences
in dealing with Japan during his service as a governor of Northern China in early
1930s. In 1944, at the same time Ho worked with General Albert C. Wedemeyer,
commander of US forces in China, Shang became head of the Chinese Military
Delegation to the United States. Obviously, having experience in dealing with foreign
military officers were amongst the prerequisites for being appointed to lead the
Chinese Mission in Japan.
Regardless of their common military service backgrounds, Ho was very different
from Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen. Ho was a Chinese general with a Eurasian
appearance that made prejudiced Chinese generals wary of him. We could surmise
that the reason Ho’s features did not, however, hinder his promotion up the ranks was
due in part to his lengthy military training and the influence of his father, Robert Ho
Tung. Moreover, Ho had connections with high-rankings US generals whom he had
known back when he was in the United States. It was against this background that Ho
was chosen by the United States to work with General Wedemeyer, and then assigned
to the United Nations in 1953. Due to his unique background, Ho possessed multiple
layers of national identity. First, he regarded himself a Hong Kong native and a
British compatriot. But, when he entered the Chinese military bureaucracy, Ho
abandoned his British citizenship and identified as a Chinese patriot of the KMT -
48 John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 43.
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while maintaining his Hong Kong origins. How Ho Shailai’s identity evolved and was
shaped by history is beyond the scope of this study, but Ho was indeed extremely
loyal to the ROC despite of his family’s century-long ties with the British.
The historical value of General Ho’s diaries is incalculable. General Ho never
wrote a memoir, nor did he ever participate in any oral-history projects. To date there
exist two books on the life of Ho Shaiali. One is a scholarly biography reliant on
newspaper sources written by the Hongkong historians Zheng Wan-tai (鄭宏泰) and
Wong Siu Lun (黃紹倫 ). Another is a quasi-biography of Ho Shailai written by a
member of the Ho family, but many annotations inside the book are problematic and
some of the stories are obviously exaggerated.49 These two books both lucidly
delineate Ho’s life, but many pivotal points, and particularly his service in Japan
between 1950 and 1952, are missing.
General Ho’s diaries, which he kept from the first day of his arrival in Japan on
June 11, 1950, until his last day in Tokyo, July 26, 1952, reveal substantial amounts of
information about his time at the Chinese Mission.50 Their content focuses on
discussions with people whom Ho met and his feelings about them. The topics he
exchanged opinions with others entail nearly every important issue facing the ROC,
including the Korean War, the peace treaty with Japan, restitution of Chinese property,
the identity of overseas Chinese, and China’s image among the Japanese public. It is
remarkable how detailed the accounts are of Ho’s interactions with foreign diplomats
in Tokyo and Chinese officials in Taipei. Ho also recorded a series of disputes about
his suitability for the role as leader of the Chinese Mission. Opponents of the
appointment in Taipei were concerned about Ho’s lack of knowledge about Japanese
political affairs and culture. After months-long debates, Chiang Kai-shek eventually
made up his mind to have Ho retain his position until the conclusion of the peace
treaty on the grounds that Ho had good relations with SCAP officials. The philosophy
49 Ho Sen (何森), Heshili Jiangjun de Chuanqi Yisheng (何世禮將軍的傳奇一生) [The Legendary
Life of General Ho Shailai] (Self-published by Ho Sen, 2011).
50 By far there exist only the diaries of William MacMahon Ball, the United Kingdom representative in
Japan, which divulged the life of a diplomat who took part in the occupation of Japan. See William
MacMahon Ball, Intermittent Diplomat: the Japan and Batavia Diaries of W. MacMahon Ball.
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exemplifies the fact that postwar Sino-Japanese diplomacy was to a great extent
affected by the United States. Although Ho himself was not a diplomat per se, as long
as he was favored by the US officials, Chiang would retain his services for the
Chinese Mission. Last but not least, Ho also wrote about his leisure activities while in
Japan. These included playing tennis with foreign diplomats as well as hosting and
attending tea parties.51 These vivid descriptions allow an historian using the diaries to
also glimpse the colorful daily life of the important historical actors who populated
this unique period of the past.
CHAPTER OUTLINE
The dissertation is comprised of eight chapters. The first chapter describes the
activities of the Chinese Mission during the Chinese Civil War. It explores how the
Chinese Mission lobbied General MacArthur to secure military assistance for KMT
troops as the military fortunes of the KMT under the command of Chiang Kai-shek
declined. Unlike previous writers who have largely neglected MacArthur’s role in the
Civil War, this chapter places MacArthur in the context of China’s political crisis and
argues that his attitude toward China, not only in the Civil War but also in the later
Korean War, was to a certain extent influenced by the Chinese Mission. This chapter
was published first in the Journal of Chinese Military History in 2019 with the title
“The “China Lobby” in Tokyo: The Struggle of China’s Mission in Japan for General
Douglas MacArthur’s Military Assistance in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949.”52
Some revisions have been made to that paper after including additional archival
sources from the United States in this period, and these are included in the present
dissertation. Another difference with the earlier paper is that chapter one only covers
events between 1946 and 1948, leaving 1949 to the second chapter because events
51 William Sebald recalled that the Occupation “quickly rehabilitated Japanese recreational facilities,
from gold links to ski lodges, and they were well patronized.” See William Sebald, With MacArthur in
Japan, 105.
52 Kan Lee, “The “China Lobby” in Tokyo: The Struggle of China’s Mission in Japan for General
Douglas MacArthur’s Military Assistance in the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1949,” Journal of Chinese
Military History, vol. 8-1 (2019), 29-51.
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that happened in that year require special treatment. Chapter two traces MacArthur’s
attitude towards and support for the KMT in late 1949, after the KMT regime had
been driven to Taiwan. The KMT sought MacArthur’s support to settle the dispute
over the island’s status, and the General assured that the status quo would not be
challenged. These promises laid the foundations for MacArthur’s Far Eastern Policy
before and after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
Chapter three examines how the Chinese Mission dealt with SCAP to arrange the
repatriation of Japanese soldiers and citizens who had remained in China (mostly in
Manchuria) at the end of the war. It also looks at how the Chinese Mission became
involved in the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union over the
latter’s refusal to collaborate and repatriate Japanese left in Siberia. Chapter four
looks at how the Chinese Mission served as the communicative channel between
SCAP and Nanjing in dealing with extraditions of Japanese criminals to be sent either
in Tokyo or Nanjing for trials. It further explores how the Chinese Mission scrambled
to gather evidence in favor of having Japanese war crimes prosecuted so as to have
the B and C classeses of war criminal trials conducted by the Chinese Mission in
Yokohama. Finally, this chapter brings out Shang Zhen’s attitude as he witnessed the
executions in Tokyo. To some extent this event signifies China’s revenge on its
Japanese aggressors, while some Chinese believe that the results of the Tokyo Trials
were disappointing.
Chapter five deals further with the reparation issue and the involvement of nearly
all the countries inside the Far Eastern Commission as negotiations became extremely
convoluted. It has a special focus on the distribution of Japanese compensation
between the four countries and how representatives clashed over these issues – as well
as America’s generosity to the Chinese. For example, on April 7, 1947, Wang Shijie
reported that the conference on reparations could not be convened because of a
disagreement about how Japanese reparations would be distributed. However, with
the support of the United States, China obtained a fifteen percent share from the
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demolition of Japanese factories.53 The Chinese Mission had been actively
investigating and visiting factories in Japan to make their wish-lists, which were in
urgent demand in China not only for economic revival but for military purpose. The
first five chapters tackle with the Civil War, repatriation, war crime trials, and
reparation respectively, but in general they are tightly correlated and constitute the
main accomplishments of the Chinese Mission between year 1946 and 1949.
The outbreak of the Korean War caused the United States government to pour
resources into Taiwan to protect the Nationalist regime from attack by the
Communists. The Korean War’s impact on the modern history of the Chinese
mainland has generated a great amount of scholarship in the past decades. As for
Taiwan, the main questions relating to the Korean War have been about how it forced
the United States to adjust its stance towards China and ensure Taiwan’s survival.54
Another question has been the Nationalist’s role in the Korean War. As John Spanier
has written, immediately after the outbreak of the conflict, Chiang was eager to send
KMT troops to join the war, but his idea was initially rejected.55 However, following
the poor performance of UN forces under the command of General MacArthur in
subsequent months, Chiang’s idea was floated again by US officials and garnered
support from Senator Joseph McCarthy and Henry Cabot Lodge.56 As James
McGovern has pointed out, in early 1951 Joseph Martin, a Republican congressman,
allied himself with General MacArthur to support the idea of relieving some of the
pressure on US-led forces by using Chiang’s forces to open a “Second Front.”57
However, neither proposal was adopted by President Harry Truman. Instead,
MacArthur’s military strategy, his disregard for Washington’s orders, and his alliance
53 Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyangweiyuanhui Dangshiweiyuanhui (中國國民黨中央委員會黨史
委員會) [Committee of the Party’s History of the KMT’s Central Committee], Guofang Zuigao
Weiyuanhui Changwuhuiyi Jilu (國防最高委員會常務會議記錄) [Minutes of Conferences of the
Supreme Committee of National Defense], vol. 9, 218-219.
54 Zhang Shuya (張淑雅), Hanzhan Jiu Taiwan? Jiedu Meiguo Duitai Zhengce (韓戰救台灣？解讀美
國對臺政策) [Did the Korean War save Taiwan? Interpreting the US policy on Taiwan] (Taipei:
Weicheng Chubanshe, 2011)
55 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge: Belknap
Press, 1959), 70-71.
56 James McGovern, To the Yalu; from the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur's Dismissal (New
York: Morrow, 1972), 138-139.
57 James McGovern, To the Yalu, 164-167.
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with the Republican’s on the Taiwan issue was, for Truman, unpalatable, and
eventually led to the head of SCAP’s dismissal in 1951. By using Ho Shailai’s diaries
in chapter six, I delve into the details of the interactions between Chiang Kai-shek and
MacArthur, regarding such events as MacArthur’s visit to Taipei in July 1950 as well
as Chiang’s ceaseless proposals to dispatch his own troops to join the Korean
battlefield and General MacArthur’s responses. Through the lens of Ho Shailai, one
could review the ROC’s role in the Korean War from an entirely different angle.
Small and insignificant it may have been, the Chinese Mission and Ho did play a
crucial role in a specific juncture of the conflict.
Chapter seven discusses some invisible battlefields, apart from the Korean War,
in which the Chinese Mission were deeply engaged. In 1950, the Chinese Mission
immersed itself in an attempt to prevent the CCP from replacing the KMT as the
occupant of the ACJ’s “Chinese seat,” and a similar effort to unseat the Nationalists
inside the United Nation. In addition, the Chinese Mission endeavored to secure
overseas Chinese support in Japan by means of keeping a close eye on the activities of
the CCP and the Taiwanese Independence Movement. The climate in which the
Chinese Mission operated by this time had changed, and it faced challenges on many
sides as a consequence of the KMT’s accruing failures in the civil war.
After Taiwan’s safety was secured by US support and a potential military
invasion from Communist China was, at least temporarily, deemed unlikely, the KMT
could focus on consolidating its Cold War position in the pro-American camp. Japan
became extremely significant for the Taiwanese, since the Korean War had changed
Japan’s status from defeated Second World War enemy to frontline Cold War ally. On
September 8, 1950, Truman asked John Foster Dulles to undertake negotiations and
organize an official peace settlement with the Japanese as soon as possible. The
resulting treaty was signed at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. This treaty
has been widely regarded as a watershed moment in East Asia and Cold War history,
one marking the beginning of a “partnership” between Japan and the United States.58
While the Americans saw the treaty as an obvious goal well-worth pursuing, the
58 Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler eds., Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001.
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problem of which government should be the Chinese representative infuriated the
Anglo-American alliance; Michael Schaller has referred to it as the “biggest hurdle”
the US had to overcome to get the treaty enacted.59 That the UK and US were unable
to reach a consensus on whether Communist China or Nationalist China should
represent the Chinese side meant that neither Mao Zedong’s government nor Chiang’s
participated in the conference.60 As a consequence, the United States urged Japan to
deal exclusively with Taiwan after the Treaty of San Francisco had been agreed,
annoying many Japanese who would have preferred to sign a deal with the PRC.
Michael Schaller argues that pressure from “Taiwan’s many friends in the U.S.
Senate” convinced Dulles to force Yoshida Shigeru to conclude a treaty with Taiwan,
even though it displeased the British.61 The “Yoshida letter” to Dulles was regarded
as a compromise by the Japanese government under American pressure, and provoked
a great deal of opposition within the Japanese administration.62 Continuing
chronologically, chapter eight moves on to examining the Chinese Mission’s efforts to
ensure the ROC’s status and relations with Japan would not be damaged by the
signing of the agreement in San Francisco Treaty and the ROC’s own treaty. Facing
with a general attitude of reluctance and opposition within the Japanese government
ahead of the signing of the unilateral agreement, General Ho Shailai actively
campaigned in Tokyo and Taipei to improve relations and the Nationalist’s position
ahead of the negotiations. Like the opening chapter, much of this chapter has also
been published previously. It was initially published in Chinese in The Journal of
History, National Cheng-Chi University (Taipei) in 2018, but the revised version
included here is augmented by a framework which discusses the central issues within
a broader international framework, especially the role played by John Foster Dulles
59 Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan and China at Fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler
eds., Partnership: The United States and Japan, 1951-2001, 40.
60 Rana Mitter, “The Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance
in Contemporary East Asia,” (Taipei: War in History and Memory, 2015), 9.
61 Michael Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at fifty,” in Akira Iriye and Robert Wampler
eds., Partnership: the United States and Japan, 1951-2001, 41.
62 Marc Gallicchio, “Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy,




The central argument running through the sum of this dissertation’s seven main
parts, as I summarize in the conclusion, is that post-Second World War Chinese
history should not be placed only in the single, China narrative of Civil War, the
Korean War, and the Taipei Treaty, but should be examined using a broadly inclusive
approach in which the countries of the United States, Japan, and China were all
deeply interconnected. For the United States, as Nathaniel Thayer has summarized,
the status of Japan shifted from that of “an enemy state to being a reluctant ally to
being an equal partner”.64 The Sino-Japanese relationship followed the same course,
an evolution best represented by changing role of the Chinese Mission in Japan. At
the beginning, the Mission’s role was that of victor and superior. With the changing
status of Japan in the year that followed, however, the Chinese Mission had to adjust
itself to a new geopolitical environment. To a great extent, the negotiations prior to
the signing of the Taipei Treaty were a humiliation for the Chinese Mission, a body
whose position had fallen to that of “petitioner” rather than the proud “victor” it had
been immediately after the War of Resistance against Japan had been won.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE “CHINALOBBY” IN TOKYO
Immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, China was committed
to dispatching its own force to occupy Japan for the dual-purpose of demonstrating its
new international status and appeasing the Chinese people’s desire for revenge. After
preparation lasting nearly a year, this plan was eventually laid aside by the ruling
KMT government as the progress of the Chinese Civil War became less certain.
Indeed, as the KMT’s military fortunes in that conflict declined under the command
of Chinese President and head of the KMT Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Mission in
Japan was given an additional assignment: lobby General MacArthur in order to
secure military assistance from SCAP. The Chinese Mission received this order after
US President Harry Truman terminated his country’s provision of aid to Chiang’s
regime following the failure of the Marshall Mission in 1947. Hence, then, the urgent
need to turn to General Douglas MacArthur, who, as the most influential American
representative in Asia, was thought to be in a position to continue military aid to the
KMT in some form. The subsequent interactions between the Chinese Mission in
Japan and General MacArthur during the Civil War years of 1946 to late-1948
constitutes the main focus of this chapter, with the events of 1949 and after covered in
the next chapter. From MacArthur’s viewpoint, although Chinese affairs were beyond
his domain of responsibility, events occurring within the borders of Japan’s former
foe and the US’ wartime-ally would strongly influence his occupation policy. As a
result, MacArthur grudgingly became involved in the unfolding Chinese Civil War. It
was therefore against this background that the Chinese Mission in Japan began to
serve as a second “China Lobby” in Tokyo, operating while the official one in
Washington actively urged President Truman to reconsider his decision to withdraw
American assistance given to Chiang’s faltering regime.
ZHU SHIMING, WANG ZHI AND THE CHINESE OCCUPATIONAL FORCES
Because the position was a symbol of China’s victory over Japan after decades
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of Japanese aggression in China, Chiang Kai-shek paid special attention to the
selection of his representative to the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). And the
appointment was doubly crucial for Chiang because the person selected for the role
would also serve as the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The Chinese Mission
was composed of four sections, which were in charge of military, diplomatic,
economic and overseas Chinese affairs. There were approximately 120 staff in the
mission, most of whom were selected from the Chinese government.
Based on his abundant experience in foreign military affairs, in February 1946
the Executive Yuan appointed Zhu Shiming to what was a new and important
position.65 Born in 1898, Zhu studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
the Virginia Military Institute and received his PhD degree from Columbia University.
After returning to China in 1926, Zhu became an aide to Chiang. Then, from 1937 to
1943, Zhu served as the Military Attaché to the Chinese Embassies in Moscow and
Washington.66 As a representative whose role required him to negotiate with both the
Russians and Americans, Zhu’s background in those two countries, as well as his
fluency in English, made him perhaps the most suitable candidate for the job of
leading the Chinese Mission and representing China at the ACJ.
Amongst the other candidates perhaps considered by Chiang, Wang Zhi (王之)
may have been one likely option. When the United States joined the Second World
War’s East Asian theatre in 1942, a communication channel was set up between the
military headquarters of General MacArthur and Chiang Kai-shek. Wang, a West
Point graduate who was stationed in the Philippines before the start of the Pacific War,
was the person placed in charge of ensuring communication flowed freely between
the two allies.67 A scholar summarized his wartime résumé as follow:
Because of Wang’s ability in English and his affiliation with West Point, Chiang
65 “Waijiaobu to Guominzhengfu Wenguanchu,” February 7, 1946, Guoshiguan,
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Kai-shek appointed him as China’s liaison officer to the United States Army
under General MacArthur in 1941. During the Second World War, Wang was
stationed with the U.S. forces in the Philippines and Australia. On October 25,
1943, he flew from Perth to Sri Lanka and over the “hump” to the wartime
capital of Chongqing (Chungking) to personally deliver MacArthur’s battle plans
to Chiang Kai-shek. During the signing of Japan’s formal surrender on the
Missouri, Wang was one of four members of the Chinese delegation.68
After the Allies’ victory, Wang served as the Chief Chinese Liaison in Tokyo,
arranging postwar affairs while Allied-occupational policy remained unclear. On
September 30 Wang provided a update of the latest information about the situation in
Japan under MacArthur’s rule, reporting that he had asked SCAP to keep close tabs
on former Chinese officials of the Manchukuo puppet regime who had fled to Japan
but were now awaiting repatriation to China.69 As the British representative in
London noted, “Military Liaison Mission (To SCAP) under General Wan Chih [Wang
Zhi], still existing independent of Chinese Member of Council. Nine members
including two Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives. On good but not intimate
terms with SCAP.”70 Yet despite Wang Zhi’s two-year work experience stint serving
under General MacArthur, it is debatable whether Chiang might have chosen him to
lead the Chinese Mission and act as representative to the ACJ. One explanation for
Chiang’s final choice may be that Wang had little experience working in the sphere of
China’s domestic affairs, which, in the end, would made him a less suitable choice
than Zhu.
According to the Potsdam Declaration, China could send troops to partake in the
Allied occupation of Japan. In the wake of the Japanese capitulation, when assessing
the feasibility of having Chinese troops sent to Japan for the occupation, the US
Commanding General China Theater reported on November 10, 1945, that “due to
unsettled conditions in China it would not be possible to send Chinese occupational
forces to Japan for several months and that “the Gimo regrets very much inability to
68 Stacey Bieler, "Patriots" or "Traitors"?: A History of American-Educated Chinese Students
(Armonk, NY : M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 63-64.
69 Wang Zhi to Chiang Kai-shek,” September 30, 1945, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00013-296.
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participate and will do so should local situation clarify”.”71 He spoke just at the time
General Marshall was in the midst of conducting mediation between the KMT and the
CCP, and Marshall did not anticipate the impending Chinese Civil War impeding
Chinese troops being transferred to Japan - as he indicated to President Truman on
February 9, 1946: “China should announce her intention to send troops into Japan.
Generalissimo was previously forced to state his inability to do this, but under present
and prospective circumstances I think he will make the offer shortly, on my
suggestion, the movement to be initiated about May 1.” Marshall also stressed the
necessity of sending Chinese troops to occupy Japan in order to demonstrate its
international standing: “China would now be ready to carry the Manchuria issue to the
Far Eastern Commission, with definite evidence of unification, with the
embarrassment of the presence of American combat troops removed, and with her
status dignified by the fact of her troops having joined the Allied Occupation Forces
in Japan.”72 On the other hand, as Shang Zhen told Gu Weijun on February 18, 1946,
General Albert Wedemeyer opposed the idea of dispatching Chinese troops to Japan.
Both Shang and Gu believed his opinion was groundless, and Gu believed that China
must put all efforts to fulfill its obligation since China’s status as a big country was
obtained with bitterness.73
Many Chinese officials, including Zhu Shiming, shared a view similar to
Marshall’s, believing that even though Civil War was seemingly inevitable,
occupation troops should still be dispatched to Japan. As MacMahon Ball recounts in
his diaries, Zhu told him that “he would be very glad when the Chinese military forces
arrived to share in the occupation. He thought it desirable to have more troops here in
case there were disturbances by the ‘extreme left.’ This suggested to me that perhaps
he shares something of MacArthur’s aversion to communists.”74 Dai Jian（戴堅）,
who had led the Chinese expeditionary army in fighting the Japanese in Burma, was
71 “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman),” November 21, 1945,
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72 “General Marshall to President Truman,” February 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Vol. 9, 429.
73 Gu Weijun, Guweijun Huiyilu (顧維鈞回憶錄) [The Memoir of Gu Weijun] (Beijing: Zhonghua
Shuju, 1987), Vol. 5, 655.
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selected to command the Chinese Occupation Force, which was composed of General
Du Yuming’s (杜聿明 ) Honorary Second Division, later renamed the sixty-seventh
Division. As the Nippon Times noted, “Maj. Gen. Chien Tai [Dai Jian], Division
Commander of the Chinese troops to occupy Japan, accompanied Gen. Chu and Gen.
Lee, and will head the advance echelon for the Chinese Occupation Forces”.75 On
June 16, a Chinese newspaper noted that the Chinese occupation forces were already
stationed in Shanghai and ready to depart.76 One month later, on July 15, Dai Jian
reported Chiang that his forces were ready and “the morale was high.”77 On July 20,
1946, a draft agreement on the function of the Chinese Occupation Force in Japan was
signed by Zhu and General Paul J. Mueller, who acted as General MacArthur’s
representative. This agreement anticipated the size of the Chinese Occupation Force:
It is understood that the strength of the Chinese Occupation Force will be
determined by inter-governmental decision. It is also understood that the
Chinese Occupation Force will maintain a basic organization of one
Infantry Division with suitable ground service supporting elements and will
probably total approximately 15,000 personnel…It is also understood that
progressive reduction will be made in the Chinese Occupation Force from
time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in other Allied
Forces in Japan. 78
In MacArthur’s original blueprint, as Macmahon noted in his diaries, the Nagoya
area was reserved for the expected Chinese Occupation forces.79 However, objections
to China sending troops were raised by other allies, especially the United Kingdom. In
June 1946, Robertson, a British officer, “expressed great anxiety about what would
happen when the Chinese Division arrived in Japan. He thought it unlikely that they
were properly trained to be occupation troops and probably very much ill-feeling
75 “China Generals Back from Trip,” May 30, 1946, Nippon Times.
76 “Shiwen Jianxun (時聞簡訊)[News Summaries],” June 16, 1946, Yishibao (Tianjin) (益世報)
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77 “Daijian to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 15, 1946, Guoshiguan, 001-072470-00018-007.
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Vol. 8, 330-331.
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would develop between them and the Japanese people.”80 Despite British concerns, it
was the ensuing Chinese Civil War, rather than opposition from the United Kingdom,
that stopped Chinese troops being sent to Japan. Instead, the Chinese Occupational
Force was dispatched not to Japan, but deployed to fight the Communist forces of
Mao Zedong in China.81 As Samuel C. Chu, son of General Zhu Shiming,
summarized, “the Chinese had ordered an occupation force of 10,000 men, drawn
from Chiang’s elite force, to assemble in Shanghai in preparation for passage to
Nagoya. But again this force was never sent, in part because China lacked both the
funds and the ships to carry out this scheme. Instead a unit of thirty men was sent to
Tokyo as guards for the Mission. Subsequently even this token unit was
withdrawn.”82 As one historian pithily summarized, the KMT “too had initially hoped
to contribute military forces; but, in spite of inducements, the increasing civil war
there made this impossible.”83
KMT historiography intentionally ignores the fact that Chiang was firm in his
desire to dispatch troops to Japan, and claims, rather, that Chiang, after the end of the
conflict with Japan, rejected the chance to dispatch troops to Japan in order to prevent
the Russians from occupying Hokkaido, in northern Japan. Zhang Weihan (張維翰), a
KMT member, even claimed years later that “The Japanese people still believe to date
that if the Soviet Army stationed in northern Japan, even if Japan escaped the
communist fate of the Chinese mainland under Mao, it would still inevitably separate
into two countries, such as is the case in Korea, Vietnam and Germany.”84
As a victor of the Second World War, dispatching its own troops to occupy Japan
was of great psychological significance to the Chinese. Besides dealing with the chief
issues of war crime trials and Japanese reparations, in 1946 the major concern of the
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Chinese Mission in Japan was that of the occupation forces. Yet, the plan faced many
obstacles and was eventually abandoned once negotiations between the KMT and the
CCP broke down in late 1946. After that development, not only could the Nationalist
government no longer contribute troops to the occupation, but it itself required
additional military assistance from SCAP. It was against this background that the
Chinese Mission in Japan began to approach MacArthur to secure his support for
Nationalist China.
THE FIRST CONTACT: GAUGING MACARTHUR’S ATTITUDE
The first confrontation between the KMT and CCP after the War of Resistance
had been won was over the recovery of areas that, during the war, had been occupied
by the Japanese army and to whom the Japanese should surrender. Given the mission
of coordinating the surrender of Japanese forces in Asia, MacArthur urged, in line
with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the soldiers of the imperial army to
surrender themselves to the Nationalists, but not to the Communists.85 A message
sent from President Truman to Chiang also stated that “General MacArthur will direct
the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese forces in China, other
than those opposing the Russians, surrender unconditionally to you or your
subordinate commanders.”86 Despite airing his thoughts about the Japanese surrender
in China, MacArthur himself did not want to become involved in the Chinese affairs.
According to General Wedemeyer, for example, MacArthur rejected a proposal that he
deployed seven divisions to Manchuria to counter-balance the Soviets.87 At that
moment in time, MacArthur was clearly immersing himself entirely in Japanese
affairs; the strife in China was outside of his immediate purview.
Only when Soviet actions became aggressive, as when Soviet forces raided
Japanese assets in Northeast China (Manchuria), did MacArthur begin to pay attention
85 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 308.
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to the Soviet Union’s movements on the Asian mainland. On February 1, 1946,
MacArthur exchanged opinions on Soviet industrial demands in Manchuria with
Averell Harriman, who had just completed a three-year posting as American
ambassador to the Soviet Union, and was then on his way back to the United States.
When Harriman read to MacArthur cables he sent to Washington in which he urged
opposing Soviet demands in Manchuria with “every means at our disposal”, the
genral replied to the diplomat that, “I wouldn’t change a word.”88 But MacArthur still
had no intention of getting directly involved in the tussle for Northeast China. On
February 22, when Marshall asked MacArthur whether he could “spare sixty junior
officers and equal number of noncommissioned officers to run the elementary school
for infantry and artillery officers and for division and corps staff officers”, MacArthur
rejected the proposal.89
Nevertheless, while immersing himself in Japan’s affairs and showing little
concern for the situation on the ground in China, MacArthur was still willing to meet
with Chiang Kai-shek as soon as circumstances would allow. On March 23, Wang Zhi
reported that MacArthur had expressed his willingness to meet with Chiang at a
ceremony to be held in the Philippines on July 4, marking the day of national
independence, and at which, he and President Truman would both be present.90 July
1946 was also the month when Marshall advised the US government to cease the
provision of military material to the Nationalist government in order to preempt any
communist charge that US assistance was arming Chiang Kai-shek’s army.91 For the
KMT, seeking assistance from MacArthur quickly became an alternative option for
receiving foreign military assistance when the truce between it and the CCP finally
disintegrated and Civil War resumed on July 13. Soon after combat between the two
sides resumed, the KMT forces were dealt a significant blow in Northern Jiangsu by
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CCP forces under the command of Su Yu (粟裕), triggering the request of assistance
from MacArthur. Soon after, on August 11, a proposal for strengthening contact
between the Chinese Mission and MacArthur was written by Wang Zhi. As Wang
wrote, even though China was one of the four allied powers occupying Japan, it did so
in name only. Wang urged the Mission to develop and pursue its own standpoint.
Wang believed that it had become paralyzed between the two Superpowers and was
only busy maintaining benign relationships with them. Wang suggested that the
Chinese Mission had adopted a “sit on the fence” attitude, which would lead neither
to it obtaining assistance from the Soviet Union, nor to it gaining the full confidence
of the United States. Wang thus broached the idea of paying greater attention to
obtaining practical benefits, rather than struggling for purely-superficial status;
Wang’s report offered two solutions:
(1) The Mission should strengthen military and economic connections between
our country and General MacArthur’s Headquarters. We should obtain
military assistance and materials from Japan, and in the future these can be
used in the preparation for international wars.
(2) The Mission should understand MacArthur’s unique power in governing
Japan and immediately request to take possession of factories, dockyards,
and machine equipment that have already been listed as Japanese reparations.
For instance, Kawasaki dockyard, Kure dockyard, Kobe steel factory, and
Mitsubishi fourteenth aircraft factory are all on the list of reparations.
However, some machines are damaged because our country failed to have
them transported back to China at the earliest possible time. The scale and
equipment of Japan’s scientific research institutions – especially institutions
for aircraft manufacturing – are nearly equal to those of England and the
USA. These institutions could be used as reparations as well, and we should
try to obtain them as soon as possible.92
This proposal had a significant impact on the KMT. After reading this Wang’s
ideas, Chen Cheng, chief of staff of the KMT army, asked Chiang Kai-shek to order
the Chinese Mission to revise its “sit on the fence” attitude, repeating the term that
92 “Wang Zhi to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 11,1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-061. Zhu’s “sit
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Wang had used, and recommended China send another person to serve as Chiang’s
special envoy to MacArthur.93 At this point time, however, MacArthur’s support was
not sought urgently, since KMT troops were still dominating the battlefields even after
the reverses in Northern Jiangsu. Still, to counter-balance Marshall’s increasingly cool
treatment, the KMT wanted to establish a connection with MacArthur to maintain
close relations with at least one senior US military figure as a way to win support for
their military campaigns against the communists. Although fully-occupied in Tokyo,
MacArthur apparently kept one-eye on events unfolding in China and, given the
opportunity, adopted a friendly posture to the Chinese people. In July MacArthur told
James Forrestal, US Secretary of Navy, that “the administration ought to do more to
halt the Communist advance in China.”94 MacArthur also told him that while Chiang
and his regime “might not be the best in the world,” they “were on our side and
should be supported.”95 As Sebald recalled, “[a]lthough the General seldom attended
the frequent social functions which characterized official life, he was on hand early
with Mrs. MacArthur for the Chinese celebration of the traditional Double Ten
(October 10) national holiday in 1946.”96 MacArthur’s ambivalence towards Chinese
affairs was identified by American journalist Mark Gayn, who recounted how a
member of “MacArthur’s Inner Circle” told him, in November of 1946, that:
General MacArthur firmly believes that Japan has replaced China as the pivot of
our policy for Asia. He believes the Chinese Nationalist administration to be
incompetent and shot through with corruption. He fears that if we identify
ourselves with it, we may “lose face” throughout Asia. But if he firmly believed
in nonintervention in China before, he has gradually been coming over to the
view that military force should-and could-be employed to halt the spread of
Chinese Communism.97
Although the accuracy of this information divulged by somebody from
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MacArthur’s “inner circle” might be questionable, it does represent the mentality of
MacArthur in the years to come. The question would be to what extent would
MacArthur become involved in Chinese affairs if the worsening situation in China
affected Japan’s revitalization, and to what degree would he let that involvement
encumber him? For MacArthur, the ideal solution would surely be for directly
military assistance to continue coming from Washington, without responsibility being
passed through his hands.
Back in China, in late 1946 KMT troops recovered Zhangjiakou, Siping, and
Andong. With these successes, the KMT firmly believed its military predominance
would soon bring them victory in the Civil War. As a consequence, despite setting up
a direct connection with MacArthur, no specific request for military assistance was
made by the Chinese Mission. In the months that followed, the KMT became more
conscious of MacArthur’s attitude toward China, particularly after Marshall
announced his departure on January 6, 1947. One day later, on January 7, Zhu
Shiming wrote a report to Yu Jishi (俞濟時), a close confidant of Chiang, in which he
gauged MacArthur’s stance toward China:
The policies on China in the United States government belong to Marshall, who
is quite influential with the Secretary of War. MacArthur should be wary of it and
will not go further. Besides, MacArthur is quite satisfied with his current tasks in
Japan and is not interested in Chinese affairs, except for the issue of Northeast
China with regard to the Soviet Union, and does not have any opinion on them. I
will further investigate his attitude and meet him in the near future.98
In fact, MacArthur disavowed Marshall’s mediation in China. As Michael
Schaller summarized:
In meetings with Dwight Eisenhower, Herbert Hoover, and James Forrestal
during 1946, MacArthur said little about Japan’s economic muddle. He spoke,
instead, about oriental psychology and American politics. Eisenhower, he
charged, was a “slave to the press,” a poor chief of staff, and an “enemy” of West
Point. Instead of wasting time on a “2000 to 1” shot mediating China’s civil war
98 “Zhu Shiming to Yu Jishi,” January 7, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00005-317.
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(and generating publicity for a presidential campaign!), Marshall ought to send
military aid to Chiang….By undermining Chiang Kai-shek and pushing radical
nostrums on SCAP, the administration would force Tokyo “to go Communist
both to get free and secure Russian protection.” Truman’s main interest seemed
sabotaging MacArthur’s effort to construct an “ideological dam in the
Pacific…against the Asiatic tide of Communism”.99
Zhu’s motivation of keep abreast of MacArthur’s thinking was not because the
Nationalists wanted him to take part in the Civil War, but to use his status in
Washington to either maintain US support to China or to assure certain significant
American individuals would offer their support to the Nationalists if and when needed.
Within a week, Zhu successfully “investigated” MacArthur’s viewpoints. On January
15, 1947, Zhu paid a visit to MacArthur and summarized their conversation in a report
to the Foreign Ministry. They discussed twelve issues but none of them directly
involved the Chinese Civil War. According to Zhu, MacArthur strongly praised
Chiang for the completion of China’s constitution. Besides this, MacArthur invited
the Chinese government to dispatch two warships to participate in the occupation.
With regards to Washington’s China policy, MacArthur “slightly criticized” the last
speech Marshall made in China while stating that Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s speech,
made a few days before Zhu met with MacArthur, represented the majority opinion
within the United States.100 The Senator’s speech to which MacArthur referred was
one made on January 11 in which Vandenberg urged the US government take a more
sympathetic posture toward Chiang.101 It is difficult to evaluate, though, whether
Vandenberg’s opinions was predominant amongst the political class in the United
States, as MacArthur told Zhu it was. MacArthur also echoed Vandenberg’s opinion
of increasing assistance to the Nationalists. Again, however, MacArthur believed that
any assistance should come directly from Washington, not Tokyo.
SHANG ZHENAND THE INCREASING DEMAND FOR US SUPPORT
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In 1947, the Nationalist’s military position deteriorated rapidly. In January and
February, Nationalist troops suffered massive losses in the Lunan (魯南) and Laiwu
( 萊 蕪 ) battles in Shandong, after which Chiang reprimanded his high-ranking
generals for their frailty and selfishness.102 The fiasco in Shandong may have alerted
Chiang to the need to re-think the issue of obtaining military assistance from the
United States. On February 22, 1947, the same day he scolded his generals for their
ineptitude, Chiang cabled Zhu asking him to return to Nanjing in late February “to
discuss something.”103 The details of the meeting have yet to be made public, but it is
likely that Chiang wanted Zhu to travel to the United States to make a new case for
providing the KMT with military assistance. Zhu then spent his final weeks in Tokyo
finishing up his work before departing. Then, on March 5, he proposed a topic for
discussion for a meeting of the ACJ: “Policies and Programs for Repatriated and
Demobilized Persons”.104 Zhu used the meeting to promote his accomplishments in
Japan. For MacMahon Ball “[the meeting] was only interesting in that Chu
reappeared after some month’s absence. Time and visiting Chinese journalists were
also there, taking photos of Chu [Zhu].”105 On April 15, the Executive Yuan made the
decision to replace Zhu with General Shang Zhen.106
Like Zhu, Shang possessed experience in international affairs, but he also had
more experience than his predecessor in China’s domestic administrative and military
affairs. As a significant figure within the Yan Xishan (閻錫山 ) clique, Shang had
joined Chiang’s faction in 1931. During the War of Resistance, Shang participated in
several battles and became the commander of the Sixth War Zone in Hunan in 1940,
before being appointed as the director of the Military Affairs Commission Foreign
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Affairs Bureau in 1941.107 As the director in charge of all foreign interactions with
Chinese troops, Shang worked closely with General Joseph W. Stillwell, who called
him a “stooge staff general.”108 In 1943, Shang accompanied Chiang to attend the
Cairo Conference.109 Thereafter, Shang’s role in China’s international affairs
increased in prominence, and he was later appointed as Chief of the Chinese Military
Mission to the United States in 1944, where he frequently pleaded with his hosts, on
behalf of the Nationalists, for US weapons to help repulse Japanese attacks.110 In
1946, Shang served as the chief Chinese delegate to the Military Staff Commission of
the United Nations, with He Yingqin (何應欽 ) replacing him that October.111 The
reason why Chiang wanted Shang to replace Zhu as head of the Chinese Mission in
Japan is debatable, but Shang’s experience in dealing with the US and acquiring
military aid to China during the War of Resistance may have played a role. Despite
his warlord background, Shang was also closer to Chiang.
As Shang succeeded Zhu in Tokyo, the fighting in China’s Northeast continued.
On May 13, CCP troops under the command of Lin Biao (林彪 ), commander of
CCP’s Northeastern Army, initiated a fifth offensive. On the same day, Shang and
MacArthur met in Tokyo, with MacArthur showing his concern for the situation
across the China Sea. Shang replied that the Nationalists were confident of defeating
the CCP forces. According to a telegram sent to Chiang, Shang told MacArthur:
There is progress everywhere in China. Shandong is the place where the major
forces of bandits [CCP] are located, the Nationalists troops are encircling them
with armies and air force. Several days-ago our army conquered Tai’an, and
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there will be bigger successes in the following days. While the situation in
Shanxi is a little bit tense, forces in Suiyuan and Shaanxi could assist if need be.
The victory in Shandong will easily solve the problem in Shanxi.112
Shang also passed-on the information that, MacArthur showed his “admiration
for Chiang’s determination and colossal excitement” after hearing the news, and told
Shang to cooperate closely with him and meet him at any time to discuss anything.113
However, Shang’s prognostication was immediately proved wrong. Three days after
the meeting in Tokyo, the CCP were victorious in the Battle of Menglianggue (孟良崮)
in Shandong, in which the seventy-fourth division, one of the five best-equipped
divisions of KMT troops, was exterminated. This catastrophe shook the KMT’s
confidence and greatly encouraged the CCP.114 On May 20, a large-scale student
demonstration opposing the Civil War was dispersed by the police. This
demonstration was followed by series of student movements in China’s major cities,
most of which were organized by the CCP and greatly harmed the image of the KMT.
In the Northeast, the Battle of Siping (四平) broke out on June 11, and the CCP were
again the victors, conquering the city on June 22. Yet, while the CCP was forced to
retreat again eight days later, the battle resulted in significant KMT casualties and the
near-total depletion of American supplies in the Northeast. The bad news certainly
reached MacArthur, as he told news correspondents that events in China were to the
“misfortune to Japan.”115 A report written by the Canadian representative in Japan in
mid-October underlined MacArthur’s feelings: “He believes China is currently in a
mess. He rebuked the corruption and ineptitude of the current government. While
saying so, he still believes that it would be a mistake for the USA not to assist the
Nationalists more effectively in the war against the Communists.”116
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Around the same time, MacArthur cabled John Leighton Stuart stressing that,
“although I uphold democracy in Japan I never oppose China obtaining US support,”
adding, “I deeply agree with the concurrent anti-communist battle in China and am
hopeful this will dissipate Nationalist China’s misunderstanding of me.”117 Within
three months, MacArthur’s attitude toward the Chinese Civil War had rapidly changed
following the KMT losing the upper-hand in Shandong. When MacArthur became
fully-aware of the KMT’s military ineptitude, which was so evident that Shang had no
opportunity to refute it, Zhu Shiming was extremely active in the United Kingdom
and the United States. Duan Maolan (段茂瀾 ), Minister-Counselor of the Chinese
Embassy in London, disclosed the purpose of Zhu’s activity in an informal
conversation on September 16, 1947:
General Chu Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming] had left London September 15th by air for
New York. According to Tuan [Duan], Chu is going to New York for the
ostensible purpose of serving as one of China’s delegates to the general
Assembly meeting of the United Nations. However, his real mission, according
to Tuan, is to assist Dr. Wang Shih-chieh [Wang Shijie], Chinese Foreign
Minister, in talks which the latter hopes to have with the Secretary. The purpose
of these talks, Tuan said, would be to seek American aid for China.118
By September 1947, the CCP and the Red Army were in the ascendancy in China.
“The Government had made little progress in its campaign against the Communists,”
recounted a document relaying a speech made by Zhu in London. “The Government’s
campaign against the Communists had taken a favorable turn in Shantung [Shandong]
just before his departure from China. But even in Shantung the Government forces
had suffered several reverses and there had been four changes of commanders in
recent months,” it continued. Moreover, Zhu had also “remarked that the American
Military Advisory Group in China had contributed little to the training of Chinese
forces, adding that the group was concentrated in Nanking and that General Lucas had
virtually no access to the Generalissimo and that he rarely saw General Chen
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Cheng.”119 In his words, then, Zhu was attributing the military failures of the KMT to
the inefficiency of American assistance and implied that the situation would
deteriorate further if the United States could not provide more and better assistance.
On September 30, Wang Shijie met Truman in Washington to discuss the critical
situation in Northeast China. Wang mentioned that some people were proposing that
the KMT abandon the Northeast in order to shorten their battle front, something to
which the KMT would never agree.120 Nor did Truman favor this solution, but he still
refused to offer direct military aid to China. Frustrated and irritated, Wang Shijie paid
a visit to MacArthur in Japan in October. Before Wang’s arrival, on October 20,
MacArthur received a personal note from General Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer had just
finished an investigative tour of China. In the letter, he warned how acute the situation
in China was, “[w]e are focusing our attention and efforts in Western Europe while
dangerously destructive forces are moving successfully forward in the Far East.121
This warning put MacArthur in a dilemma. As the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, MacArthur’s main task was to rebuild Japan as a reliable ally of the United
States while Chinese affairs were not, as we have seen, within his jurisdiction or
responsibility (As Michael Schaller summarized: the General “commanded military
occupation forces in Japan and southern Korea and, after 1947, the regional Far
Eastern Command. He did not, however, exercise authority over American forces in
China.”122). However, as the KMT was about to lose Manchuria, potential Soviet
dominance over the region would directly threaten Japan. According to a Chinese
newspaper, MacArthur clearly believed by this time that the situation in Asia was,
from an American perspective, deteriorating sharply, particularly as the southern half
of Korea had fallen into the hands of the communists while China’s fate remained
unsettled. This Chinese source accurately sensed that “internal turmoil in China
severely hampered economic revitalization in Japan.” For instance, over the course of
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the previous fifteen years, Japan had relied upon grain and other foodstuffs being
shipped from Northeast and Northern China, but this supply line had been cut by the
civil war. By the same token, exports of Japanese textiles and light industrial products
were significantly circumscribed.123 Despite this, MacArthur endeavored for as long
as possible to remain aloof from the Chinese Civil War, even as its influence on Japan,
both politically and economically, began to spread.
THE FALL OF THE NATIONALISTS
On December 6, 1947, Tang Zong (唐縱), a high-ranking official in the Military
Intelligence Bureau, proposed the idea of using Japanese bullet-production machines
to produce artillery in China. Shang Zhen was ordered to realize this proposal.124
Nearly a week later, on December 12, Chiang telegraphed Shang to “negotiate with
General MacArthur.”125 After negotiations in Japan, Shang could only reply, however,
that the machines were to be destroyed in accordance with an earlier ruling by SCAP.
Shang then proposed that Wellington Koo negotiate with the Far Eastern Committee
to an convince them to make an exception for China. But Shang also pointed out that
there was, amongst the 9,447 machines China had already received from Japanese
reparations, a portion that could be used to produce ammunition.126
If the year 1947 can be regarded as the turning point of the KMT-CCP civil war,
1948 would be a precipitous catastrophe for the Nationalists. Early that year, the CCP
initiated a winter offensive in Northeast China, posing the greatest threat to KMT
forces in Manchuria since the end of the War of Resistance. On February 15, a final
attempt to revive the idea of mobilizing the remnant Japanese troops in local areas
was once again proposed. In fact, the idea of using Japanese soldiers had been
adopted earlier – after Chiang had begrudgingly given permission – with “Japanese
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soldiers doing guard duty or even patrolling the streets.”127 And with the situation in
the Northeast becoming increasingly unfavorable for the KMT, Chiang had no option
but to again adopt the idea. Yet Chiang ordered specifically that the matter not be
relayed to SCAP.128 The Generalissimo clearly understood that MacArthur would
oppose the use of Japanese forces by the Nationalists.
At about that same moment, MacArthur was in the midst of contemplating
whether or not to compete in November’s US presidential election. When Zhu
Shiming approached the General about the possibility of him being elected, the
General replied that, “it would be a miracle.” After Zhu enquired further about what
the outcome would be if such a “miracle” happened to occur, MacArthur answered,
“it would be the best opportunity for your country as well as President Chiang.”129
While the veracity of this conversation might be doubtful, it is not unrealistic to
assume that MacArthur would offer more assistance to China to contain the spread of
communism in East Asia if he were elected to the White House. In practical terms,
however, what MacArthur was able to do at this moment was show his generosity to
China. While disapproving of its quest for an increased share of Japanese reparations,
MacArthur did appropriate the American’s share for Chinese use. On February 28,
1948, Chiang cabled MacArthur to thank him for his assistance in both selling and
giving US surplus war material from the Pacific Area to China.130 MacArthur’s
support for the KMT also encouraged Republicans in the United States. On March 3,
Gu Weijun cabled Chiang to inform him that “the House of Representatives and the
press are now paying attention to MacArthur’s claim that he is concentrating on the
Chinese question.”131 As one historian has summarized, MacArthur, along with
Wedemeyer, formed the “Far Eastern faction,” which with backing by Republicans in
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the United States, argued for continued military aid to China.132 On March 6, Chiang
wrote in his diary that “the debate on military assistance to China in the US Congress
has come to boiling point. MacArthur strongly countenanced the idea of assisting us
with convincing arguments. Although the final result is not yet known, Marshall has
already agreed to sell to us urgently needed machine guns and several kinds of
munitions.”133 Receiving news of the conclusion of the United States’ Foreign Act,
Chiang wrote a letter to MacArthur to express his gratitude in May:
Dear General MacArthur:
I wish to express to you my appreciation for the support that you gave to the
China Aid Act of 1948 in your testimony before the Congress, which greatly
contributed to its speedy passage. The successful implementation of the Act, I am
sure, will not only help to alleviate the sufferings of the Chinese people, but will




In the months that followed, MacArthur magnanimously allowed Chinese troops
to transfer American ammunitions stored in Okinawa to Shanghai for use in the civil
war.135 In a conference on March 21, MacArthur said he “considered the situation in
China today as deteriorating, but not yet hopeless.” Also, MacArthur advocated the
“release at once to the Chinese Government, of all U.S. military surpluses in the
Pacific Area. This release should be a gift-not a sale.” As George F. Kennan noted,
He feels certain there are large reserves of equipment still available and that such
equipment will be considered obsolete for American Forces by the time another
war comes. He said he himself does not expect to fight in Japan, and if he does,
he has sufficient reserve equipment under his control in Japan to take care of his
own needs.136
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As part of the same conversation, MacArthur also argued that the US
government should dispatch officers to supervise the delivery of US surplus war
material and provide “moderate economic and financial assistance” on the grounds
that the US “would have everything to gain and very little to lose by furnishing
moderate support to the Chinese Government at this critical time.”137 Kennan
summarized, too, that MacArthur “is somewhat doubtful of the eventual outcome [of
the civil war], since he is not certain that China’s Field Commanders still retain the
“will to fight”. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, he feels that all-out aid to
China at this time is decidedly a worthwhile gamble for the United States.”138 From
MacArthur’s perspective, one can sense the fact that the General believed it would
suit US interests to assist the KMT at this point, not the extent that hampered his
project to revitalize Japan.
Some Republican politicians also mulled over the feasibility of MacArthur’s
serving as a special military adviser to Chiang in 1948. By using British Foreign
Office archives, Michael Schaller noted that:
He [MacArthur] told British diplomats in Tokyo “he would not be adverse to
adding this responsibility to his present one in Japan.” As for the idea of leading
American troops into Manchuria to drive out the Chinese Communists,
MacArthur boasted he “could accomplish this in six months by air action with a
force of 1000 suitable aircraft.” He might then occupy Manchuria as a “trustee”
for the Nationalists and, thereby, safeguard all Asia from communism.139
MacArthur’s doubts about the willingness of the KMT generals to fight were not
groundless, and the support that did come from the United States came too late – for
the KMT was already on the brink of collapse. On April 21, 1948, KMT troops in
Yan’an retreated and the forces in the Northeast were encircled in several cities. Other
battles in northern, central, and eastern China did not go well for the KMT either.
Eventually, Chiang sent an emergency signal to MacArthur. On June 9, after a
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lobbying mission had seen him sent to Japan as Chiang’s special envoy, Zhu Shiming
reported to Chiang on a meeting he had with MacArthur:
I met General MacArthur at noon today and handed over the President’s letter to
him. The meeting lasted about an hour, in which MacArthur showed his honest
attitude and promised to try his best to help. He also mentioned that one year ago
there were surplus weapons that could equip ten to fifteen divisions in his zone
of control, among which half had been transferred back to the United States and
half dispatched to other forces in Japan. Now the amount of remnant munitions
has sharply decreased, but the number of riffles is still satisfactory. He then
ordered his logistics staff to confer with me and asked that this information be
kept absolutely secret.140
It was at this crucial moment that Chiang requested MacArthur’s immediate and
direct input on the Chinese battlefield without first obtaining Washington’s approval.
On July 24, He Yingqin, in a cable to Chiang, proposed the Chinese Mission in Japan
negotiate with MacArthur and obtain any remnant Japanese weapons.141 The next
month, on August 21, Zhang Qun (張群 ) visited Japan to meet with MacArthur.
According to Zhang’s own account, MacArthur said he heard that the Nationalist
Chinese would abandon Northeast and Northern China and focus on defending
Southern China, a rumor which he hoped was not accurate. MacArthur urged the
KMT to “Never give up! Give up nothing!” and wished to meet Chiang Kai-shek in
person.142 However, Chinese newspapers did not mention Zhang and MacArthur
exchanging opinions about the deteriorating condition of the Civil War; rather, the
readers were left to read about on Zhang’s wiliness to visit Japanese politicians and
his extension of an invitation to them to visit China.143 Information about another
two-hour meeting between the two men was also not disclosed to the public.144
It is not at all farfetched to assume that the purpose of Zhang’s visit to Japan was
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to find other grounds for hope after speaking directly with MacArthur. On September
7, Chiang cabled Zhang to inquire whether the KMT could purchase 50,000 to
100,000 strong horses in Japan for use in the civil war.145 To Chiang’s great
discomfort, one week later, on September 16, Shang reported back that Japan lacked
horses and there wasn’t any available to be sent to China. SCAP’s response to the
Chinese request was that it could only “probably collect 200 to 300 stallions.”146
When Zhang Qun visited MacArthur on September 10, MacArthur impressed on the
Chinese that under no circumstances could the KMT abandon Northeast and Northern
China and the KMT should bolster its anti-CCP campaign. MacArthur believed all the
CCP’s munitions were coming from the spoils of war seized by the Soviet Union from
the Japanese army and that additional ammunition produced in Siberia were
insufficient. Thus, the CCP could not continue their stand for too long and might soon
pursue peace. As long as the KMT could persist in the Civil War, US military
production would supply China incessantly, and some other necessities could be
shipped from Japan as well.147
In spite of those predictions, the CCP launched the Liaoshen (遼沈) Campaign in
Northeast China’s Laioning province on September 12, 1948. The CCP quickly
conquered Changli and disabled the Jinyu railroad, isolating KMT forces in the
Northeast and cutting them off from outside military assistance. After Chiang’s
ultimately ineffective struggle to obtain comprehensive military support from Japan,
the Chinese Mission was assigned the task of surreptitiously investigating the exact
amount of military materiel left by the Japanese Kwantung Army after its withdrawal
from China and to see what could be used for the repulse of the Liaoshen
Campaign.148 On October 4, 1948, a document listing the amount of Japanese
artillery left in Northeast China drafted by the Chinese Mission was sent to Nanjing:
“ammunitions total 20,000 tons, which could supply the needs of ten divisions in
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battle….petrol for aircraft could be used for one month.” According to the report’s
closing sentence, “All the ammunitions mentioned above are worth approximately
five trillion Japanese dollars.”149 The entire investigation was undertaken without
MacArthur being informed because such inquiries apparently violated SCAP
regulations. However, Chiang’s last-ditch attempt to reverse his military disadvantage
in the Northeast was, in the end, fruitless. Less than a month after the report was
written, the KMT’s forces were totally defeated. On November 2, 1948, the Liaoshen
Campaign ended in Communist victory. For the first time in modern Chinese history,
the CCP took full control of the country’s Northeast.
CONCLUSION
As Michael Schaller summarized, “As the tide of battle in China turned in the
Communists’ favor, most Asia specialists in Washington opposed further American
involvement. MacArthur, by contrast, argued for increased assistance to the crumbling
Nationalist regime.”150 This chapter argues that the objective of the Chinese Mission
in Japan evolved significantly as the Chinese Civil War progressed, particularly with
regards to committing itself to obtain additional support from MacArthur. The
appointments of Zhu Zhuming and Shang Zhen demonstrates that postwar
Sino-Japanese relations were significantly influenced by the policy of the United
States. By and large, every request the Chinese Mission made of MacArthur was
closely related to developments in the Chinese Civil War. For instance, during the
early stages of the war, MacArthur’s attitude toward China was not of major concern
to the KMT since Chiang and his government firmly believed that the arrival of
victory was just a matter of time. The first time the KMT took a serious interest in
MacArthur’s stance was in January 1947 when Zhu was asked to gauge MacArthur’s
reaction the day after Marshall announced his departure from China following his
failure to mediate between the two belligerents of China’s destructive civil conflict -
149 “Chinese Mission to Foreign Ministry,” October 4, 1948, Guoshiguan, 002-080103-00065-008.
150 Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General, 140.
51
the KMT sensing there and then that the end of the Marshall Mission sowed seeds of
uncertainty as to the KMT’s fate. The Chinese Mission then requested military
assistance during the Shandong battles in early 1947 and again during the Liaoshen
Campaign in late 1948, two of the most decisive battles in the Chinese Civil War.
Despite these political maneuverings, they would have little effect on the final
outcome of the Civil War, although the strenuous lobbying made MacArthur wary of
the chances of the KMT’s survival.
MacArthur’s eventual and grudging involvement in the Chinese Civil War was in
great part due to its effects on the occupation of Japan. Then, the later shift in US
occupation policy was also in great part due to the outcome of the Chinese Civil War,
as Kazuo Kawai has summarized:
Along toward the end of 1947 or the beginning of 1948, the emphasis of the
Occupation shifted from that of reforming a vanquished enemy to that of
building him up as a potential ally of the United States. The intensification of the
Cold War obviously was primarily responsible for this change. As the drift of
China toward the Communist orbit became unmistakable, Americans began to
conceive of Japan, rather than China, as the new major force in the Far East for
peace, democracy, and friendliness toward the United States.151
From the outbreak of the Civil War to Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat to Taiwan,
General MacArthur was an active, if initially reluctant, supporter of the KMT.
However, as the chief architect given the job of rebuilding postwar Japan, MacArthur
did not want to help China to the detriment of Japanese (and American) interests,
which was his primary focus. Thus, while MacArthur showed sympathy to Chiang’s
plight, he usually took a hands-off approach towards the fighting on the Chinese
mainland because he believed that it was Washington who was obliged to lend China
a hand, not SCAP. When MacArthur eventually decided to lend his assistance to
China in mid-1948, Chiang’s ultimate military failure had already decided. With
mainland China apparently lost, beginning in 1949, MacArthur began to pay much
more attention to the defense of Taiwan as well as the survival of the defeated KMT




CHAPTER TWO: FROMMAINLAND TO FORMOSA
The previous chapter suggests that from the outset of the Chinese Civil War,
MacArthur was active in urging Washington to support the KMT while attempting to
curtail his and SCAP’s own involvement in Chinese affairs. If the Chinese Civil War
period between 1946 and 1948 was not regarded by MacArthur as being, as the
previous chapter concludes, a thorny issue in which he needed to intervene, 1949
therefore represents a watershed in his attitude toward events on the Asian mainland,
as the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime eventually galvanized him into action.
For SCAP, the CCP’s anticipated victory against the KMT constituted a great threat to
the recovery of Japan and, as a consequence, MacArthur began to fix his attention on
defending the KMT’s regime after its retreat to the island of Taiwan.
This chapter is comprised of four sections: Nationalist China’s continued
lobbying of MacArthur; the General’s understanding of contemporaneous events in
China in 1949; the debate over the status of Taiwan; and Ho Shailai’s involvement in
the Chinese Civil War and the activities of the shadowy White Group before his
appointment as head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in 1950. These sections discuss
MacArthur’s strategy with regard to the defense of Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, as
well as Taiwan’s reliance upon the General before the outbreak of the Korean War. To
a great extent, the outcome of the Chinese Civil War laid the foundation for
MacArthur’s East Asian policy before and after the Korean War began in June 1950.
THE FINALATTEMPT
According to Congressman Walter Judd, when he visited MacArthur in Japan in
October 1948, the General was “deeply puzzled by the Chinese situation.”152 On
November 3, one day after the KMT’s defeat in the Liaoshen campaign which raged
whilst Judd was meeting with the American General, Chiang ordered Wang Zhi to
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visit MacArthur in Japan to ask for immediate aid. “The military situation is very
urgent now,” noted Wang, “the American assistance will still take time, and we should
ask for MacArthur’s direct assistance from Japan.”153 A few weeks later, reporting on
comments made by the son of Sun Yat-sen, Sun Fo [Sun Ke], Ambassador Stuart said
that, “China must be prepared to make any reasonable concession in order to obtain
major American military assistance as soon as possible and mentioned General
MacArthur as possible supreme military adviser to be given full powers.”154 Within a
month, MacArthur had sent his evaluation of the CCP’s victories to Washington. He
viewed the US positions in Japan “as weakened materially by the flanking Communist
positions in the north on the Kuriles and Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and in the south in
China. Additional troops, ships and planes are needed if our position in Japan and the
Ryukyus to the south is to be secure….”155 At this point MacArthur foresaw the
irreversible defeat of the KMT in mainland China, and thus envisioned setting up
what, using an anachronistic term, we might call a “fire wall” between China and
Japan. As news correspondent Hanson W. Baldwin accurately summarized:
“Apparently General MacArthur does not feel that much, if anything, can now be
done to arrest the sweep of communism in China; his report is concerned primarily
with strengthening the insular bases of American power in the Orient now that large
portions of the Asiatic mainland have come under the dominance of unfriendly
regimes.”156
The forthcoming catastrophe not only verified MacArthur’s prediction but
crushed the KMT’s last hopes of retaining a toehold on the Chinese mainland. From
late 1948 to early 1949, KMT troops were repeatedly crushed in the Liaoshen, Pingjin
(平津), and Huaihai (淮海) campaigns. Consequently, on January 21, 1949, Chiang
Kai-shek resigned as president of the ROC, and was succeeded by Li Zongren. A few
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days later, and on what was his sixty-ninth birthday (January 26, 1949), General
MacArthur addressed friends about the current situation in East Asia, as the New York
Times recorded:
“While unable to estimate the military potentialities because of the many yet
undetermined and imponderable factors beyond my assessment or control,” he
asserted, “I can and do give complete assurance that with the firm spiritual
support of the American people, this frontier outpost of democratic freedom,
regardless of the tide of conflict upon the adjacent mainland, will not yield before
the political or social pressure of communism or any other concept of
enslavement.”157
The potential communist threat from mainland China led to rumors that
MacArthur was attempting to reconstitute the Japanese army, but these were
apparently “totally without foundation.”158 Even more so than MacArthur, Chiang
Kai-shek was understandably anxious about the situation in China. Despite his formal
resignation, the Generalissimo was still operating politically from “behind the
curtain”. The KMT was planning to retreat to Taiwan if necessary, and Chen Cheng
had been appointed as the provincial governor of the island on January 5. Later that
month, and two days prior to MacArthur’s birthday celebrations, a telegram had been
sent to the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in Tokyo, Shang Zhen, requesting
that he secretly invite Wedemeyer to Taiwan.159 Shang met with Wedemeyer in early
February and afterwards cabled Chiang to report that the American had shown a
willingness to visit Taiwan and offer assistance to the KMT.160 Not long after, on
March 5, Shang was unexpectedly replaced as the head of the Chinese Mission in
Japan by Zhu Shiming, the man who was also his predecessor.161 The reason behind
Chiang’s removal of Shang has not yet been made public, but according to one
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Chinese source, Shang was frustrated with the downfall of the KMT regime and
resigned in 1949 to focus on managing a business in Japan.162
MacArthur now began to place a higher strategic value on Taiwan than mainland
China. In a meeting on February 16, MacArthur said if Formosa falls into the hands of
the CCP, then the “whole defensive position in the Far East” for the US would be
“definitely lost” and “could only result eventually in putting our defensive line back
to the west coast of the continental United States.” The General also pointed out that
Formosa “was astride the line of communications between Okinawa and the
Philippines, that it outflanked our position on Okinawa and, in the hands of the
Chinese Communists, broke through the island wall which we must have along the
Asiatic “littorals” in order to maintain, in a strategic sense, a defense line in the
western Pacific.”163 MacArthur viewed the KMT’s failure as irretrievable, but Taiwan
would nevertheless need to be secured on the grounds that it was pivotal to the US
line of defense in East Asia. When asked for his opinion on the possible retreat of
Admiral Badger’s forces from China, the General seemed to be more interested in
incorporating Badger’s forces into his command in Japan.164
In April, Nanjing fell to the CCP, and KMT officials began the retreat to
Southwestern China. Attempts at compromise between the CCP and KMT ended in
failure later that same month, as the KMT refused to accept the CCP’s demands.
MacArthur sensed that defeat was now inevitable, and began to contemplate steps to
mitigate the consequences of the KMT’s loss. As The New York Times noted, “General
MacArthur today promised to help bring Americans out of China if necessary. “The
evacuation of American nationals from China is a responsibility of the Commander of
Naval Forces of the Western Pacific,” he said.”165
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CHINESE CIVILWAR’S EFFECTS ON JAPAN
Alongside the military threat and fears of communist infiltration, the anticipated
CCP victory struck a decisive blow to Japan’s economy. A report in the Nippon Times
noted:
The increased goal was worked out recently between the Japanese Government
and General MacArthur’s key industrial officials. The Communist capture of
North China’s important coal areas has developed a serious hitch in the
development of Japan’s steel program and Japanese officials were understood to
have pleaded that production beyond 1,500,000 tons for next fiscal year would be
virtually impossible without authorization for additional blast furnaces.166
Japan’s trade with China had also constituted a significant part of MacArthur’s
original blueprint for the future. While supporting blockades and boycotts of China,
the General had to contend with Japan’s reliance on the China market. As Michael
Schaller put it, the General “tried to have it both ways, demanding authority to ban
Sino-Japanese trade while actually encouraging the mutually profitable commerce.”167
On the political front, the victory of the CCP bolstered the morale of the
burgeoning Japanese Communist Party. In the Diet election which took place on
January 23, 1949, the Japanese Communist Party won 35 seats in the House of
Representatives, occupying 9.76 % percent of the parliament - nine times more than
its previous level. As the Nippon Times wrote, “It was a test closely watched by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur and the headquarters. The Communists made decided gains by
capitalizing on China war and domestic unrest but some quarters felt the combination
of these developments might have given them even more political power.”168 Due to
the severity of the situation in East Asia, some in US congressional coteries suggested
MacArthur be called upon to visit Washington to report on the situation.169 This
suggestion was not enacted.
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MacArthur also demanded more troops be sent to Japan. A source noted that
MacArthur had “submitted a secret report on the American military situation in Japan
in view of Communist victories in China” and he was believed to “have asked for
more troops and airplanes.”170 Washington turned down the request. As the CCP
began to drive the KMT deeper into southern China, the defense of Japan became
MacArthur’s priority. As one editorialist wrote in April, MacArthur was “stepping up
defensive measures in Japan following the recent advance of the Chinese Communists
who, apparently will not only occupy Shanghai but also sweep farther south” and had
said that “the occupation of the Chinese coastline by Communists under Soviet
influence would certainly lead to many difficulties in Japan—which is compelled to
maintain trade relations with a free China in order to rehabilitate itself.”171 In
evaluating MacArthur’s performance in Japan, Time Magazine noted that “Japan’s
continuing poverty and the Communist victories in China have exposed Japan to
communism’s appeals” but “the Communists would have far greater cause for mirth if
Douglas MacArthur had never come to Japan.”172
THE FINAL PHASE OFTHE CIVILWAR
Full-scale Civil War resumed as peace negotiations between Li Zongren and the
CCP broke down in late April, 1949, and soon after the CCP initiated its new
offensive, crossing the Yangtze River. By June 2, the CCP occupied the cities of
Nanjing, Wuhan and Shanghai, crushing the KMT’s hopes of holding on to the
economic heartlands around the Yangtze River Delta. Thus, the last mainland bastion
held by the KMT was in Southern China, and, as a consequence, the defense of the
southeastern coastline as a consequence became of utmost importance. At this point,
MacArthur became Chiang’s last hope for material support, and he was eager to meet
MacArthur in person and bolster the General’s determination to assist Taiwan. On
August 1, Chiang cabled Zhu Shiming:
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I will be visiting Korea at President Lee’s invitation in a private capacity in the
following days. Due to the urgent domestic situation, I must fly directly to Korea
from Taipei in order to return as soon as possible. I apologize for not being able
to visit General MacArthur in Japan due to time constraints. Please forward my
respect to General MacArthur and keep it secret.173
On August 4, Zhu cabled Chiang to report on his meeting with MacArthur the
previous night. MacArthur acknowledged Chiang’s visit to Korea and Philippines and
regretted Washington’s limited support for China. According to Zhu, the General
suggested that Chiang make a “touching” joint statement with Elpidio Quirino and
Rhee Syng-man, the Presidents of the Philippines and Korea, respectively.174 The
next day, the United States issued the China White Paper in which it placed the onus
for the military failure in the Civil War on the KMT. Despite the fact that Truman
made it clear that the United State would not again become involved in Chinese
affairs, the KMT nonetheless continued to pursue support from MacArthur.
Military disasters continued to dog the KMT during August. In the first week of
that month, men under the command of Cheng Qian (程潛 ) in Hunan deserted the
KMT and joined the CCP’s military forces, shattering the former’s defensive line in
southern China. Wu Tiecheng (吳鐵城), serving as Chiang’s special envoy, arrived at
Tokyo on August 12 in order to visit MacArthur, and some people speculated that
SCAP might promise Wu that the KMT would “receive US aid if they held Canton a
few months longer.”175 Some sources believed that Wu’s visit to Japan was to confer
with MacArthur on the proposed “anti-Communist Pacific union.”176 All such
speculation was later confirmed by a report presented to Chiang written by Wu
himself. On August 13 and 18, Zhu Shiming accompanied Wu to a meeting with
MacArthur. According to Wu’s report, MacArthur suggested that US Far Eastern
policy will “become clear in the next six weeks”, and in six months there will be
173 “Chiang Kai-shek to Zhu Shiming,” August 1, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00009-053.
174 “Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 4, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00034-023.
175 “The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State,” September 11, 1949, FRUS, 1949, Vol. 8,
525.
176 “China Presses for Pact,” August 11, 1949, The New York Times.
60
“concrete exemplification”. The Chinese government has no need to request US aid,
for “it will come without asking” at the proper time. When the time is ripe, said
MacArthur, he would also come to help them as well. The General also told Wu to
“count on me.” MacArthur also conveyed to the Chinese that he believed the China
White Papers had been published at an “inappropriate” time, with no benefit to either
country. Speaking of the Civil War, MacArthur hoped the Chinese government could
hold Huanan (Southern China) for six months. MacArthur urged them to “Fight! Fight!
Fight! Never compromise! Never compromise! Never compromise!” The General
also suggested the KMT strengthen its air force and navy activities. If possible, the
KMT should achieve a great victory. If not, then at least a “middle scale victory.” If
still not possible, then at least several small victories could change the international
image of the KMT. Lastly, MacArthur stressed that “unless you crash in yourselves no
one could defeat you.”177 Wu’s report might be the frankest expression of
MacArthur’s attitude toward the Chinese Civil War as it manifested itself in 1949. But,
of course, MacArthur’s anticipation of a KMT military victory – great, middle scale,
or small – was not realized. In August, the PLA occupied Fuzhou, severely hampering
the KMT’s defense of the southern coastal region.
As things continued to go badly on the Chinese mainland, in Japan, MacArthur
remained the biggest concern for the Chinese Mission. In general, the tactics that the
Chinese Mission in Japan adopted in dealing with SCAP were similar to those of
previous years, the only change being additional requests to defend Taiwan and ally
with other East Asian countries. To the Nationalists, every step taken by the General
might have a significant impact on Taiwan’s chances of survival. On September 17,
Zhu cabled Chiang to report that according to an unofficial source, MacArthur had
suggested that the United States government restart its provision of military assistance
to China by offering 500 planes to Claire Lee Chennault to help with a naval blockade
of China’s coastline.178 MacArthur’s plan included “(1) issuance of a ringing
declaration that the U.S. will support any and everyone who is opposed to
177 “Wu Tiecheng to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00066-004.
178 “Zhu Shiming to Chiang Kai-shek,” September 17, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00044-188.
61
communism; (2) placing 500 fighter planes in the hands of some “war horse” similar
to General Chennault; (3) allowing volunteers to join such a fighting force without
penalty; and (4) assigning surplus ships to the Chinese Navy sufficient to blockade
and destroy China’s coastal cities.”179 China’s news agency was soon eager to know
if Chennault would visit Japan to discuss these issues, and especially the 500 fighter
planes, in November.180 The CCP also kept a close eye on any Chennault activity in
Japan, with one newspaper believing that his conversation with MacArthur included
nothing but “business and war conspiracy.”181
On October 1, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China, marking the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War.
Conversely, Chiang was in the throes of total defeat and struggling to defend the coast
with the navy and air force. On November 10 Chiang cabled Zhu Shiming to arrange
for American staff to visit Hainan Island.182 Perceiving that the loss of mainland
China was now inevitable, MacArthur showed what was rare interest in assisting the
KMT defense of Hainan.183 Despite this, Hainan was ceded to the CCP in April 1950.
In the meantime, Li Zongren had fled to Hong Kong, where he became “inclined
toward [a] decision [to] temporarily stay [in] Hong Kong [to] seek [the] promise [of]
direct and substantial support from MacArthur, which, if forthcoming, would allow
[the] Kwangsi clique [to] organize [its] own political party independent of [the]
Generalissimo and continue [the] civil war.”184 As later chapters will demonstrate, at
this juncture many political factions within China began to approach MacArthur as
they had relatively few alternatives.
179 “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth),” FRUS, 1949, Vol. 9, 559.
180 “Chennade Jiang Furi yu Maike Ase Huishang(陳納德將赴日與麥克阿瑟會商) [Chennault Will
Go to Japan to Meet MacArthur],” November 9, 1949, Dagongbao (Chongqing).
181 “Chennade Laigang Heshi Dong Xianguang Beizu Jichang (陳納德來港何事 董顯光被阻機場)
[What is Chennalt Coming to Hong Kong for? Dong Xianguang Stopped at the Airport],” November
19, 1949, Dagongbao (Hong Kong).
182 “Chiang Kai-shek to Zhu Shiming,” Novemer 10, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00006-249.
183 An account reveals that MacArthur favored Sun Lianzhong (孫連仲) to defend the Hainan Island,
however, no evidence could support this claim. Liu Fenghan (劉鳳漢) ed., Sun Lianzhong Xiansheng
Nianpu Changbian (孫連仲先生年譜長編) [Chronology of Sun Lianzhong] (Taipei: Academia
Historica, 1993), Vol. 6, 3187.
184 “The Consul General at Hong Kong (Rankin) to the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1949, FRUS,
1949, Vol. 8, 603.
62
MacArthur, though, disapproved of fighting with the CCP on the Chinese
mainland. Instead, he emphasized the defense of Taiwan as he believed the island was
of great strategic importance and was the only and final hope for the KMT’s survival,
as Michael Schaller summarizes:
He [MacArthur] dispatched Colonel Stanton Babcock to tell the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee of the JCS that he considered it “of the greatest importance
that Formosa not fall under communist control.”……”By hook or by crook, we
must keep it out of Communist hands.” MacArthur proposed several schemes,
including putting the island under American trusteeship, under the control of
some other “safe nation,” or even returning it to the Japanese (e.g. SCAP).185
THE TRUSTEESHIPAND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN
As peace became impractical and the result of the Chinese Civil War became
increasingly unpredictable following the failure of the Marshall mission in early 1947,
the status of Taiwan began to be raised as a concern in Washington. While not being
regarded as a major issue in comparison to myriad other China questions, some
policymakers contemplated whether or not there was an alternative option for postwar
Formosa. In the meantime, worries about the resumption of the Chinese Civil War
generated rumors, spreading through Taiwan, that MacArthur hoped to claim the
island again for Japan.186 The February 28 Incident of 1947 had already decreased
local Taiwanese population’s inclination towards mainland China; after which rumors
and speculation about the possibility of Taiwan being placed under the United Nations
or SCAP trusteeships also began to circulate. As General Wedemeyer noted such
opinion in a report on August 17, 1947, “There were indications that Formosans
would be receptive toward United States guardianship and United Nations
trusteeships. They fear that the Central Government contemplates bleeding their
island to support the tottering and corrupt Nanking machine and I think their fears
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well founded.”187 Michael Schaller described the position of Taiwan thus: “With
increasingly less to do in Tokyo, MacArthur turned his attention to other parts of Asia.
He expressed growing fear of the Chinese revolution and increasing interest in
protecting Taiwan.”188
On February 10, 1949, MacArthur received General Sun Liren (孫立人) in Tokyo.
This meeting has attracted much scholarly attention over the decades but, regrettably,
the full details have yet to be revealed. One can only surmise that MacArthur might
have exchanged opinions with Sun about the Chinese Civil War and the status of
Taiwan, and Sun might have told MacArthur that the military defeat of the KMT was
inevitable.189 As the CCP consecutively occupied major cities while moving from
north to south in early 1949, MacArthur began to openly claim that the Americans
should defend Taiwan at all costs. As William Sebald summarized, “It was public
knowledge, however, that MacArthur frequently told visitors Formosa should be
saved at all costs, if only for its strategic position, while some Washington officials
seemed reconciled to its probable loss.”190 The feasible options proposed by
MacArthur included “putting the island under American trusteeships, under the
control of some other “safe nation,” or even returning it to the Japanese (e.g.
SCAP)”191 Amongst these possible options, the only one which received serious
consideration from Washington was the idea of placing Taiwan under the trusteeships
of either SCAP or the United Nations. From MacArthur’s standpoint, the strategic
position of Taiwan was of such importance that the United States could not bear the
consequences of losing it. Although MacArthur had supported Chiang during the
Chinese Civil War, as discussed in chapter one, when he sensed the irreversible defeat
of the KMT, rather than maintaining Chiang’s position on the mainland, saving
Taiwan became MacArthur’s top priority.
MacArthur’s plans for Taiwan reached Chiang’s ears. On June 15, 1949, the KMT
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leader received a report from the Department of National Defense. The report
informed him that, according to the head of the Chinese Mission, there was a
“ridiculous opinion” being floated which favored placing Taiwan under trusteeships,
as proposed by SCAP.192 On the same day, Chiang also received letters from his wife
mentioning a similar plan.193 Furious at the proposal, three days later Chiang
expressed his determination to “defend the island at all costs” and made it clear he
would never let Taiwan be placed under allied trusteeships.194 To make sure SCAP
understood his position, on June 20 Chiang instructed Zhu to meet MacArthur to
stress the important status of Taiwan, a place which could be the “new political hope
of the anti-Communism movement in China.”195 In his diary entry for that day,
Chiang also noted that he had expressed a willingness to make “a last-ditch defense”
of Taiwan.196
The progress of the Civil War had convinced MacArthur that Chiang’s retreat to
Taiwan was already in progress. If Chiang could safely bring his remaining naval and
air forces to Taiwan, it would be unnecessary to place Taiwan under trusteeship.
MacArthur also revealed his dissatisfaction with Chiang’s ineptitude in terms of
leading troops, as well as his corrupt officers and generals.197 General concerns about
Chiang’s ability to hold Taiwan against the communists meant Sun Liren had been
deemed by SCAP the most suitable person to replace Chiang. Despite this, MacArthur
continued to back Chiang while he retained overall control of the KMT. In late 1949
MacArthur was believed to have allied himself with Secretary of Defense of the
United States, Louis A. Johnson, so as to utilize the defense of Taiwan as leverage to
reversing Washington’s position on the issue.198 MacArthur’s reply to Zhu in June,
verified his position and delivered a clear message to Chiang Kai-shek about what
was expected. Zhu also said in October that he found “a great improvement in morale
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of Nationalist troops” in Taiwan.199 Ironically, some people doubted that the visits of
Zhu Shiming and Wu Tiecheng to Taiwan occurring at the same time was purely
coincidental, and rumor had it that Zhu’s visit was related to the island potentially
being placed under trusteeship. Zhu nevertheless clarified that his visit was
undertaken to help encourage trade between Taiwan and Japan.200
It was also believed that MacArthur was interfering with affairs on the island. As
one KMT source noted, at their meetings in Tokyo, MacArthur asked Wu Tiecheng to
promote two Taiwanese men, Lin Xiantang (林獻堂 ) and Xu Bing (許丙 ), to high
positions in the KMT’s Taiwan administration. Chiang accepted Lin but refused Xu
on the grounds that the latter supported Taiwanese independence. Also, a source noted
that MacArthur had suggested a Taiwan Joint Government be set up by the US to
replace the government of Chiang and Chen Cheng.201 As a source pointed out,
“There are recurring rumors in Taipeh [Taipei] that there is a group within the top
inner circle that would like to end Chiang’s arbitrary control, but not many people
believe them capable of doing it.”202 This speculation seems to be corroborated by Gu
Weijun’s memory that the General wanted Chiang to “take a trip abroad.” In addition,
General Willoughby visited Taiwan to discuss the possibility of an “officer from
General MacArthur’s staff” serving as an adviser.203
Ironically, MacArthur’s suggestion that Taiwan be placed under trusteeship raised
doubts about whether he was actually in a position to support Taiwan’s independence.
In a meeting between Dong Xianguang (董顯光) and MacArthur, held in November
1949, the latter firmly rebuffed the rumors of granting Taiwan independence, saying
that the independence movement must be “firmly prohibited.”204 In the meantime,
though, the Formosan League for Independence urged MacArthur to “oust the
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Chinese Nationalists from Formosa and occupy that island until it obtains
freedom.”205 Elsewhere, Senator H. Alexander Smith openly supported the idea of
sending US troops to occupy Taiwan, claiming that the idea had received support
from MacArthur.206 Approaching MacArthur, as well as using MacArthur to
rationalize political viewpoints, revealed how important MacArthur was in
influencing Washington’s policy in East Asia.
Still, President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson held an entirely
different view. Believing that any direct intervention on Taiwan would push the CCP
closer to the Soviet Union, Acheson favored offering only limited support to the
Chinese Nationalists on the island. Then, on January 5 1950, Truman announced the
end to “military aid or advice to Chinese forces” on Taiwan. On January 12, 1950,
Acheson declared Taiwan outside the US defense perimeter. Endeavoring to change
Acheson’s position, MacArthur invited him to Tokyo. Recalling the moment in his
memoirs, the General wrote:
I felt that the Secretary of State was badly advised about the Far East, and invited
him to be my guest in Tokyo. I had never met Dean Acheson, but felt certain that
his own survey of the Asiatic situation would materially alter his expressed views.
He declined the invitation, saying that the pressure of his duties prevented him
from leaving Washington. He did, however, visit Europe eleven times during his
stay in office.207
Pressure from the US President and Secretary of State did not alter MacArthur’s
mind. The General insisted on pursuing his bold policy, although some critics
believed he did so simply to embarrass Washington. William Sebald’s account also
offers a reasonable explanation for MacArthur’s stance on Taiwan in early 1950:
It was public knowledge, however, that MacArthur frequently told visitors
Formosa should be saved at all costs, if only for its strategic position, while some
Washington officials seemed reconciled to its probable loss. Almost as quickly as
they established control over the mainland, the Chinese Communists made the
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capture of Formosa a major goal. MacArthur’s attitude on this point was
well-expressed during a talk with Karl L. Rankin, who visited Tokyo in July,
1950…… Speaking of Chiang, MacArthur told Rankin: “If he has horns and a
tail, so long as he is anti-Communist, we should help him. Rather than make
things difficult, the State Department should assist him in his fight against the
Communists—we can try to reform him later!”208
To MacArthur, as long as Chiang Kai-shek could hold the island, there was no
need to fret about the fate of Formosa. To be sure that the KMT could, though,
MacArthur strongly advised the United States to help by making the famous argument
that Taiwan was an “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender.”209 MacArthur
expressed his thoughts to the Department of the Army on May 29, 1950,
In the event of war between the United States and the USSR, Formosa’s value to
the Communists is the equivalent of an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine
tender, ideally located to accomplish Soviet strategy as well as to checkmate the
offensive capabilities of the central and southern positions of the FEC [Far
Eastern Command] front line.210
In general, although MacArthur did not support providing military aid to Chiang,
he urged Washington to “take some measures to prevent Communist seizure of
Taiwan or else prepare to reinforce its positions in the Far East.”211 This viewpoint
accompanied MacArthur until his removal by President Truman in April 1951. Prior
to that, MacArthur had even considered having KMT troops stationed on Taiwan
participate in the Korean War. In analyzing MacArthur’s evolving attitude towards
Taiwan from 1947 to 1950, one must weigh up how he saw Chinese affairs having an
effect on his policies in Japan during the occupation - after all Japan always remained
his focus. Yet as a Republican, MacArthur’s alliance with the China Lobby in
Washington and its battle with the Truman administration to vie for influence in
Chinese affairs, was also decisive in shifting MacArthur’s attitude. The continuous
208 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 122.
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lobbying by the Chinese Mission in Japan might also have played a role in shaping
MacArthur’s policy direction on China, but the degree to which it did so is difficult to
evaluate and thus should not be overestimated. For the Chinese Mission in Japan, at
least, its assignment to lobby MacArthur on the KMT’s behalf was successful. But
although the status of Taiwan under the KMT was secured, the legitimacy of the
Republic of China and the Chiang regime remained shaky.
HO SHAILAI’S APPOINTMENT
After victory over Japan was secured, Ho Shailai was assigned to the post of
commander of the Huludao Port headquarters and was in charge of the repatriation of
Japanese nationals embarking from there. In June 1946 Ho was then promoted to Vice
Commander of the Combined Logistics Command, a newly-established organization
which coordinated logistics across different services.212 For his role in “securing the
port which assured the logistics at the frontline during the anti-bandit battles in the
Northeast,” Ho was awarded a medal in September 1947.213 A while later, Ho was
dispatched to the north to combat the CCP, but details of his assignment have proved
difficult to uncover.214
In April 1949, KMT Secretary General Zheng Yanfen (鄭彥棻 ), cabled Jiang
Jingguo (蔣經國)—Chiang Kai-shek’s son who was then head of the KMT’s branch
in Taiwan—with news that he had asked Ho Shailai to seriously considered a proposal,
and the latter had replied that if “he is in demand objectively and everyone believes he
should be in charge than he would accept the appointment” and hope to “obtain full
cooperation from former staffs.”215 The vagueness of the telegram makes clarifying
212 “Diaodong Jiangzuo Yipi (調動將佐一批) [Transfer of High-Ranking Officers],” July 1, 1946, The
Kung Sheung Daily News.
213 “Zhang Qun to Guominzhengfu Wenguanchu,” September 24, 1947, Guoshiguan,
001-035100-00014-034.
214 Zheng Wan-tai (鄭宏泰) and Wong Siu-lun (黃紹倫), Xianggang Jiangjun He Shili (香港將軍何世
禮) [Ho Shailai: A General from Hong Kong] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 2008), 190.
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to which appointment it referred difficult. After, weighing-up Ho Shailai’s activities in
late-1949 and early-1950, though, it is very likely that the post mentioned by Zheng
was head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. But before his eventual appointment to that
position, Ho was nominated as commander of the Keelung Port in northern Taiwan in
October 1949.216
After the Battle of Guningtou (古寧頭 ), Ho had accompanied Chen Cheng to
investigate Kinmen (Quemoy) when the Communists Kinmen laid siege to the island
from October 25 to October 27.217 In a KMT meeting in October, Chen Cheng’s
proposed nominations for the Consolidation of the Taiwan Plan Research and Drafting
Group (Gonggu Taiwan Fangan Yanjiu Qicao Xiaozu 鞏固台灣方案研究起草小組)
were sanctioned. Within this group, Sun Liren was placed in charge of military affairs,
while Ho oversaw economic affairs.218
In 1950 General Ho Shailai was given more significant assignments as a
consequence of the dramatic defeat of the Nationalist forces on the mainland.
According to a report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in early January 1950
Ho paid a short visit to Tokyo, where he apparently noticed the “Communist
affiliations” of the man whose job he would soon take, Zhu Shiming.219 Yet prior to
that role, in April 1950, Ho was promoted to the Vice Minister of the Department of
Defense. This appointment received much press attention:
Lt. Gen. Ho Shih-li (Ho Shai-lai), son of Sir Robert Ho Tung, a British knight in
Hongkong, has been appointed administrative vice minister of national defense in
the Nationalist cabinet. Sir Robert is 80 years old. He recently toured Europe and
visited George Bernard Shaw. He is founder of the Industrial and Commercial
Daily News, a Chinese newspaper in Hongkong. Although non-partisan, the paper
still uses “the 39th year of the Chinese republic,” instead of “1950” at the top of
216 “Jilong Gaoxiong Liang Gang Jue Chengli Silingbu (基隆高雄兩港決成立司令部) [Ports in Jilong
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217 “Chen Cheng Zuo Fei Jinmen Shicha (陳誠昨飛金門視察) [Chen Cheng Flies to Jinmen for
Inspection],” October 28, 1949, Dagongbao (Chongqing).
218 “Minutes,” October 13, 1949, Guoshiguan, 002-110701-00010-015.
219 “Reasons for Removal of CHU Shih-ming as Head of Chinese Mission to Japan,” May 29, 1950,
General CIA Records, CIA-RDP82-00457R005000100007-2.
70
each page.220
Xu Yongchang (徐永昌), a senior figure in the KMT who just resigned from the
Minister of National Defense, ran into Ho when he visited Bai Chongxi on April 5,
and they exchanged opinions on Vietnam and MacArthur’s activities in Japan.221
Chiang Kai-shek received Ho the next month, on May 21, but details of the meeting
are not disclosed in Chiang’s diaries.222 But on June 4, Chiang did write that he had
“had a conversation with Ho Shailai and censor the name lists of weapons.”223 It is
unclear, though, whether the latter part of the sentence is linked to Ho’s chat with
Chiang. Two days later, on June 6, Chiang received Ho to discuss issues regarding
SCAP and the forthcoming visit of Louis Johnson, the US Secretary of Defense, to
Japan.224 At last, on June 11, Ho arrived at Tokyo to become the fourth, and the last
head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The following morning, General MacArthur
held a lunch meeting with both Ho and his predecessor Zhu Shiming. “General
MacArthur looks tired,” Ho wrote in his diary. “And his wife speaks with good
manner and honesty. I am pleased to hear the General says that he welcomes me to
Japan permanently.”225
Over the next few days, Ho met a variety of commanders and influential foreign
diplomats in Tokyo. Besides meeting General MacArthur, Ho also paid a visit to C.
Turner Joy, Commander of the Naval Forces in the Far East.226 As for other SCAP
officials, on June 12 Ho visited William J. Sebald, a man with whom he maintained a
close relationship until the end of his term in Tokyo. On the same day, Ho met with
Louis J. Fortier, Director Theater intelligence Div., Far East Command. Fortier told
Ho that Washington was paying much attention to the defense of Magong (馬公) and
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the Pescadores on the grounds that the PLA had just blockaded Shantou (汕頭) and
might directly attack Magong and then look to land at Kaohsiung (高雄 ). If that
happened, Taiwan island would be defenseless.227
On June 16, Ho visited Walton H. Walker, commander general of the U.S. Eighth
Army, a force which would play a significant role during the first stage of the Korean
War. It was also a chance for the two men to reminisce about their first meeting in
Tianjin, nineteen years earlier.228 Ho also befriended the heads of Missions from
other countries – men such as the famous historian Egerton H. Norman of Canada, the
seasoned diplomat Maurice Dejean, from France, and Gastao do Rio Branco, from
Brazil.229 As later chapters will show, these relationships enabled Ho to play a
significant role during his time in Tokyo.
Examining Ho’s activities in early 1950 can help clarify details about important
events that have long been disputed. For instance, scholars have tended to rely upon
Gu Weijin’s memoirs or a Columbia University oral history project when
investigating Chiang Kai-shek’s dealings with the Americans in 1950. For example,
Gu Weijun claimed that Ho Shailai told him in 1970 that in May and June 1950
Chiang was asked to deploy several thousand members of the armed forces to South
Korea “in anticipation of a northern invasion,” but, because Chiang demanded so
much in monetary payment, “discussions were still going on when the war in Korea
actually broke out.” Citing Gu’s account, Michael Schaller has commented that “If
true, this suggests that MacArthur had embarked on a private foreign policy in Asia
before June 1950.”230 Based on Ho’s diaries for June, as well as Chinese and English
archival materials, however, Gu’s account appears to be misremembered. As a later
chapter will demonstrate, the offer to dispatch troops to South Korea was in actual
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fact raised by Chiang and turned down by MacArthur.
THEWHITE GROUP
When looking at the KMT’s efforts to combat the CCP after 1949, it is important
not to omit the role played by the White Group, an extremely secret organization
composed of former Japanese militarists who undertook a mission to train soldiers in
Taiwan. While many scholars have been trying over the years to verify the activities
of the White Group, owing to the scarcity of historical materials, a concrete and
detailed study has yet to be written. A significant question relating to the story
involving the Chinese Mission in Japan can, though, be explored in this dissertation:
What was the Chinese Mission’s involvement in the secret endeavor?
The idea of the White Group could be traced back to 1947, when Lieutenant
General Lin Xunnan (林薰南), a military counselor to the Chinese Mission, suggested
utilizing Japanese soldiers to fortify China’s national defense.231 Previous studies
have focused on Cao Shicheng (曹士澂), the military attaché of the Chinese Mission
in Japan as well as a special representative dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek to
coordinate the mission in Tokyo.232 On June 30, 1949, Cao Shicheng wrote a report
suggesting Chiang Kai-shek establish an Anti-Communist Frontline in East Asia and
make Tokyo the nucleus. Furthermore, Cao suggested setting-up an Anti-Communism
Intelligence Bureau in Tokyo, as well as a sub-Bureau in Manila or Singapore, after
which an Allied Chief of Operations would be established in Taiwan or the
Philippines.233 Cao’s proposals might have won support from Zhu Shiming, who was
at that point still head of the Chinese Mission, but it is unclear whether or not Cao had
conferred with SCAP on the issue before submitting his plan to Chiang - since SCAP,
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and especially MacArthur, would never have expressed support for such a proposition
at that moment. On September 8 Zhu also reported to Chiang on the idea of recruiting
Japanese soldiers to fight in the Chinese Civil War, an idea which had been repeatedly
proposed but would be unfeasible as it contradicted SCAP regulations. However,
South Korea was organizing 30,000 volunteers for participation in the battle for China
on the side of the Nationalists.234
According to another report, dated July 22, Cao Shicheng was ordered by Chiang
to meet Hou Teng (候騰) in Guangzhou in order to confer with him about a plan to
use Japanese soldiers (as suggested by Zhu Shiming). This report remarks that the
First Section of the Chinese Mission in Japan should recruit exceptional Japanese
soldiers to form a special advisory group, and pursue a mission to collect intelligence
on the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea, as well as Northern and Northeastern China, for
use by the Allied Anti-Communism Corps in East Asia that would have to be set up. It
should also strengthen its anti-communist capabilities in Japan and counter the
expansion of Japanese communism. According to this proposal, expenses and
communications equipment would be supplied by the Second Bureau of the Ministry
of National Defense.235 Additionally, Zhu Shiming and Cao Shicheng were to serve
as the chief and vice-chief of the group in Japan.236 Chiang sanctioned this proposal
immediately, after which Cao began to put it into effect. In another report written by
Cao on July 31, the name of the Japanese actor involved in this operation was added.
The name, which was not unfamiliar to the Chinese, was Okamura Yasuji (岡村寧
次).237 Another member of the operation was named Nemoto Hiroshi (根本博). He
had served as private counsel to Tang Enbo during the Battle of Guningtou in October
1949.238
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Nemoto’s activities had already attracted the attention of SCAP. In September
1949, a report revealed that “General Nemoto and a Lt. Colonel were smuggled
aboard a Chinese vessel which left Yokohama for Formosa on June 27th in the guise of
crew members. They later proceeded to Amoy.”239 The report also speculated that the
Chinese Mission in Japan was behind this, as it reported that besides Nemoto, “an
insignificant number of senior and junior Japanese officers have subsequently been
similarly smuggled out to Formosa probably with the connivance of the local Chinese
Mission.”240 Subsequently, an investigation was made to “determine the full scope of
the operation and the extent to which the Chinese Mission in Tokyo might be
involved.”241 It was speculated that the Chinese Mission was recruiting ex-Japanese
soldiers, just as another report noted:
Chiang is said to have converted 4 million United States dollars into yen on the
black market in Tokyo, and Head of Chinese Mission in Tokyo is said to be
offering a quarter of a million yen per man as initial payment to pilots. General
Wu when recently in Tokyo is alleged to have sought unsuccessfully an interview
with Yoshida.242
British intelligence gave credence to the Chinese account, while the concrete
amount of funds offered by Chiang Kai-shek remains unconfirmed. Zhu Shiming also
publicly denied the accusation that Nationalist China was “recruiting Japanese
pilots.”243 The investigation into the matter conducted by SCAP might have
restrained the operation but did not put an end to it. CCP propaganda accused
MacArthur of dispatching fifteen Japanese soldiers to assist the KMT in Taiwan, so
they perhaps also believed that Ho Shailai’s visit to Japan in December of 1949 was
for recruiting the “Japanese voluntary army.”244 The Chinese Mission continued to
deny the existence of and such operation. In February of 1950, the spokesman of the
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Chinese Mission in Japan issued a statement denying that the KMT was recruiting
Japanese pilots and Chiang Kai-shek was looking to at Japan as a safe haven to flee to.
As quoted in the Nippon Times:
“Both in regard to the rumor that volunteers for the Chinese Army are being
recruited and the one that Gen. Chiang and other Nationalist leaders are looking
for houses to take refuge in Japan, suggest operations of vicious brokers. The
Chinese Mission has no knowledge whatever or either,” the spokesman said.245
From this point onward, Cao Shicheng became more covert in coordinating the
operation. In January 1950, Cao submitted an updated report to Chiang in which he
suggested they establish the “Far Eastern Anti-Communism College.”246 The venture
to establish the East Asia Anti-Communism Corp was implemented by Wu Tiecheng,
personal envoy of Chiang Kai-shek, during his visit to Tokyo and Seoul in April 1950.
The International News Service noticed the Chinese presence in Seoul:
Reports from Tokyo last week said that Nationalist officials are seeking to obtain
continental bases in Korea from which Nationalist naval and air forces could
attack Communist North China and Manchuria. In return, these reports said, the
Nationalists were offering air support for President Syngman Rhee’s “little civil
war” against Communist forces of North Korea.
These reports said that Gen. Wu Te-Chen, member of Gen. Chiang
Kai-shek’s “super-cabinet”; Gen. Chu Shih-Ming, chief of the Chinese
Nationalist mission in Tokyo, and Maj. Gen. Tsao Shih-Chen, also a member of
the Tokyo Mission, were negotiating in Seoul.
However, Mr. Ryee said that although General Wu and Chu recently visited
President Rhee, they did not offer any proposals regarding a military alliance
between the two Governments.247
Although the plan to form an allied corps against the communists turned out
eventually to be an abortive one, the White Group plan continued. In February 1950,
seventeen Japanese ex-soldiers arrived in Taiwan to begin the job of military
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education and training programs under the leadership of Tomita Naosuke.248 With
Zhu Shiming suspected of having pro-CCP leanings, and following his resignation in
1950, the White Group operation was strictly confidential, involving only Cao
Shicheng and his staff in the First Division of the Chinese Mission. Ho Shailai
apparently knew of the existence of this operation but was not closely involved with it
– an assumption supported by his diaries. For example, in his diary entry for August
21, 1950, Ho wrote down a news item stating that several Japanese were arrested by
the police at a harbor where they were departing for Taiwan and joining KMT forces.
They had been paid 13,000 yen each, and, working behind the scenes, the person
organizing them was Nemoto.249 While Ho met Okamura Yasuji frequently in Japan,
they barely discussed anything relating to the White Group. In late 1951, Ho noted
that he had become “entangled” in the affair through Nemoto and his colleagues
because Japanese who did not receive their salaries from Taipei began asking the
Chinese Mission to pay.250 Thus, it seems fair to judge that Ho did not know a lot
about the details of the White Group mission, while Cao disclosed as few details as
possible to Ho about the White Group. While Ho was entrusted by Chiang to conduct
extremely important missions between Tokyo and Taipei, other secret operations led
by other officials were in progress simultaneously. Chiang’s philosophy for managing
his staff, as many scholars have observed, meant he never entrusted individuals with
full responsibility for, and knowledge of, the complete picture. Whether a diplomat or
a general, Chiang’s men would be placed under surveillance and kept working in
competition with one another.
CONCLUSION
Michael Schaller has summarized it best: “Before 1950, the public, the press, and
the Congress lavished far more attention on the dramatic Chinese civil war (where
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American involvement remained minimal) than on the unglorious routine of
reconstructing a shattered Japan.”251 Looking back over that period, this chapter has
analyzed MacArthur’s grudging involvement in Taiwan’s affairs as the Chinese Civil
War continued towards its conclusion in 1949. In summation, before 1949 the General
was inclined to “sit on the fence” and showed little concern for the progress of the
Civil War. However, as the threat that the CCP might pose to Japan developed to a
degree of seriousness that it could no longer be ignored, MacArthur paid much greater
attention to what was happening in China.
At this juncture, there were two lines developing in MacArthur’s mind. First,
MacArthur kept his eyes on the final phase of the Civil War and pondered its potential
effects on East Asian political order. In the meantime, since the KMT was about to
lose the war, the strategic significance of Taiwan became increasingly apparent. It was
believed that MacArthur was involved in a debate over trusteeship of the island,
internal affairs in Taiwan, and he even, as some studies have suggested, advocated the
replacement of Chiang Kai-shek with more “open-minded” figures. As the war came
to an end, the General also began to receive more Chinese Nationalist guests as a way
to gather information about Taiwan, William Sebald recalling that “Instead of
personal observation, MacArthur familiarized himself with his command through
voracious reading and close, shrewd questioning of innumerable visitors.”252
As for MacArthur own writings, he barely mentioned proposals relating to
Taiwan in his memoirs. However, analyzing the KMT’s retreat to Taiwan, the General
resignedly wrote:
The decision to withhold previously pledged American support was one of the
greatest mistakes ever made in our history. At one fell blow, everything that had
been so laboriously built up since the days of John Hay was lost. It was the
beginning of the crumbling of our power in continental Asia-the birth of the taunt,
“Paper Tiger.” Its consequences will be felt for centuries, and its ultimate
disastrous effects on the fortunes of the free world are still to be unfolded.253
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To a great extent, these words laid the foundation for MacArthur’s approach to
East Asian affairs and Taiwan over two years which followed. As the next chapter will
discuss, MacArthur finally demonstrated tangible support for Chiang with the
outbreak of the Korean War. General Ho Shailai’s work during the Chinese Civil War
will also be rendered more-fully, for he would be the main Chinese representative
dealing with MacArthur as the American general at last came to the aid of the Chiang
and his Nationalist regime.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CHINESEAND SOVIET REPATRIATION
The repatriation of Japanese nationals from China to Japan was perhaps
uppermost on the list of tasks assigned to the Chinese Mission in Japan between 1946
and 1949. Theoretically, the entire operation was not expected to be too testing for the
KMT. An internal report speculated that only six months would be needed to carry out
the operation. However, it turned out to be a more time-consuming and convoluted
one than they expected. This chapter examines the role played by the Chinese Mission
in Japan in the repatriation of Japanese nationals with two focuses. First, the
repatriation of the Japanese nationals from Northeast China.254 The reason that the
repatriation in the Northeast should be studied separately from the repatriation
operations which took place in other areas is due to the fact that repatriation from
Manchuria was complicated significantly by the Chinese Civil War, a conflict in
which the Soviet Union and the Americans played supportive roles behind the scenes.
The second focus of the chapter is the Soviet’s reluctance to cooperate with the
repatriation of Japanese troops from the USSR and the almost constant disputes that
this caused in Tokyo. Both American and Soviet representatives in the Japanese
capital exploited this issue, using it to make accusations against the other while
attempting to gain support among the Japanese public – something which became
increasingly obvious as the US-Soviet relationship sharply deteriorated in 1950 with
the onset of the Cold War. In order to gain the upper hand in this dispute, the
Americans secretly approached the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan and Chinese
representative to the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) from June 1950, Ho Shailai,
convincing him to support proposals that the US would make in an important meeting
of the ACJ. But prior to that, between 1946 to 1949, the Chinese Mission in Japan,
under the leadership of, first, Zhu Shiming and, then, Shang Zhen, coordinated the
Chinese repatriation of the defeated Japanese army between Tokyo and Nanjing.
254 In SCAP’s archives, Manchuria is regarded as part of Northeast China. For instance, Dalian (大連),
then under the control of the Soviet Union, was not recognized as part of Manchuria. Given the fact
that the amount of Japanese residents in Dalian was relatively low, in this chapter the term Manchuria
is equal to Northeast China.
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THEAMERICAN-LED REPATRIATION FROM CHINA
According to Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration, “The Japanese military forces,
after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the
opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.” After the Japanese surrender in
September 1945, ensuring the repatriation of approximately 3,000,000 Japanese
nationals in China became one of SCAP’s top priorities. The United States’ postwar
China policy sought to assist Chiang Kai-shek rebuild his regime so that he could take
firm control of China, something which “could not be accomplished as long as the
security of China was threatened by the presence of large numbers of Japanese
troops.” As was written by a member of the SCAP staff, “large numbers of Japanese
were located in areas of conflicting interests of the French Government, Viet Nam,
Chinese Nationalists, and Chinese Communists, making early evacuation of these
groups imperative to prevent their being used as pawns in the various political
disputes.”255 For the Chinese government of Chiang, the urgent repatriation of
Japanese nationals was also necessary for a more practical reason: to reduce national
levels of food-consumption – just as He Yingqin, one of the KMT’s most senior
figures, wrote in a report. According to He’s estimation, the repatriation required
ship-tonnage measuring in the millions and could be finished in six months.256 This
estimation soon proved overly-optimistic, for He did not foresee the task of
repatriation being impeded so significantly by the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War
in Northeast China.
Due to the level of urgency, an interim plan was implemented in October and “a
more complete organization for repatriation was developed by SCAP through a series
of conferences, in which the Chinese and United States ground and naval
commanders in China were integrated into the SCAP repatriation system”257. As
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Michael Schaller put it, “Under American naval supervision, the Japanese assembled
a transport fleet of nearly four hundred ships that spent months repatriating these
displaced persons.”258 The Americans mobilized their forces at the behest of SCAP,
Naval Command in the Pacific, and United States Forces in China, while the Chinese
Nationalists played a subsidiary role by arranging for the transfer of Japanese men
and women to the ports assigned for embarkation by the Americans. A telegraph sent
by Shang Zhen (who would assume the leadership of the Chinese Mission in Japan in
1946) from the Office of the Military Committee to He Yingqin exemplified the
degree of Sino-American cooperation on the issue. In the telegram, Shang reported
that, according to notices from the Americans, three Japanese ships arriving in Tanggu
could each evacuate 5,000 Japanese. That being the case, the Chinese should send
15,000 Japanese to the ports in time for the scheduled dates.259 At that moment in
time, of course, the Chinese Mission in Japan had yet to be established, and thus
communication between China and SCAP proceeded through standard diplomatic
channels. Any information had to pass through several stations before arriving with
the intended recipients. For instance, the Ministry of National Defense of China
telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek with information about fifteen Japanese nationals who
had received political training from the Chinese Communists in Zhangjiakou and
were now aboard a ship leaving from Tanggu for Japan. The Ministry of National
Defense therefore wished to advise Chiang that he might inform the Americans who
would then, in turn, pass this intelligence on to SCAP and the Japanese so that they
could make the appropriate preparations for the arrival of potential political
agitators.260 The establishment of the Chinese Mission in Japan would soon facilitate
a more efficient exchange of information between Nanjing and Tokyo.
The joint Sino-American repatriation of Japanese nationals proved generally
efficient and well-ordered for most parts of China. Indeed, by June, 1946, “the greater
part of China was cleared.”261 On October 31 of that year, a British report
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summarized the progress of repatriation: “Peiping Headquarters Group announced the
completion of mass repatriation from China (including Manchuria). There remain
some stragglers, retained technicians, and released former war crimes suspects, whom
the Chinese have been urged to repatriate by 31 Dec 46.”262 Two months later, on
December 31, 1946, another British report noted, “SCAP-controlled repatriation
shipping was withdrawn.”263 According to SCAP’s own record, “mass repatriation
from Chinese areas was completed by the end of December 1946, with some
3,101,700 Japanese returned home.”264 While the mass repatriation from China had
been all-but completed, as announced officially, what was left uncompleted,
especially in Manchuria, proved to be burdensome and onerous for the Chinese
government. The newly-established Chinese Mission in Japan therefore became the
cushion between Chinese Nationalists and SCAP, and was the recipient of the bulk of
petitions from the Japanese public eager to see Japanese nationals still in China –
whether soldier or civilian – return home.
REPATRIATION EFFORTS IN MANCHURIA
While the repatriation of Japanese nationals in most parts of China proceeded
smoothly, the operation in Manchuria was impeded by the resumption of the Chinese
Civil War. Immediately after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the Chinese Communists
occupied several cities in Manchuria with assistance from the Soviet Union. Because
of this development, and as SCAP were well aware, “[b]y comparison with the rest of
China, repatriation from Manchuria proved the most difficult.”265 On September 8,
1945, when asked by the Japanese how 800,000 Japanese residents in Manchuria and
Northern Korea would be protected, Richard Sunderland, Macarthur’s Chief of Staff,
replied frankly that, “this is a big problem. I see your difficulty, but I have no good
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idea.”266 As the struggle between the KMT and CCP for the Northeast progressed, the
repatriation of Japanese nationals became more complicated. “Due to the special
circumstances of the Northeast,” wrote He Yingqin in a report to Chiang Kai-shek on
December 15, 1945, “the repatriation in that area has not been included in the
repatriation operation as a whole.”267 Furthermore, the number of the Japanese
nationals in Manchuria had been miscalculated, because many were transferred to
prison camps in the Soviet Union as the war ended. As a SCAP report noted, “It is
NOT clear how many Japs who surrendered to the Soviets in Manchuria still remain
in the area.”268 A British report written in April 1946 then projected that, “Prospects
of the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria and Northern Korea seem brighter, but
it appears that only civilians are available for repatriation, since the Japanese soldiers
(who were the majority) are no longer in those areas.”269 A Marshall Mission
notification from 1946 elaborates further:
Japanese forces, totaling some 700,000 are for the most part disarmed but their
whereabouts is obscure. The Russians have made no reply to U.S. queries as to
their intentions to repatriate these Japanese forces from Manchuria. On the
contrary, reports indicate that extensive use is being made of Japanese military in
the construction of fortifications at Vladivostok as well as Manchuria.270
The Nippon Times (April 13, 1946) also reported that, “Thus far, no Japanese
have been returned from Manchuria, Northern Korea, the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin,
North Indo-China, or Canada.”271 The repatriation procedure in Manchuria, as well as
a more precise calculation for the number of Japanese nationals, only began after the
KMT managed to reclaim territory in Manchuria in April 1946. The KMT’s
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bittersweet victory in the Battle of Siping forced the CCP to retreat northward and
enabled the repatriation of Japanese nationals to proceed without obstacle from the
port of Huludao, in Liaoning. SCAP calculated the number of Japanese in Manchuria
at 1,603,000 – of which 59,000 were scheduled for repatriation by the end of April.272
On May 12, Du Yuming, the KMT military commander in the Northeast, announced
that on May 6 the first shipment of Japanese had left Manchuria.273 According to the
Nippon Times, and based on a Chinese-American agreement, repatriation was the
“direct responsibility” of the KMT and happened “without the aid of United States
Marines in North China.”274 In reality, however, the Americans played a central role
in the endeavor. General Keller Rockey, commander of the US First Marine Division,
admitted that marines were on-hand “to help in the repatriation of Japanese and to
guard American property.”275 “During this period every effort was made to push
repatriation in order to complete the program in Manchuria before the port of Hulutao
was frozen in,” SCAP later summarized, before adding:
Out of the 1,300,000 believed to be in the area, only 469,000 Japanese, mostly
civilians, had been repatriated by mid-August 1946. During the summer repeated
attempts were made to secure evacuation of Japanese from central and north
Manchuria under Chinese Communist control. Early in September evacuation
from Chinese Communist areas was at last made possible; the outflow from
Hulutao increased to 10,000-15,000 daily during the next two months. By the end
of October all Japanese had been evacuated from Manchuria except the 250,000
under Soviet control and some 68,000 unaccounted for in the interior.276
As regards those 300,000-plus people either “under Soviet control” or simply
“unaccounted for,” the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan’s Periodical Report
had already stated, in February 1946, that “The fate of Japanese in Manchuria and the
Russian zone of Korea, of whom nothing has been heard since the surrender, has been
the subject of repeated appeals to S.C.A.P. by the Japanese Government.”277 Relatives
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of some of those “accounted for” people had begun to petition the Chinese Mission in
Japan in order to obtain information on their whereabouts and plead for their return.
The Japanese government had also been trying to find ways to rescue its missing
compatriots in Northeast China. For instance, on September 9, 1945, the Japanese
government proposed that MacArthur reopen “railway communication between
Northeast China (Changchun and Mukden) and Southern Korea (Pusan).”278 Aside
from seeking help from the Americans, the Japanese government communicated with
Soviet representatives in Tokyo, but to no effect. It is unsurprising therefore that
Japanese individuals began turning to SCAP and the Chinese Mission for assistance.
On November 20, 1946, the Chinese Mission in Japan cabled the Foreign Ministry in
Nanjing, reporting that they and the ACJ had been receiving numerous petitions
asking about the repatriation of Japanese soldiers. “These kinds of petitions are placed
in a tiny room in the ACJ Secretary’s office and are piled several feet tall now, among
them are letters signed with blood and several hundred signatures, proving how the
Japanese care about this issue.”279 Amonth previously, in a letter written in English to
the political advisor of the Chinese Mission, Shen Jinding, Japanese petitioners
requested that the “authorities of the Allied Powers, especially your country, the
Republic of China to sympathize with us and arrange for early repatriation of those
who are still abroad to let them see, as soon as possible, their parents, wives, husbands,
sisters, brothers, children and friends who are longing for their return to their home.”
Four key demands were also put forward:
1. That the repatriation of those who remain at Dairen and the vicinity, over
300,000 in number, through the ports of Dairen, Shahokuo, Tafangshen and
Chinchow be arranged at the earliest possible [time].
2. That the repatriation through Hulutao of those who are in Manchuria be
continued; and protection against the cold on the way of transportation be
provided.
3. That the repatriation from North Korea, Saghalien, the Kuriles and Soviet
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4. Should they be obliged to spend another winter, adequate provisions against
the cold be provided.280
While expressing their gratitude to the Republic of China, these petitioners
perhaps overestimated the abilities of the KMT to do anything to resolve the issue of
Japanese nationals still in Manchuria, and especially those in the Soviet-controlled
areas needing to “be expedited”. The end of the Battle of Siping was followed by a
cease-fire agreement extracted by Marshall so that a degree of “calm prevailed in the
Northeast throughout the summer and on through September” of 1946.281 During this
period, a massive repatriation of Japanese nationals was indeed undertaken in
Manchuria. On October 11, the KMT regained Zhangjiakou, a Northern city with
significant strategic value, and continued to broaden its attack by marching on
Andong. From the perspective of the KMT, expending energy on locating and
repatriating the 300,000 “missing” Japanese nationals at this point would not have
been to their immediate benefit in the fight against the CCP. Hence, even after
receiving numerous petitions, the KMT did not look to accelerate the frequency of
repatriations from Manchuria.
Besides, the number of Japanese nationals found in the KMT-controlled areas was
far less than the 300,000 indicated by the Japanese petitioners. As Xiong Shihui (熊式
輝), the KMT military chief in Northeast China noted, “In Northeast China 773,764
Japanese have been repatriated, among which 242,872 were in CCP-controlled zone.
Except for the CCP-controlled zone the number of remaining Japanese is unclear, in
our zone there is 30,902 Japanese who are now undergoing the repatriation
procedure.”282 The Civil War meant, of course, Japanese nationals in Manchuria were
divided by being located in areas occupied by the KMT and CCP, respectively.
Published on January 15, 1947, a KMT report offered some figures for the new status
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KMT 773204 30902 Huludao May 7, 1946 to August 15,
1946.
CCP 242524 CCP:42119 Huludao August 21, 1946 to
December 1946.Soviet:270000
This calculation corresponded to the statistics given by Xiong and also revealed
another fact: those 270,000 Japanese residents were all in Dalian, a city which, from
1945, had been occupied by the Soviets following “a legalistic interpretation of the
Sino-Soviet Treaty.”284 In the meantime, SCAP also made a calculation, which to a
great extent matched the KMT’s. In January 1947, it speculated that “about 40,000
Japanese still remain in the Chinese National Government-controlled areas of
Manchuria and about 55,000 in Chinese Communist-controlled territory.”285 As these
calculations demonstrated, the majority of the Japanese nationals were stationed in the
CCP and Soviet-controlled zones, where the KMT had no influence. Faced with this
predicament, Zhu Shiming, the first head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, openly
asked General MacArthur “what had been done about recommendations on
repatriation and demobilization programs.”286 The dilemma was clarified by SCAP
thus:
This dilemma was epitomized in a SCAP report,
The problem of repatriating Japanese stragglers in Manchuria still existed,
however; in a G-3 report of 29 April 1949 it was estimated that there were
slightly more than 60,000 Japanese still in the Chinese Communist controlled
areas of Manchuria. Their repatriation could be accomplished only if they were
able to infiltrate into Nationalist areas and then be transported to ports on the
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coast. General MacArthur was prepared to send shipping whenever there were
sufficient number of Japanese available for repatriation.287
Another SCAP report continued on the theme: “Small numbers of technicians and
their dependents, who are released, may continue to be repatriated through southern
ports on shipping available to the Chinese.”288 This information revealed that the
repatriation of some Japanese nationals, like skilled technicians, was prioritized. What
this SCAP report did not reveal was the fact that some Japanese nationals with
influence, power, and connections had sought other ways to be evacuated from
Manchuria. The case of Takasaki Tatsunosuke (高崎達之助) was typical and deserves
attention.
Takasaki was born in 1885 and became a key figure in the puppet state of
Manchukuo, serving as the president of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development
Company. After the war, Takasaki stayed in Northeast China to “help” with the
recovery of the local economy as the CCP assumed control over the area. To this end,
he was coerced by the Soviet Red Army into “preparing an affidavit transferring the
Manchurian Heavy Industry Company to the Soviet Union.”289 When the CCP was
forced to retreat by the KMT in 1946, Takasaki stayed on, and served as a counselor
dedicated to the economy and also began managing repatriation operations. As
Mayumi Itoh has written, “In the absence of government help, several Japanese
civilian leaders who had remained in Manchuria organized self-help organizations to
facilitate the repatriation of Japanese. The representative of these voluntary groups
was Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who patiently negotiated with the ROC government, the
Soviet Army, and other concerned authorities.”290 On October 4, 1947, after
Takasaki’s family had asked for his return, SCAP approached the Chinese Mission
directly to help with his repatriation:
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The Diplomatic Section presents its compliments to the Chinese Mission in Japan
and has the honor to request information regarding a Japanese national, Mr.
TAKASAKI Tatsunosuke……It is reported that he desires to return to Japan and
that his family also is desirous of his repatriation in order that he can take care of
certain outstanding family affairs. It would be appreciated if the Chinese Mission
could furnish this Section with information as to Mr. Takasaki’s present status and
the possibility of his early repatriation to Japan.291
At this point it is safe to say that the Japanese nor SCAP knew the true status of
Takasaki and the full extent of his activities in Manchuria. That is, Takasaki was one
of the leaders of a secret group operating in Northeast China and overseen by the
KMT and Chinese National Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. The group’s
mission was the surveillance of the activities of their compatriots who were awaiting
repatriation and undertake counter-espionage in the Chinese-Korean border area
against the Japanese and Korean communists who were operating there. The results
achieved by Takasaki and his group satisfied Chiang Kai-shek to the degree that he
sanctioned sending a Chinese official to Japan, serving as a counselor to the Chinese
Mission, to undertake similar intelligence gathering operations.292 It is still unclear
how the Chinese Mission replied to SCAP with regard to repatriating Takasaki, but it
is certain that it would not have let SCAP know about the man’s involvement in the
secret group.
With relevance to the cases mentioned above, the Chinese Mission in Japan were
also aware that some Japanese residents repatriated from Siberia had received training
from the Soviets and been ordered to open shops and work in factories in Hokkaido in
order to gather information on the American’s military facilities.293 This information
was reported to the Ministry of National Defense and later to Chiang Kai-shek in
December 1947. It was still unknown whether the Chinese Mission informed SCAP
about this group.
A similar case can be found in a note from SCAP dated October 21, 1947, in
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which it asked the Chinese Mission to arrange the return of Colonel Temiaki Hidaka.
“This Officer was chief of the Information Bureau of the Japanese North China Army
Headquarters at the time of Japan’s surrender and is now an adviser employed by the
Chinese War Department at Peiping. The Colonel is most eager to rejoin his family in
Tokyo and his services are also desired by this Headquarters.”294 No further
information on Hidaka can be located in the Chinese archive and how the Chinese
Mission replied to SCAP remains unclear, but it was extremely likely that Hidaka,
like Takasaki, remained in China and continued to work for the Chinese.
Petitions hoping for the return of loved ones poured into the office of the Chinese
Missions in Tokyo. In some cases, petitions were delivered to the Diplomatic Section
of SCAP, rather than to the Chinese Mission. As a result, the Diplomatic Section had
to forward the letters to the Chinese Mission and request that they deal with them.
When, for instance, the Chinese Mission received a memorandum from SCAP on
May 20, 1948, they were informed that the occupation authorities had been sent a
letter from “the Yokohama Branch of the Diplomatic Section requesting repatriation
of her husband, a radio operator, from China.” Elaborating further, the missive reads,
“The letter is enclosed for consideration by the Chinese Government and such action
as may be possible……When the matter has been appropriately investigated,
information would be appreciated in order that a reply can be sent to Mrs. Watada.”
After a month, He Yinqin replied to the Department of Foreign Affairs that the
Japanese could be repatriated when “there is a ship next time.” 295
With assistance from the Chinese Mission in Japan, the amount of the Japanese
nationals in Northeast China had been reducing sharply between 1946 and 1948.
According to the calculations of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, by
October 1948 only 60,316 Japanese remained to be evacuated from Manchuria.296 Yet
as the military fortunes of the KMT in Northeast China began to collapse, the
repatriation of Japanese nationals slowed to a crawl. In a report from the Mukden
Consulate-General dated September 13, 1948, only 54 Japanese were in a group of
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refugees who had just left Changchun and were heading to Mukden, from where they
would be “flown to Chinchow, for repatriation by a ship expected to leave Hulutao
[Huludao] towards the end of this month.”297
From the perspective of SCAP, after 1948 the repatriation procedure in
Manchuria was a secondary issue comparing to that in Siberia. In an official
announcement marking the realization of Japanese demilitarization, “All that remains
to be done is the repatriation and demobilization of the Japanese servicemen still
being held in areas under Soviet control. This action is the last in a series taken by the
Japanese under compulsion of SCAP instructions.”298 In their eyes, the amount of the
Japanese left in Soviet-controlled areas was such that those in Manchuria could no
longer register in comparison. As a British report on June 3 noted, of those who were
waiting to be repatriated, “676,831 are being held in Soviet-controlled areas in camps
distributed from the Caucasus to the Maritime Province of Siberia and on the island of
Sakhalin, plus a few thousands in Dairen and North Korea. In addition, there are
about 65,000 to be returned from Manchuria……”299
In general, beginning in April 1946, the repatriation operation had proceeded
effectively. However, after Marshall’s failure and the resumption of civil war in 1947,
repatriation was significantly disturbed by the conflict between the KMT and CCP.
For instance, in the week of June 22 to 29, only 24 Japanese were repatriated from
Manchuria.300 In the week of January 9 to 15 of 1948, this number decreased to
one.301 In fact, throughout the entirety of 1948, and even until the total defeat of
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in 1949, the number of Japanese awaiting to be repatriated,
approximately 60,000 in total, had not decreased significantly due to the severity of
the fight for control of China – on September 27, 1949, 60,000 Japanese were still
estimated to be in Manchuria awaiting repatriation.302 Another source also noted that
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in May the number was 60,000, but “it is difficult to tell whether these Japanese,
many of whom were reported to have fought with Nationalist or Communist forces,
were still in Manchuria, had gone south into North China, or had been moved to
Siberia.”303 This burden of dealing with the problem had by then become the CCP’s;
the Chinese Mission in Japan could do nothing. Three years later, by the end of May
1952, there were still 59,028 Japanese in mainland China.304
It is worth noting here, too, that repatriation was not as homogenous an
experience as the tables of figures make it out to be. In its 1946 annual report, for
example, the Chinese Mission dealt with the repatriation of twelve Japanese who were
suffering from leprosy in Tianjin.305 As John Dower has observed, “Diseases ravaged
many groups of returnees, and as a consequence repatriation became delayed by the
need to conduct medical examinations, immunizations, and occasional
quarantines.”306 That is just one example of the many aspects of the Chinese
repatriation operation still awaiting scholarly investigation. In KMT historiography,
however, the difficulty of repatriating the overseas Japanese in Manchuria is rarely
mentioned while the overall success of the operation is celebrated. He Yinqin, who
nominally coordinated repatriation operations, later claimed, “I devoted my biggest
efforts to repatriating 1.2 million Japanese soldiers and 850,000 citizens back to Japan
in ten months.”307 He also stressed that China had used 300,000 tons of Chinese
shipping, an amount which accounted for eighty percent of the entire Chinese capacity,
to repatriate the Japanese.308 By saying so, He Yingqin downplays the role played by
SCAP as a way to develop a sense of gratitude to the KMT from among the Japanese
public.
The story of repatriation under the KMT has also been utilized to criticize the
303 Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50 (New York: Macmillan, 1950),
15.
304 “H. A. H. Cortazzi to F. W. Marten,” December 3, 1952, UK National Archives, FO 371/99523.
305 “Sanshiwu Niandu Benzu Jingban Yewu Jianbao (三十五年度本組經辦業務簡報) [Group
Business Briefing, 1946],” 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0006.
306 John Dower, Embracing Defeat, 51.
307 He Yinqing, Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji (日本訪問講演選集) [Selected Speeches on Visit to
Japan] (Taipei: Zhongri Wenhua Jingji Xiehui, 1959), 50.
308 He Yinqing, Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji, 64.
93
way the return of Japanese nationals was being handled by the CCP and the Soviet
Union. Okamura alluded to the difference when he asked, “whom should we be
thankful for allowing two million Japanese in China to return home in less than a year
peacefully, even being allowed to bring private objects and blankets?”309 The quote
also refers to He Yingqin allowing the Japanese to carry 30 kg of luggage back to
Japan, although Okamura was asked by SCAP to decrease the luggage allowance
since it complicated train transportation.310 Okamura, as well as some Japanese who
benefited from He Yingqin and Chiang Kai-shek, praised the KMT to show their
dissatisfaction with the progress of repatriation from mainland China’s CCP-held
regions and the Soviet Union.
REPATRIATIONAND THE SOVIET UNION
Due to the relatively small numbers, the repatriation effort in CCP-controlled
Manchuria after 1949 was not a major concern for SCAP. In contrast, however, the
issue of repatriating Japanese nationals detained in Soviet-controlled territory was
heatedly debated in Tokyo. The issue was exacerbated, of course, by the
Soviet-American rivalry in Tokyo, and became something of a bargaining chip.
In June 1946 George Atcheson had reported that the number of Japanese captured
by the Soviets and their whereabouts were “unknown to General Headquarters.”311
Similar to the case of those Japanese left in China, anxious relatives of the Japanese
soldiers now in the Soviet Union joined the Japanese government and SCAP in
prodding the Soviet Mission in Tokyo for their swift repatriation. On December 19 of
that year, Derevyanko signed an agreement, according to which the Soviet Union
promised to repatriate 50,000 Japanese prisoners on a monthly basis. However,
progress was slow and the Soviets were far from forthcoming with replies to requests
for information sent by the Japanese government. Then rumors began to spread that
the Soviet Union was slowing the progress of repatriation in order to indoctrinate the
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prisoners with anti-American and anti-SCAP ideology.312 In the spring of 1947, the
Soviet Mission in Japan openly denied accusations that the USSR was purposely
delaying repatriation of Japanese nationals.313 In spite of the denial, the allies doubts
were far from eased. Though according to William Sebald, the Soviets “were
completely isolated on this issue. The British Commonwealth and Chinese members
fully supported SCAP during the Council meeting.”314
The strife between the sides then escalated when the Americans seized on the
Soviet’s apparent insincerity as regards the repatriation of Japanese nationals so as to
garner support from the Japanese public, with SCAP frequently lamenting the Soviet’s
constant delays.315 On the other side, the Soviets complained about the hostile
attitude of the Japanese press and draw attention to the “anti-democratic measures of
the Japanese Government” as a way to counter-balance the negative impact of
criticism. Demonstrating the Soviet’s frustrations, in December 1949 General
Derevyanko urged both the Japanese and American governments to not “publish
fabulous figures of the Japanese still not repatriated from the USSR and disseminate
other slanderous insinuations with regard to the conditions of the Japanese prisoners”
because it incited Japanese hostility towards the Soviet Union. Derevyanko also
requested the “anti-democratic” issue be placed on the agenda of that same ACJ
meeting.316 After Derevyanko had interrupted the meeting several times, Sebald, the
chairman, stated that “The General is out of order.” Derevyanko then left the meeting
in protest, leaving only Sebald, Zhu Shiming and Hodgson behind. Seblad then
scolded the Soviet Union for not obeying the Potsdam Declaration with regard to the
repatriation of foreign nationals, noting for the record that “as of today, a total of
316,617 Japanese remain to be evacuated form Soviet-controlled areas, including
Dairen, Karafuto, the Kuriles, and Siberia, but not including Manchuria, which is
312 John Dower, Embracing Defeat, 52.
313 “Su Zhuri Daibiaotuan Fouren Chiqian Rifu Shuo (蘇駐日代表團否認遲遣日俘說) [Soviet
Mission in Japan Denies Delaying Japanese Repatriations],” March 8, 1947, Yishibao (Shanghai).
314 William Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 140.
315 “Mengjun Zongbu Ze Su Yanchi Qianfan Riren (盟軍總部責蘇延遲遣返日人) [SCAP Scolds the
Soviets for Delaying Japanese Repatriations],” May 15, 1948, Yishibao (Shanghai).
316 “Verbatim Minutes of the 132th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83811.
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statistically charged with 60,312 unrepatriated Japanese.” (According to American
calculations, in sum, the total number of Japanese nationals still held by the Russians
was 370,000; the Soviet regime “strenuously denied these accusations.”317) To
buttress his argument, Sebald asked the Secretary-General of the ACJ to bring a part
of the “petitions, letters and postcards received to date” into the meeting room. Sebald
then asked him “How many bundles of that size do you have?” In reply, the
Secretary-General said, “There remain 102 more bundles similar to each of these
four.” After that, Sebald made a long statement scolding the Soviet’s for their distinct
non-cooperation and, at the end, urged members of ACJ to “give all possible
assistance to the SUPREME COMMANDER and his General Headquarters in the
urgent and vital task of tearing the veil from the ugly countenance of the repatriation
problem that should have been resolved long since, and of discovering the secrets
which have been hidden from us for so long….” 318
Asking the members of the ACJ for assistance, Sebald referred to Zhu Shiming,
since only Nationalist China knew the details of the situation in Dalian and Manchuria.
After answering questions from Hodgson, Sebald again spoke, “GENERAL CHU, do
you care to make any comment?” Zhu Shiming did indeed care to, adding,
……In a subsequent meeting, October 1947, the then MEMBER FOR CHINA
stated that the Chinese Government had with only certain exceptions almost
completely repatriated the Japanese nationals to their homeland. I have nothing to
add to that statement except I want to strike out the word “almost”. Now we have
completely repatriated the Japanese Nationals which were in our hands after the
war.
By replying that China had completed its own repatriation operation in
KMT-controlled areas, Zhu perhaps misread Sebald’s intention. Nevertheless, Sebald
certainly wished to prompt Zhu to support his argument by making use of the KMT
success by portraying it in contrast lack of progress on the part of the Soviet Union.
And as Sebald recounted later, with “the strong support of the British and Chinese
317 Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953),
144.
318 “Verbatim Minutes of the 132th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83811.
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members on this issue, SCAP continued to press the Soviets on repatriation
throughout 1950.”319
Certainly, in January of that year, this dispute had not reached anything like a
compromise. Then from February 1 onwards, the Soviet representative refused to
attend the ACJ meetings because “the inclusion on the agenda of the question of
repatriation of Japanese appears unlawful.”320 During an ACJ meeting held in May, a
Chinese representative named Lee Dai-chin spoke: “At present, I don’t think I can
propose any competent method to complete the big job but I only hope the Japanese
repatriation can be completed very soon, the sooner the better.”321 On August 2, Ho
Shailai, now head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, joined the meetings. Ho began by
stating that Nationalist China’s “handling of the Japanese repatriates was done
efficiently and without any feeling of enmity or bitterness.” Ho was clearly conscious
of the US-Soviet tension that had risen around the repatriation issue, as well as the
opportunity that it presented the Chinese Nationalists. Ho also observed wryly that the
Soviet Government had “established a new form of diplomatic practice by referring
formal communications from foreign governments, to news reports on such a serious
matter as this.”322 This practice was summarized by Robert A. Fearey:
On April 22 Tass News Agency announced the “completion” of Japanese
repatriation from the Soviet Union, stating that, with the exception of 2,458
persons connected with war crimes and 9 cases of illness, no more Japanese
prisoners of war remained in Soviet custody. This statement, confirming that of
May 1949, produced a sharp reaction in Japan and strengthened fears that
310,000 Japanese still unaccounted for inn Soviet territories, and about 60,000 in
Manchuria, were dead. On April 29 the Chief of SCAP’s Diplomatic Section sent
a note to the Soviet member of the Allied Council again requesting the Soviet
Government to furnish information on Japanese prisoners of war and internees
who had come under Soviet control. The Soviet member of the Allied Council
absented himself from all meetings of the Allied Council at which the repatriation
issue was to be discussed, and remained away from the May 24 and June 7
meetings, even though the repatriation item was not on the agenda.323
319 William Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 147.
320 “Verbatim Minutes of the 116th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83812.
321 “Verbatim Minutes of the 113th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83812.
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According to his own diary entry for July 29, in a discussion with the vice head of
the Chinese Mission, Ho thought about how he should reply if the repatriation issue
was raised at the next meeting of the ACJ.324 Then, at an ACJ meeting held on
November 8, the Chinese Mission proposed a ‘plan A’. The Soviet representative
opposed the plan, claiming that the Chinese representative had no right to vote on any
issue. After also being rejected by Sebald, the Chinese representative offered a ‘Plan
B’which did find favor with the other members of the ACJ.325
Deeply antagonized by the outbreak of the Korean War and the Soviet’s refusal to
recognize the official status of the Chinese Nationalist government, Ho began
aggressively criticizing the Soviet’s repatriation claims. On the ACJ meeting of
December 20, Ho chastised and even satirized the Cominforn:
……But, as everyone knows, the Soviet Government has adamantly refused to
permit any such investigation for one reason or another which convinces nobody.
The Russians, true to their usual pattern, are trying to cover up their crimes
against humanity and human rights and believe that lies and falsification of facts
can hide the truth……MR. CHAIRMAN, the Allied Council for Japan, unlike the
Cominforn, does not force any of its members to do what it does not want to do,
but by the Soviet refusal to permit an investigation one fact can be
established……
Continuing to display his cynicism, Ho closed his reprimand with a right-hook of
a suggestion:
……By detaining so many Japanese in Russia could it be that these so-called
“volunteers” will one day “volunteer” to engage in subversive activities in Japan.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I recommend that this Council call the attention of the
SUPREME COMMANDER to this possibility of a new variety of so-called
“volunteers”. That is all.
As usual, the Soviet representative did not want to confront this issue under
324 DHSL, July 29, 1950.
325 DHSL, November 8, 1950.
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discussion but raised instead the “anti-democratic” discourse used to critique the US.
Ho responded by listing several examples showing how rude the communists were
and how the Soviet was unqualified to criticize others,
……The entire world knows that the achievements of the Occupation under the
executive authority of the SUPREME COMMANDER are vast and epochal and
that the political and economic health of Japan and her people have steadily
improved. This progress of Japan has been made possible despite the
obstructionism and non-cooperation of the Soviet Government as represented on
this Council. The record of this Council shows that what criticism the SOVIET
MEMBER has given has been destructive rather than constructive, what advice
he has given has been cynical rather than sincere.
After hearing this, Kislenko, the Soviet representative, suggested that Sebald
“cool down these Kuomintang representatives who represent nobody, resort to insults,
slanderous attacks and practice in cynicism and rudeness.”326 In his diaries, Ho
mentioned the effort he had put in order to act well during this meeting. Ho received
the news that Sebald would be raising the issue of Japanese convicts in USSR at the
next get-together of the ACJ five days before. Ho felt perturbed and immediately
convened a meeting with his own staff to flesh out a way to deal with this proposal
ahead of time.327 Two days later, Ho convened another meeting to discuss the issue
further.328 The next day, on December 18, Ho wrote down a secret request he had
received from Sebald ahead of the meeting of the ACJ,
Last Saturday I sent Liu Yutang to SCAP Diplomatic Section to ask what attitude
shall we take in the next ACJ minute and had not received any reply. Today the
Diplomatic Section asked Liu in to have a conversation. According to Liu, Sebald
hoped I would try to stop the Soviet member taking the floor and hope me to
offer full assistance, which obsesses me. The reasons are (1) The Russian do have
the right to take the floor. (2) Limiting the ACJ members ability to take the floor
will significantly effect the policies made by the ACJ in the future. Since the
Diplomatic Section asks me to do so and since it has good relationship with me, it
seems that I cannot refuse to support it. As a result, I have to figure out best to
326 “Verbatim Minutes of the 129th Meeting,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83813.
327 DHSL, December 15, 1950.
328 DHSL, December 17, 1950.
99
react to this.329
On the eve of the ACJ meeting, Ho summoned the staff of the Chinese Mission to
his residence to discuss the issue and translate his speeches into Chinese, something
they did until midnight.330 Ho’s speech the next day clearly satisfied Sebald. Writing
in his diary that night, Ho revealed that his speech was meant to “assist Sebald to
admonishing the Soviet representative” and his performance would have “at least
make a little contribution to the American [aims].”331 The following day, Ho received
a call from Sebald who expressed his sincere gratitude to Ho for the support he had
demonstrated in the meeting. Sebald was, so Ho recorded, extremely touched by the
“similarity between Ho’s speech and the American’s.” Reflecting on Sebald’s reaction,
Ho speculated in his diary, “at least this might verify that I am able to offer concrete
assistance to SCAP after our friendship has developed during the past several
months.”332 As the next chapter will demonstrate, Ho’s desire to cooperate closely
with the Americans at this point in time was in great part due to the progress of the
Korean War, during which the Chinese Nationalist regime, now based in Taipei, had
been urgently seeking support from Washington.
CONCLUSION
As Okamura Yasuji recounted in a discussion with He Yingqin, the KMT army
equipped with American equipment which was dispatched to Manchuria was mainly
composed of soldiers from South China – men who ate rice and were not accustomed
to the foods and climate of the northeast. Since transports were occupied with
repatriating Japanese soldiers, southern rice could not be sent to Manchuria for the
KMT units from the south, something which hugely disadvantaged KMT army. As
329 DHSL, December 18, 1950.
330 According to Ho’s diaries, those staffs were Chen Qingwen (陳清文), Liu Zenghua (劉增華), Song
Yuelun (宋越倫), Liu Yutang (劉毓棠), Wang Xinzhong (王信忠), Deng Zhenxu (鄧振緒), all of
whom were leaders of Sections under the Chinese Mission in Japan. See DHSL, December 19, 1950.
331 DHSL, December 20, 1950.
332 DHSL, December 21, 1950.
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Okamura claims, “repatriating the two million Japanese in a short period of time
required the Chinese making significant sacrifices.”333 The resumption of the civil
war in the Northeast impeded further repatriation and so Japanese nationals left in that
region - either those transferred to the Soviet Union or those remaining within the
borders of mainland China - became a thorny issue for American and Russian
diplomats in Tokyo for years to come.
Between 1946-1948, Huludao served as the main port of embarkation for
Japanese nationals leaving Manchuria. It was also the port placed under the charge of
future head of the Chinese Mission, Ho Shailai. Ho was appointed Port Commander
of Huludao and Qinhuangdao in March 1946.334 One of his core missions was to
arrange the repatriation of 1,000,700 Japanese soldiers within nine months. As a
person who visited the ports in Huludao in April 1947 recalled, the dock could berth
five 10,000-ton steamships.335 In this period, Ho followed Chiang’s “meet hate with
compassion” directive and treated the Japanese soldiers well, just as a Japanese
journalist described,
During the examination of Japanese by Chinese soldiers before the boarding.
Gen. Ho used to stand by to see that no inconvenience was given by men under
his command. More than once he reprimanded his officers for failing to obey this
instruction to be kind to the Japanese. Though they were enemies only a few
months ago, Gen. Ho always used to pick up Japanese in his car whenever he
came across them.336
During his time in Huludao, Ho made friends with many Japanese and, as his
diaries reveal, remained in contact with a number of them during his stay in Tokyo
from 1950 to 1952. On November 26, 1950, Fukushima, a man who had got to know
333 He Yingqin, Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji, 65.
334 “Qinhu Liang Yaogang Siling He Shili Beifai L xin (秦葫兩要港司令何世禮北飛履新)
[Qinhuangdao and Huludao Commander Ho Shailai Flew North to Assume New Post],” March 27,
1946, The Kung Sheung Daily News.
335 Shen Yunlong (沈雲龍), Ling Hongxun Xiansheng Fangwen Jilu (凌鴻勛先生訪問紀錄) [The
Reminiscences of Mr. Ling Hung-hsun] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1997),
215.
336 “Nippon Gov’t to Thank Gen. Ho for Kindness in Repatriation”, July 29, 1950, Nippon Times.
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Ho whilst in Huludao as part of a crew working for the Manchuria Railway Company,
paid a visit to the head of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo. Ho wrote candidly in his
diary, “I have not met him for several years and could not have believed I would meet
him again here.”337 Similarly, on June 24, 1951, a Japanese named Kimura, whom Ho
had also met in Huludao, pleaded with Ho for funds totaling ten thousand yen that
could pay for his daughter’s wedding. In his diary, Ho wrote of Kimura, “I think he
made many contributions in Huludao. Only after he sent the last group of Japanese
nationals aboard did he himself leave, a fact which deserves compliment. As a
consequence, I decided to collect ten thousand yen to send to him as a way of
showing that our government has not forgotten him.”338 When Ho was coordinating
the repatriation efforts in Huludao in 1946, the Nationalist-led China was still one of
the Big Four Powers. Four years later, however, as he assumed the leadership role at
the Chinese Mission, and even though internationally they were still recognized as the
legitimate Chinese regime, the Nationalists had lost the civil war and been driven to
Taiwan. In 1952, the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty weakened the status of
the Nationalists fundamentally. As Ho frequently wrote in his diary, his professional
experience is a lens through which the changing fortunes of the Chinese and Japanese
governments in the post-war period can be observed. What’s more, Ho Shailai’s
involvement in the dispute between the ACJ’s American and Soviet representatives
opens a window on the growing US-Soviet Union rivalry during the opening stage of
the Cold War.
337 DHSL, November 26, 1950.
338 DHSL, June 24, 1951.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE TOKYO TRIAL
To the Chinese, obtaining reparations from Japan and punishing Japanese war
criminals responsible for atrocities committed in wartime were amongst the top
priorities of postwar policy. According to a member of staff from the Chinese Mission,
the main focus of China’s policies toward Japan included the “removal of the emperor,
reparations to be paid, participation in the actual administration of the Japanese home
islands, punishment of those guilty of war, [and] removal of the influence of the
zaibatsu.”339 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also
famous for its synonymy as the Tokyo Trial, was established in 1946 to try Japanese
war criminals. The Tribunal was a long and complicated process during which a
variety of competing views and opinions prosecuting the offenders were sharply
debated. Though the final results of the Tokyo Trial seemed satisfactory to the
Chinese representatives, the bitterness and numerous unresolved problems deriving
from it did not easily dissipate. In addition, after the establishment of the PRC in 1949,
trying and reeducating Japanese accused of war crimes who remained in mainland
China became a propaganda weapon wielded as a way to demonstrate the legitimacy
of the CCP.340
Due to its historical and political significance, controversies over whether the
Tokyo Trial was a demonstration of “victor’s justice,” whether or not it conformed
with international laws in regards to force, how it contributed to the development of
later international laws, and how it compared with the Nuremberg Trial, have made it
the nucleus of scholarly studies for decades.341 In the China Studies field, however,
scholarly studies have, unsurprisingly, focused on the Tokyo Trial’s ties with the
339 Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations,” in
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340 See Barak Kushner,Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice.
341 Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice : Tokyo War Crimes Trial (N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2015); Kerstin Von Lingen, Transcultural Justice at the Tokyo Tribunal: The Allied Struggle for Justice,
1946-48 (Boston: Brill, 2018); Timothy P. Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials
(Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial:
The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center,
2008); Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the
Nuremburg Legacy (London: Routledge, 2008); Arnold C. Brackman, The Other Nuremberg: The
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Japanese invasion of China and, more pertinently, the Nanjing Massacre.342 As the
Trial relates to what occurred in the winter of 1937 in Nanjing has been examined by
Timothy Brook, who looks to “understand how the tribunal chose to interpret the
Rape of Nanking as part of its strategy to determine Japan’s war criminality.”343
China’s direct participation in the Tokyo Trial has only been superficially studied
because the role played by Chinese men such as Judge Mei Ru’ao (梅汝璈 ) and
Prosecutor Xiang Zhejun (向哲濬 ) was relatively limited. A passage from John
Dower on the American dominance in the Tokyo Trials aptly summarizes the current
understanding of the field:
An international panel of judges did preside and the president of the tribunal was
Australian, but the Tokyo trial was a predominantly American show. Americans
dominated the “International Prosecution Section” that set the agenda for the
tribunal, and they brooked scant internal dissent from other national
contingents.344
In recent years the publications of Mei’s diaries and Xiang’s papers, however,
have offered another angle to explore China’s role during the Tokyo tribunals. In these
documents, the Chinese Mission is mentioned occasionally. For example, Mei
usefully recounted his life in Japan from March to May of 1946, frequently
mentioning his interactions with the Chinese Mission in Japan.345
This chapter introduces stories from behind the scenes of the IMTFE which, in
the opinion of the author, deserve scholarly attention. As a Japanese academic has
summarized, the United States “seized the initiative in the management of the trial,
342 Cheng Zhaoqi (程兆奇), “Songjing Shigen de Zhanzheng Zeren Zaijiantao-Dongjing Shenpan
Youguan Nanjing Baoxingzui Beigaofang Zhengci Jianzheng Zhiyi (松井石根的戰爭責任再檢討
——東京審判有關南京暴行罪被告方證詞檢證之一) [Re-Evaluation of Iwane Matsui’s War Guilt:
Verification of Testimony on the Nanjing Massacre Given by Defendants at the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials],” Jindaishi Yanjiu (近代史研究) [Modern Chinese History Studies], 2008, No. 6, 4-23.
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including the preparations, the appointment of judges and prosecutors, and all the
other details of setting up the court.”346 Thus, with the United States dominating
proceedings, other nations participating in the Trial were merely present in supporting
roles: “the work of the war crimes sections established in the British Foreign Office,
in America, in Australia, in Canada, in New Zealand, in China, and among the exile
governments of the Netherlands and in liberated France was basically confined to the
identification of those responsible and to the collection of evidence bearing on their
activities.”347
It is therefore undisputable that the Chinese voice in the IMTFE was relatively
weak and could not ultimately influence court proceedings, but this does not mean
that the Chinese accepted the arrangement and outcome fait accompli. Indeed, the
Chinese counterpart to the Tokyo Trial – The Nanjing War Crimes Tribunal held in the
Nationalist’s capital in 1946 brought to the fore the contentious issues of jurisdiction
and authority over the right to try the war criminals. It was against this background of
contending international actors that the role of the Chinese Mission in Japan became
significant. Serving as a channel between Tokyo and Nanjing, just as it had done for
the repatriation issue, the Chinese Mission frequently transmitted messages requesting
that certain Japanese war criminals be tried or called to give testimony. The Chinese
Mission also served as the residence of the Chinese prosecutors and consultants
attending the trial in Tokyo and the staff assisted with the gathering of information
and administration. By analyzing several cases, this chapter looks at the Chinese
attitude towards the trials of Japanese war criminals with an special focus on the key
role played by the Chinese Mission.
CONTROVERSIES OVER JURISDICTION
Authorization for trying Japanese war criminals was first stipulated in Article 10
346 C. Hosoya, N. Ando, Y. Onuma, R. Minear eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International
Symposium (Kldansha International Ltd., 1986), 80.
347 R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1981), Vol. 1, xii.
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of the Potsdam Declaration:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a
nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall
remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies
among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.348
On August 29, 1945, the United Nations War Crimes Commission issued “Draft
Summary of Recommendations Concerning Japanese War Crimes and Atrocities,” in
which Article 3 stated that,
… those Japanese who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part
in, the crimes or atrocities committed in, or against the nationals of, a United
Nation should be apprehended and sent back to the countries in which
abominable deeds were done or against whose nationals crimes and atrocities
were perpetrated in order that they may be judged in the courts of those countries
and punished.349
This stipulation later led to a debate over whether Nanjing or Tokyo had the
judicial authority to try Japanese war criminals. On September 7, the Chinese
government listed 82 Japanese war criminals “holding key positions” and were “all
Generals or Lieutenant Generals, including such notorious characters as Yamashita,
Homma, Doihara, Terauchi, Matsui, and Honjo.”350 On October 20, the Chinese
government presented a list of 12 major Japanese war criminals and inquired if the US
government had any objection to it. If no objection was forthcoming, the Chinese
government announced it “will telegraph General MacArthur as Supreme Allied
Commander and request that these men be arrested and detained as major Japanese
348 Potsdam Declaration. July 26, 1945,
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war criminals.”351 On November 6, 1945, the Chinese established the War Criminals
Handling Committee (Zhanzheng Zuifan Chuli Weiyuanhui 戰爭罪犯處理委員會), a
body composed of representatives from the Military, Diplomatic and Juridical
departments. At the conference to determine how the Chinese government should
respond to requests from SCAP to arrest and extradite Japanese POWs held on
November 13, the Committee consented to the arrest of POWs whose whereabouts in
China were known, but for those suspected of committing offences in China, it agreed
that they must be prosecuted first before then being extradited to Japan.352 Until the
founding of the Chinese Mission in Japan in May 1946 greatly simplified the
procedure, such negotiations between Nanjing and SCAP proceeded via the Chinese
Military Committee headed by Albert C. Wedemeyer. But after the KMT established
their new post-war Mission, Nanjing and Tokyo could communicate much more
effectively.
FINDING THE MISSING JAPANESE AND EXTRADITION
For the purpose of arranging the trials, SCAP instructed the Chinese Mission in
Japan to investigate and repatriate a number of Japanese military criminals still in
China. According to the annual reports of the Chinese Mission, this task became a
monthly duty. Approximately six to seven cases were thus included in monthly reports.
Based on Chinese-language archival material, several cases will be introduced in this
section. Insignificant they might be, nevertheless, these cases still reflect the ad-hoc
and disorganized character of the military trial.
The first example concerns Yonegaki Kogyo (米垣興業), who was the Japanese
consular official in Canton in 1945. Several months after the Japanese surrender,
Yonegaki had yet to be repatriated to Japan and his family were eager to learn of his
351 “The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State,” October 20, 1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6,
948.
352 “Zhanzheng Zuifan Chuli Weiyuanhui Dibaci Changhui Jilu (戰爭罪犯處理委員會第八次常會紀
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whereabouts. His family therefore petitioned the Chinese Mission in the hope that
information about him might be revealed. A memorandum from SCAP also requested
that the Chinese Mission investigate the whereabouts and circumstances of several
Japanese nationals, including Yonegaki:
1. This Section is in receipt of a letter from Japanese Central Liaison Office
requesting release of certain former Japanese Dipli[o]matic and Consular
personnel in China.
2. It is requested that information be furnished this Section as to whether the
subject personnel are being detained as War Criminals or any other reasons
causing the delay of their repatriation.
3. The names and duties of the subject personnel are listed below:
a. HIRAIDE, Hiizu. First secretary of the Embassy, sent to Peking on an
official mission before the termination of the war.
b. YONEGAKI, Kogyo. Consul-General at Canton.
c. KONAGAYA, Ryosaku. Chief of the consular police station and police
superintendent at Canton.
d. ARINO, GAKU. Consular-General at Tsinan.
e. MAEDA, Teruzo. Chief of the consular police station and police
superintendent at Tsinen.353
SCAP also asked the Chinese Mission for information on the whereabouts of
another suspected criminal named Kuwajima Joichi (桑島正一). Apparently, though,
the Chinese Mission had no prior knowledge about the individual, and even after
checking a list of all influential Japanese figures during the War of Resistance was
unable to find a name with the same pronunciation. The Chinese then asked the
Japanese Foreign Office to trace this person and they found a possible match. While it
was vacillating over whether this was the suspect SCAP had been searching for,
SCAP got in contact to notify them that the request was the result of a
misunderstanding.354
In another example, SCAP sent a memorandum on March 24, 1947 to the
Chinese Mission and asked for the repatriation of a suspect in Taiwan named Su
353 “SCAP to the Chinese Mission,” May 6, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.
354 “The Chinese Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” August 19, 1946, Guoshiguan,
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Xinren (蘇新任). But this time the Nationalist government refused to cooperate, the
Ministry of Justice replying that there was no criminal activity recorded against this
person. Concrete evidence from SCAP would be required before the individual’s
extradition could be discussed. Finally, after a few months interval, on August 18,
1947, the Chinese Mission cabled the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform
them that SCAP had failed to provide sufficient evidence against Su.355
Extradition of certain Japanese criminals from Tokyo to Nanjing was conducted
by the First Group of the Chinese Mission after requests were granted by SCAP. The
Chinese Mission required the extradition of Isogai Rensuke ( 磯 谷 廉 介 ), the
commander of the Battle of Taierzhuang (台兒莊 ) in Shandong, and the man who
later served as the Governonr-General of Japanese-occupied Hong Kong, and one
Tani Hisao (谷壽夫 ), a military figure implicated in the Nanjing Massacre. Chang
Jiakai (常家鎧 ), a lieutenant colonel from the First Group of the Chinese Mission,
escorted them both to Shanghai in July 1946.356 Isogai was sentenced to life in prison
but was released in 1952, while Tani received a death sentence before he was
executed in 1947 in Nanjing.357 The Chinese Mission also requested the extradition of
Tanaka Gunkichi (田中軍吉), who was accused of killing Chinese citizens in Nanjing.
Tanaka was arrested by SCAP in April and escorted to Shanghai in May of 1947;358
he was executed in 1948.359
In another case, the Chinese government planned to dispatch its gendarmes to
355 “The Chinese Mission to the Foreign Ministry,” August 18, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.
356 “Sanshiwu Niandu Benzu Jingban Yewu Jianbao (三十五年度本組經辦業務簡報) [Group
Business Briefing, 1946],” Guoshiguan, 020-010121-0006; “Jigu Lianjie Gu Shoufu Zuo Zhuanjie
Nanjing (磯谷廉介谷壽夫昨轉解南京) [Isogai Rensuke and Tani Hisao Escorted to Nanjing
Yesterday],” October 3, 1946, Dagongbao (Shanghai).
357 Xu Zhuoyun (許倬雲) and Qiu Hongda (邱宏達) eds., Kangzhanshengli de Daijia (抗戰勝利的代
價) [The Price Paid for Victory in the War of Resistance] (Taipei: Lianjing, 1986), 164-173.
358 “SCAPIN-1633: Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals,” SCAPIN-DB, Nagoya University;
“Ri Zhanfan Tianzhong Junji Zuori Yajie Dihu (日戰犯田中軍吉昨日押解抵滬) [Japanese War
Criminal Tanaka Gunkichi Escorted to Shanghai Yesterday],” May 20, 1947, Yishibao (Shanghai).
359 “San Zhanfan Qiangjue (三戰犯槍決) [Three War Criminals Executed],” January 29, 1948,
Dagongbao (Shanghai).
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Japan to escort several Japanese criminals, including Nara Akira (奈良晃 ) and a
group of Chinese traitors, back to China. The officers’ entry to Japan was handled by
the Chinese Mission. The only problem that needed resolving was that of transport.
The Chinese government wanted the gendarmes to take a US transport plane to Japan,
but the request was turned down because passengers on the flight were not permitted
to carry weapons. The Chinese government then enquired whether its own Air Force
could provide the men with transport, only to receive the reply that the only available
plane was a bomber. That proposal was also rejected – because the weaponary on the
aircraft itself would have to be removed.360 Only some five months later were the
criminals able to finally be extradited to China.361
But not all requests from Nanjing were granted by SCAP because a number of
suspected war criminals were already being tried in Tokyo. Ogisu Rippei (荻洲立兵),
for instance, served as the Taiwan Army’s Chief of Staff under Japanese rule between
1935 and 1937, and he later commanded the Japanese Sixth Army at the Battle of
Nomonham, where he was defeated by General Zhukov. Because of this background
fighting against the Soviet Union, Ogisu was already being cross-examined by
Russian prosecutors for his part in Nomonham, and so the Chinese were thus denied
access to him.362 In December 1948, the Chinese Mission also asked SCAP to
extradite Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭) from Japan. SCAP refused on the grounds that,
due to poor health, Kagesa was unfit to travel. In such cases, China’s requests for
extradition were turned down by SCAP.
ASSEMBLING EVIDENCE
Besides locating Japanese war criminals, SCAP also requested that the Chinese
360 “Wo Pai Xianbing Furi Tijie Hanjian Zhanfan (我派憲兵赴日 提解漢奸戰犯) [Gendarmes
Dispatched to Japan to Escort Traitors and War Criminals],” January 31, 1947, Xinwenbao.
361 “Zhongyao Zhanfan Liuren Yasong Hankou Shenxun (重要戰犯六人押送漢口審訊) [Six
Important Criminals Escorted to Hankou],” November 14, 1947, Dagongbao (Shanghai).
362 “Pacific War Phase Will Open Shortly,” May 28, 1947, Nippon Times.
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Mission help collect evidence and send it on to the Tribunal in Tokyo. In May, the
prosecution asked the Chinese Mission to gather evidence of Japan’s build-up of
troops in Manchuria and Northeast China before the July 7th Incident of 1937.363 The
Chinese Mission reported that Prosecutor Xiang Zhejun had accused several figures
of conducting the war against China but demanded evidence of atrocities conducted
by Doihara Kenji (土肥原賢二), Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本欣五郎), Hata Shunroku
(畑俊六), Itagaki Seishirō(板垣征四郎) and Matsui Iwane (松井石根), as well as
about atrocities committed after the cities of Guangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha,
Hengyang, Guilin and Liuzhou had fallen into Japanese hands.364 The Chinese
government struggled with these requests, however, because gathering the required
evidence proved difficult. For instance, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ye
Gongchao (葉公超 ), admitted that the Chinese government could not present any
evidence concerning Doihara to the Tokyo Tribunal. Ye revealed that “we do not
know anything about what Doihara had said or written to Zhang Zongchang (張宗昌)
and Sun Chuanfang (孫傳芳).” Qin Dechun (秦德純), as relayed by Ye, once said that
although every three-year-old kid knows Doihara was guilty, this could not be used as
evidence.365
On February 1, 1947, SCAP’s Diplomatic Section asked the Chinese Mission to
collect back-issues of three Japanese newspapers published in Shanghai during the
war: The Shanghai Nippo, The Shanghai Nichi Nichi, and The Tairiku Shinpo with
issued date ranging from February 1, 1938 to November 22, 1944. SCAP also
requested a book entitled Record of the Facts of Illegal Acts and Resistance
Accompanied with Destruction Committed by the Chinese Communists, and “the order
of the Chungking Government for the beginning of guerilla warfare against the
363 “Zhu Shiming to Foreign Ministry,” May 22, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0030.
364 “Zhu Shiming to Foreign Ministry,” May 22, 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0030.
365 “Waijiaobu Duiriheyue Shenyihui Tanhuahui Jilu (外交部對日和約審議會談話會紀錄),”
September 30, 1947, in Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan (中國第二歷史檔案館) ed.,
Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian (中華民國史檔案資料彙編), Nanjing Guominzhengfu
Shiqi (南京國民政府時期), Vol. 5-3, 386.
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Japanese forces in China, promulgated in or about the year 1938” and “a copy of
every trial for atrocities or mistreatment of prisoners of war in which former members
of the Japanese military forces have been the accused before Chinese Tribunals in
China since the termination of hostilities.”366
The Chinese Mission transmitted the message back to China. The post-war
Shanghai government was tasked with the collection of these materials but barely
found anything, leaving the Chinese Mission to submit only very limited material
evidence to the IMTFE. The Tribunal was extremely dissatisfied with what appeared
to it to be a lack of cooperation shown by the Chinese side. In a report dated January
10, 1948, it is stated that the Tribunal had received a total of 3,700 documents and
pictures as case evidence, but only 30 items had been submitted “to sustain numerous
charges laid by China against the 25 Japanese A-Class war criminal suspects.” The
report warned that China’s failure in submitting enough concrete evidence might
place KMT-led China in an unfavorable position at the trial. The report further
analyzed the reason why China was unable to submit suitable evidence:
The Chinese prosecution section, in an interview with Central News, attributed
the lack of atrocity evidence to the “un-cooperative and indifferent” attitude of
the competent authorities in China toward the trial in Tokyo, adding that evidence
is difficult to obtain in Japan and time does not allow it to acquire more evidence
which are permitted by the Tribunal to be introduced in summation and rebuttal
stage.367
Although material evidence was lacking on the Chinese side, in-person
representation was not, and the Chinese kept dispatching aids to Tokyo to participate
in the Tribunal. As The New York Times reported on June 17, 1947, there was a
Chinese vessel departing Shanghai for Kobe carrying “sixteen Chinese officials
assigned to the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo.”368 The Chinese Mission
was instructed to assist the Chinese prosecutor teams to gather information. SCAP
366 “The Diplomatic Section, SCAP, to the Chinese Mission,” February 1, 1947, Guoshiguan,
020-010117-0026.
367 “China’s Evidence of Atrocities,” January 9, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.
368 “Chinese Ship to Visit Japan,” June 18, 1947, The New York Times.
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asked the Chinese Mission to provide accommodation to the four counselors required
by Xiang Zhejun, and only after the Chinee Mission agreed to house them would
SCAP grant them entry to Japan. The Chinese Mission then asked the Foreign
Ministry whether it could recruit those four counselors as special members to the
Mission.369 Several days later, Xiang intervened and canceled the request on the
grounds that accommodation and entry into Japan were proving “very difficult.”370
However, as the burden on the Chinese increased, in Tokyo internal conflicts among
the Chinese representatives began to develop. Each side believing that the other was
treading on its toes. Xiang Zhejun, for example, did not get along with the staff of the
Chinese Mission, and when the Tokyo Trial was over, the Chinese Mission
immediately requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to demote the Chinese
prosecutor team.371
The Chinese Mission kept an eye on several witnesses from China who would
testify at the Tribunal. For instance, the last emperor of imperial China, Pu Yi (溥儀),
was brought to Japan by the Russians on August 9, 1946. Pu Yi was “in close Russian
custody” and whoever wanted to interview him had to gain permission from the
Soviet Embassy.372 In court, Pu Yi testified on “why he was a puppet” on August 19,
1946.373 The last emperor denied the charge that his departure from Tianjin to
Manchuria in 1931 was of his own volition rather than after being coerced by the
Japanese.374
In September 1947, the Chinese Mission finished an updated report with
information about the Tokyo Trial. In it, the Chinese Mission stressed two points. First,
if any of the allied countries found new evidence against the major war criminals,
then the individual could be extradited to that country. Second, SCAP had begun to
369 “The Chinese Mission to the Foreign Ministry,” December 27, 1946, Guoshiguan,
020-010117-0026.
370 “Xiang Zhejun to Foreign Ministry,” January 6, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0026.
371 “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” June 15, 1948, Guoshiguan,
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372 “PUYI, Puppetruler, In Tokyo To Testify,” August 10, 1946, The New York Times.
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113
release suspected criminals against who evidence was flimsy. Fifteen Japanese
criminals were expected to be released if the Chinese government did not themselves
request their extradition.375 In a meeting organized by China’s Foreign Ministry, one
representative complained that SCAP had been releasing many Japanese figures
culpable for war crimes. In reply, another representative gave the reason as being that
the prisons were full and China’s difficulties with collecting sufficient evidence were
preventing it making requests for extradition. SCAP had been urging the Chinese
government to come forward with evidence but receiving no answer, thus it had little
option but to release numerous suspects.376
Courts in Yokohama where B-Class and C-Class war criminals were tried
permitted the allies to partake in the procedure whenever the case related to that
country. A member of the Chinese staff was dispatched to conduct prosecutions, but
there was no Chinese judge. As a result, SCAP asked the Chinese Mission to send one
military officer who was fluent in English to serve as a judge. The Chinese Mission
dispatched Wang Gongwu (王公五 ), a colonel in the First Group of the Chinese
Mission, to serve in Yokohama.377 Despite the Chinese occupational force was not
dispatched, this section, composed of several military officers, was still in charge of
military affairs in Tokyo. Some Chinese military officers without a background in law
were asked to serve as judges in Yokohama court. In 1948 Lei Yanjun (雷炎均 )
became a judge who sentenced three Japanese criminals who were accused of
torturing and killing overseas Chinese in wartime Japan to be hanged.378
TRIALOF OKAMURAYASUJI
375 “Zhongguo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Guanyu Dongjing Chuli Riben Zhanfan Gaikuang Baogao (中國駐
日代表團關於東京處理日本戰犯概況報告),” September 22, 1947, Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan
ed., Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian, Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 360.
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A striking example of the disputes surrounding just who had jurisdiction over the
trial of Japanese war criminals was the case of Okamura Yasuji, the former Japanese
Commander-in-Chief in China. At the inception of the postwar period, the Chinese
had anticipated that the Japanese involved in perceived war crimes would be tried and
executed. Okamura Yasuji, as the leader of the Japanese forces, was regarded as the
number one villain responsible for the wartime atrocities which China’s population
suffered, but, to many people’s surprise, he was not immediately prosecuted. Instead,
the KMT protected Okamura in order to utilize his experience battling against the
CCP during the War of Resistance – something – which the KMT valued in the new,
postwar milieu after the Japanese surrender.379 Many studies have already
documented the KMT’s use of Okamura’s abilities and the fact they led his exemption
from prosecution in the trials.380 But how and why did SCAP assent to this? This
section traces the wheeling and dealing between the SCAP and the Chinese Mission in
Japan on this very issue.
Okamura’s collaboration with the KMT has attracted academic interest over the
past decades.381 Beginning on June 1, 1946, Okamura was placed under the command
of General Chen Cheng.382 Chen’s opinion was then decisive in determining
Okamura’s fate. When the Committee under the Executive Yuan in charge of Japanese
War Criminals asked Chiang Kai-shek on July 4, 1946, when Okamura should be
arrested, five days later Chen advised Chiang that Okamura should be “prosecuted
with mercy.” Yet, in order not to arouse misunderstandings either domestically or
internationally, Okamura should still be prosecuted as a criminal - but with the caveat
379 The fact that Chiang utilized Okamura’s advice in the Chinese Civil War has widely been
mentioned by scholars in mainland China. See Jin Chongji (金沖及), Zhuanzhe Niandai- Zhongguo
1947 (轉折年代—中國 1947) [Generational Shift: China in 1947] (Beijing: San Lian Shudian, 2017),
15.
380 Kato Kiyofumi, “The decline of the Japanese empire and the transformation of the regional order in
East Asia,” in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov eds., The Dismantling of Japan’s Empire in East
Asia (New York: Routledge, 2017), 25.
381 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: the Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), 10-15.
382 “He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek,” May 30, 1946, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-055.
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that he be tried “only with clauses that alleviate his crimes.”383 It seems that Chen
was determined that Okamura be prosecuted in China and was opposed to him being
sent back to Japan. Chiang replied that the Committee could arrest Okamura “after he
accomplishes his missions” for the KMT.384
In Japan, the military tribunal convened on April 29, 1946, and the court
requested that the Chinese Mission in Japan have the Chinese government send
Okamura Yasuji and Matsui Takuro to testify in the trial of Shunroku Hata, Field
Marshal of the Japanese Army during the Second World War. The main focus of
Hata’s trial was on whether or not he should be held responsible for the atrocities
committed in Nanjing in December 1937 because the defendant’s representatives
argued that “not only is Field Marshal Shunroku Hata not a Class A war criminal but
he actually was one of the Japanese army’s sternest disciplinarians who was sent to
Nanking to restore order among Japanese troops who committed the infamous
rape.”385 Any testimony from either Okamura or Matsui was therefore viewed as
potentially decisive in determining whether Hata was indeed accountable. However,
the Chinese Nationalists had no intention of cooperating on the grounds that Okamura
was too important a personage to be allowed to leave China. On November 29, Chen
Cheng reported to Chiang that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the
idea of sending the two Japanese to testify for a specified period only, Chen himself
was of the view that only Matsui could go. In Chen Cheng’s view, and as Chiang had
told the Committee, allowing Okamura to leave China would severely disrupt the
latter’s missions in China. Furthermore, Chen pointed out, to have Matsui testify was
sufficient and would not break the regulations on the arraignment of witnesses.386
Upon hearing of this suggestion from Chen, Chiang immediately sanctioned it.387
The court in Tokyo could not perceive the real intention of the Chinese
383 “War Criminals Handling Committee to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 4, 1946, Guoshiguan,
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Government, however, and kept making requests for Okamura and Matsui to attend
the proceedings through the Chinese Mission. On February 24, 1947, the Diplomatic
Section of SCAP noted:
It is noted that the Chinese Government has advised that Neiji Okamura is at
present unfit for travel and that his presence in China is required by the Chinese
Government. If his health permits and if the Chinese Government will allow him
to return to Japan for one month, it would be appreciated if he could be brought to
Japan under the same circumstances as Matsui. Should this course prove
impracticable, the Mission is requested to advise this Section in order that
alternative arrangements may be made.388
As Chen Cheng suggested, Matsui was allowed to go to Japan for one month and
return to China after giving his testimony. Okamura, on the other hand, was not
permitted to go. However, on May 14, and due apparently to illness, the Department
of National Defense decided not to allow Matsui to go to Japan either. Two days later,
on May 16, the Diplomatic Section sent another message to the Chinese Mission,
Reference is also made to the Mission’s memorandum No. CMF/189, dated
December 23, 1946, and note verbale, dated May 13, 1947, the former stating that
the illness of Neiji OKAMURA prevented his repatriation, and the latter
indicating that Takuro MATSUI was unable to travel to Japan due to the state of
his health. It would be appreciated by the Diplomatic Section if the Mission
would initiate the necessary procedure to return to Japan the persons mentioned
above as soon as the state of their health permits.389
Cleary, the “health issue” had been used as an excuse for Okamura not returning
to Japan. In the end, the Military Tribunal tried Hata without the two key witnesses,
sentencing him to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal.390 Still, as time went
on, more and more voices emerged criticizing the delay in placing Okamura on trial
and requested that he be found guilty. To the KMT’s official explanation for
Okamura’s on-going state of liberty did not, of course, mention his usefulness for the
388 “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” February 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.
389 “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” May 16, 1947, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0023.
390 “Shunroku Hata,” May 11, 1962, The New York Times.
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fight against the CCP in the Chinese Civil War. In a press conference in June 1947,
Dong Xianguang, head of the Information Bureau, explained that Okamura first had
to “assist the Chinese government deal with surrender issues and repatriate Japanese
soldiers and residents,” but, in order to appease mounting mass anger, he promised
that Okamura’s ultimate destiny “would be decided within a few months.”391
Okamura eventually faced prosecution in China but was acquitted – a verdict which
led to a subsequent anti-KMT propaganda drive. The CCP blamed the KMT for
betraying the Chinese people who had suffered during the Japanese Invasion. As for
Okamura himself, he rarely mentioned the verdict which shaped his fate nor his secret
missions in postwar China. Okamura did, though, openly express his gratitude to He
Yingqin for supporting the repatriation, but failed to comment of the potential death
sentence he was saved from by Chiang Kai-shek.392 Immediately after his acquittal,
Okamura was sent back to Japan.393
THE CASE OFTAKASHI SAKAI
Takashi Sakai (酒井隆) was a Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army
who conducted the battle of Hong Kong in 1941, and who then served as the governor
of Hong Kong until 1942. Held accountable for Japanese atrocities in Hong Kong,
Takashi was put on trial by the Military Tribunal in Tokyo. At the time Takashi was
detained by the Chinese, SCAP probably did not know of his whereabouts. But on
January 18, 1946, when MacArthur ordered the arrest of 100 suspected war criminals,
Takashi’s name was amongst those listed.394
To the British in Hong Kong, to try Takashi either in Nanjing or Tokyo essentially
made no difference. Noticing that Sakai was now in the hands of the Chinese, the
British Embassy in Chongqing expressed a willingness to offer evidence against the
391 “Gangcun Ningci Mingyun Shuyue nei Ke Jueding (岡村寧次命運數月內可決定) [Okamura
Yasuji’s Fate Could be Decided in Several Months],” June 19, 1947, Xin Wenbao.
392 He Yingqin, Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji, 24-30.
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Japanese to Chinese officials.395 The British authorities in Hong Kong, reinstated
after the war, also sought to have Takashi tried in Hongkong - but the request was
rejected. Still, because “so many residents in Hong Kong and both British and
Canadian soldiers who were involved in this case,” the British nevertheless requested
the Chinese furnish them with a full and detailed report on the trial proceedings.396
During the prosecution, Major General Sir Francis Festing, Commander of British
Forces in Hong Kong, generously supplied evidence of atrocities which were believed
to have been committed against the Chinese by Japanese acting under Takashi during
his term in Hong Kong.397 After a months-long investigation, the Nanjing court
passed down the death sentence on August 27. As the New York Times reported,
“Sakai was accused of mass [a]trocities in Hong Kong as well as conspiring to bring
about early Japanese encroachments in North China. Other charges included the
massacre and torture of wounded war prisoners and the looting and plundering of
civilians. The tribunal denied Sakai’s request for a postponement of judgement.”398
Upon receiving this news, SCAP immediately requested that China postpone the
execution in order to have Takashi testify in the Tokyo Trial. Perceiving that Takashi
might not return to China to face his punishment, Xiang Zhejun visited the Chinese
Mission in Japan and suggested that Nanjing execute Takashi immediately, using a
“telegram delay” as the excuse.399 Takashi was executed on September 30, 1946,
becoming the first Japanese war criminal sentenced to death by the Chinese military
tribunal in Nanjing.400
The American’s shifting attitude toward Japan in 1948 also affected the Tokyo
Trial, as one scholar has noted: “By 1948, the cold war between the United States and
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Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.
396 “Francis Luting to Wang Shih-Chieh [Wang Shijie],” June 1946, Guoshiguan, 020-010117-0033.
397 “Jiujinglong Baoxing Zhengju Xianggang Dangju Songdao Jing (酒井隆暴行證據香港當局送到
京) [Evidence of Atrocities Committed by Takashi Sakai Sent to Nanjing],” June 20, 1946, Zhongyang
Ribao (中央日報) [Central Daily News].
398 “Dooms Japanese General,” August 28, 1946, The New York Times.
399 “The Chinese Mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” September 5, 1946, Guoshiguan,
020-010117-0033.
400 “Qiangjue Jiujinglong Zuo Zaijing Zhixing (槍決酒井隆昨在京執行) [Takashi Sakai Executed in
Nanjing Yesterday]”, September 14, 1946, Zhongyang Ribao.
119
the Soviet Union had intensified even in the Far East. The United States and Great
Britain quickly lost their zeal for pursuing Japan’s responsibility for the war and for
punishing wartime leaders. This led to the policy of ending Class A war crimes
trials.”401 On November 14, 1948, the Court sanctioned the death sentence of seven
Japanese who were believed to be involved in the war against China. When asked by
news correspondents for his opinion about the verdict, Shang Zhen, head of the
Chinese Mission in Japan, replied that he was satisfied.402 With this verdict, the
Tokyo Trial came to an end, but the task of repatriation continued, and would last for
several more years.
THE EXECUTION
Staff from the Chinese Mission in Japan were allowed to attend the trials. One of
them, Shen Jinding, wrote down his thoughts on proceedings and included them in his
memoirs:
The defendants that have attracted my attention were the following persons:
Hideki Tojo, he was one of the prime culprits of the China invasion war and the
Pacific War. Certainly, he has lost his previous glory but he seemed to be trying
his best to maintain his mighty appearance. Seishirō Itagaki, he was one of the
main designers of the Manchurian Incident and possessed a careerist appearance.
Although he is about to receive death sentence, he still smiles grimly. Iwane
Matsui, he was swaggering around when the Japanese troops invaded Nanjing,
but now he looks old and clumsy. Most of the other defendants have no
expressions on their faces. As for Mamoru Shigemitsu, he looks calm.403
The Chinese government also requested that they send representatives to witness
the executions but were refused by MacArthur. The General gave his explanation in
his own memoir:
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I was besieged with requests for permits to allow press photographers to record
the actual executions. I refused on the grounds that such a spectacle would
outrage the sensibilities of the Japanese, and high-minded people
everywhere…The uproar soon died away, but to reassure the people of the world
that the executions had actually taken place, I invited the members of the
occupation advisory group – the Allied Council-to attend as official witnesses. All
accepted, although reluctantly.404
As a result, only Shang Zhen, as leader of the Chinese Mission and Chinese
representative to the ACJ, was invited to witness the execution. On December 21,
1948, MacArthur handed over four letters to Sebald and asked him to deliver them to
the four members of the ACJ. A part of the letter read:
The war criminals condemned to death by the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East will be executed at Sugamo Prison on Thursday, December 23, in the
early morning hours.
Inasmuch as the execution will carry out in pertinent part the judgment of the
Allied Powers represented on the Tribunal, I request your attendance thereat as
official witnesses for the said powers in order that you may thereafter certify to
the executions of that phase of the Tribunal’s judgment.405
Only Sebald, Patrick Shaw (British Commonwealth representative to the ACJ),
Derevyanko, Shang, and “a doctor and prison authorities” were present.406 Sebald
vividly recounted the reactions of the ACJ members upon receiving this special
invitation in his memoir:
Upon reading it, Pat Shaw swallowed hard, turned pink, and said, “Let’s have a
whiskey!” General Derevyanko merely said, “Yes, I will come.” He readily
agreed to be alone, although I had never seen him previously without an aide or
an interpreter. General Shang turned a bit pale but said, “Of course I will come.
What shall I wear?” I suggested that he wear his uniform.407
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After the execution, all witnesses refused to reveal their thoughts to the press.
Sebald did reveal, though, that it was “the most difficult experience in my life,” and
the British representative told his secretary that he refused to meet anyone “especially
newspaper staff.” Derevyanko and Shang also remained silent.408 A Chinese
newspaper noted that Shang was extremely tired after watching the execution and
refused to receive guests on the following day.409 Although there is no written
account left by Shang, we can surmise that the execution may have affected him in a
more complex fashion than it did the others, the reason being that the first man
executed that day was Doihara, the leading figure in designing Northern China’s
“autonomy” in the 1930s. Back in that period, Doihara frequently approached Shang,
who was then governor of Hebei province, to ask for his cooperation. Shang loyally
refused to cooperate with the Japanese while preserving his own power and was
rewarded with several posts by Chiang Kai-shek during the War of Resistance. For
Shang, then, Doihara’s execution was much more personal, and signified at last the
termination of China’s war with Japan, but marked, too, the beginning of a perhaps
even more complicated period for his country.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Chinese Mission in Japan, nor judge Mei Ru’ao or prosecutor Xiang
Zhejun contribute much to the progress of the IMTFE outside of supporting role. As
Samuel Chu, son of General Zhu Shiming, has summarized, “The other Chinese
concerns for Japan, punishment of the war guilty and sanctions against the zaibatsu,
were effectively carried out by SCAP in the early years of the Occupation, without
any imput [input] from the Chinese.”410 However, there was some “input” from the
Chinese side worth noting. As has been shown, there was the extradition of certain
408 Xiang Longwan (向隆萬) ed., Xiang Zhejun Dongjing Shenpan Handian ji Fanting Chenshu (向哲
浚東京審判函電及法庭陳述) [Hsiang Che-Chun's Letters, Telegrams and Statements at the Tokyo
Trial] (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotongdaxue Chubanshe, 2014), 28.
409 Xiang Longwan ed., Xiang Zhejun Dongjing Shenpan Handian ji Fanting Chenshu, 285.
410 Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations,” in
Thomas W. Burkman ed., The Occupation of Japan: The International Context, 33.
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Japanese criminals conducted by the First Group of the Chinese Mission, the
transmission of communication between the courts in Nanjing and Tokyo, and the
witnessing of the executions of the A-class Japanese war criminals. The Chinese
Mission was placed in charge of the B-Class and C-Class trials in Yokohama,
although the results of which were not of great concern to the Chinese.
Another detail that exemplified Chinese government’s eagerness to play a major
role in trying Japanese war criminals was the status and experience of the diplomatic
representatives that it wanted to send to Tokyo. Two months after the Japanese
surrender, the Chinese government was eager to dispatch its political representatives
to Japan at the earliest possible date. Before Zhu Shiming was selected, a suggestion
had previously been made in November 1945. According to US records, “The Chinese
Embassy made a similar request to appoint Hsu Mou [Xu Mo (徐謨 )] as head of a
special Chinese mission to be attached to General MacArthur’s headquarters and was
advised that the matter would be brought up before the Far Eastern Commission.”411
AChinese source also noted that Xu Mo and Chen Jie (陳介) were selected to serve in
Japan as Chinese representatives.412 Xu had read law at Peiyang University (北洋大
學) and George Washington University in the United States. Upon his graduation, Xu
became a scholar in Nankai University and later served as a judge in Shanghai. In
1928, Xu entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and began his career as a diplomat
with jurist background. By 1945, he had already become an elite Chinese jurist who,
representing the ROC, participated in the works of the Committee of Jurists of the
United Nations.413 Chen Jie also was a seasoned diplomat who had served as China’s
ambassador to Germany between 1938 and 1941 and had later become ambassador to
411 “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant),” October 13, 1945,
FRUS, 1945, Vol. 6, 751.
412 “Xu Mo Chen Jie Canjia Guanzhi Riben (徐謨陳介參加管制日本) [Xu Mo and Chen Jie
Participate in Overseeing Japan],” November 5, 1945, Yishibao (Chongqing).
413 Zhao Guocai (趙國材), Guoji Fayuan Shouwei Zhongguoji Faguan Xu Mo: Shengping Ji Gongxian
(國際法院首位中國籍法官徐謨（1893-1956）：生平及貢獻) [The Very First Chinese Judge Hsu Mo
(1893-1956) of the International Court of Justice: His Life and Contribution], Junfa Zhuankan (軍法專
刊) [The Military Law Journal], Vol. 60:6 (2014), 140-178.
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Brazil and Mexico.414 It was perhaps his three-year experience in Germany that had
made him a suitable candidate to participate in China’s occupation of postwar Japan.
The idea of sending Xu and Chen to Japan, despite never being fulfilled, demonstrates
the importance that China placed on the issue of Japanese war criminals at the end of
the cataclysmic war with their neighbor.
Similar to the case of Japanese repatriations, the Soviet Union was eager to utilize
the war trials of the Japanese military and political figures for propaganda purposes,
as Yoshida recounted in his memoir:
……when Pu-Yi, the ex-Emperor of Manchukuo, was summoned as a witness, it
was proposed by the Soviet representative in the Allied Council for Japan that the
Emperor of Japan should also be summoned to appear, and it was the Supreme
Commander and the Chief Prosecutor, Mr Joseph Keenan, who opposed such a
step……415
In sharp contrast to the Russians, the Chinese did not express any willingness to
prosecute Japan’s emperor, following instead Chiang Kai-shek’s instruction of
“returning virtue for malice (Yi De Bao Yuan 以德報怨).” The focus for the Chinese
was on the prosecution of major Japanese war criminals. And, despite the trials ending
in 1948, the repercussions continued. In February 1949, the CCP accused MacArthur
of interfering in China’s domestic affairs by having 260 Japanese war criminals sent
back to Japan from China to serve prison terms instead of handing them to the CCP
for trial.416 Nevertheless, when the PRC was established in October of that year, the
trials of Japanese on the mainland no longer took place under the aegis of the KMT.
From then on, war criminals and other Japanese still in China became an issue for the
CCP to resolve.
414 Chen Yutang (陳玉堂), Zhongguo Jinxiandai Renwu Minghao Dacidian (中國近現代人物名號大
辭典) [A Dictionary of Modern and Contemporary Chinese Personages] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Guji
Chubanshe, 2005), 671.
415 Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs, 50.
416 “Communists Accuse MacArthur,” February 5, 1949, The New York Times.
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CHAPTER FIVE: REPARATIONAND RESTITUTION
China’s loss and suffering during the War of Resistance between 1937 to 1945
were so colossal that the request for reparations was the top priority of the Chinese
government’s postwar foreign policy towards Japan. From the Cairo’s Conference in
1943, at which leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and Republic of
China conferred about the blueprint of postwar Japan, to the conclusion of the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, according to which the Nationalist Chinese
government relinquished its claims on reparations from Japan, Republic of China had
been struggling to obtain miscellaneous types of reparations and restitution for
Chinese properties looted by Japan, only to receive disappointing results. Policies
regarding reparations from Japan were discussed and made in the Far Eastern
Commission (FEC) in Washington D.C., and the Allied Council of Japan (ACJ) in
Tokyo was obliged to execute the decisions made by the FEC. However, for nearly
three years members of the FEC could not reach consensus on the disposition of the
Japanese properties extracted for reparations. In spite of this fact, the US government
still favored China in taking the largest amounts of reparations from Japan in
comparison to other claimant countries. It was against this background that the
Chinese Mission in Japan made some progress in receiving reparations and making
restitution for looted Chinese properties, although the final results were still
dissatisfying to the Chinese government.
Much research to date has focused on the calculation of the Chinese damages in
wartime. However, in view of the principles of postwar Japanese reparations policies
designed by the United States, the miscellaneous calculations methods undertaken by
the Chinese government, regardless of being made before or after the Japanese
surrender, regional-level or national-level calculation, turned out to be meaningless on
the grounds that the United States eventually determined to dispose thirty percent of
the reparation items to China. This philosophy was expressed in Edwin Pauley’s
report on reparations from Japan, in which he suggested that “reparations be estimated
on the basis of Japan's ability to pay, not on the cost of the war damage it had
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done.”417 In other words, no matter how colossal the amount of the damages claimed
by the Chinese government was, China could only obtain a fixed percentages from
Japan’s items extracted for reparations purpose. In studying Allied Occupation
policies in Japan, the functions of the FEC have been well examined by previous
scholars. The FEC was indeed successful in making several decisions, but it made
relatively limited progress on issues with regard to reparations. In the case of China,
Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo), China’s ambassador to the US, also served as the
Chinese representative in the FEC and his opinions were influential in the FEC
meetings. But in general, incessant controversies in the FEC meetings made progress
on reparations from Japan extremely ineffective. Furthermore, the function of the
FEC became of little importance as the US government adjusted its policies on Japan
in 1948. For the purpose of supporting economic revival of Japan to contain the
brewing communist threat in East Asia, the US government unilaterally announced
the termination of the Japanese reparation program, which thoroughly disappointed
other allies. In general, the reparations policies between 1945 to 1948 remained in
disarray, and the effects of which were relatively limited. By examining the role
played by the Chinese Mission in Japan in dealing with reparation issues in the ACJ,
this chapter examines what the Chinese actually obtained in reparations from Japan
and their preferences of items they wished to acquire.
To a great extent, postwar reparations and restitution were two sides of the same
coin. As China vied for its share of Japanese reparations with other allies, restitution
of looted Chinese properties was progressing in Tokyo. As the biggest victim of the
Japanese invasion, substantial amounts of Chinese treasures, such as ancient books
and antiquities, were taken by the Japanese army and shipped back to Japan. As long
as the Chinese government could identify or submit credentials of those items being
looted during war, SCAP granted their return back to China. This operation proved far
more effective than the reparations, as China faced little dissent from other allies. As
the US halted the reparation program in 1949, the Chinese Mission kept working on
417 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1992), 70.
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restitution. Among those miscellaneous items that China wanted to retrieve, the
former Manchukuo assets left in Japan were of great significance to the Chinese
Mission. This chapter suggests that a “Northeastern nostalgia” existed in the Chinese
Mission in Japan that prompted the Chinese Mission to pay massive attention to
issues with regard to Northeast China. The retrieval of items not only was based on
their economic benefit, but also to a meaningful political significance.
OUTLINE OF REPARATION POLICIES
China’s main objective of reparations from Japan was always
industrial-production equipment. At the Cairo Conference, Chiang Kai-shek proposed
to President Roosevelt that “a part of the reparation Japan was to pay China after the
war could be paid in the form of actual properties. Much of Japan’s industrial
machinery and equipment, war and merchant ships, rolling stock, etc., could be
transferred to China.” Upon hearing this request, President Roosevelt “expressed his
concurrence in the proposal.”418 On September 18, 1945, the Chinese government
sent a memorandum to both the US and the Soviet Union expressing its willingness
that when “various assets within Japan are divided up among the Allied nations as
partial compensation for their losses, China should be given a good percentage of
them, together with priority for the delivery of these goods.”419 A proposal in 1945
noted that except for allowing industry for peaceful means to continue to exist in
Japan, the remnant equipment should be transplanted to China as a part of
reparations.420 On the other hand, reparations from Japan were expected to alleviate
the economic crisis spreading in postwar China.421 The Chinese government made a
grandiose plan for reparations from Japan. In his report on March 4, 1946, Weng
Wenhao, the Minister of Economy, even anticipated that all of Japan’s industrial and
418 "Roosevelt–Chiang dinner meeting, 8 p.m., November 23, 1943,” in US Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 324.
419 Chang Kia-ngau, Last Chance in Manchuria, 139.
420 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 638.
421 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 452.
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mining equipment be transplanted to China.422 At this point, the Chinese government
optimistically believed that China could claim all, or at least the majority of,
reparations from Japan and would not have to share with other allies on the grounds
that China’s damages during the war were the largest.
Another factor strengthening China’s confidence in gaining reparations from
Japan came from the report written by Edwin W. Pauley, the representative of
President Truman in the investigation of postwar Japan’s industrial capacity. On
November 13, 1945, Pauley’s investigation team arrived at Japan to begin its
one-month inspection, during which Pauley paid a visit to China and met Chiang
Kai-shek on November 22. Four days later, Pauley wrote Chiang that he would like to
send his staff to Chongqing to inquire about China’s industrial capability and means
to take over reparations from Japan.423 In Pauley’s report, one can discern his
sympathy with China, as he stressed that “the allocation of surplus Japanese industrial
potential to countries entitled to reparations, especially neighboring Asiatic countries,
should improve the economic balance, and contribute to the political stability, of
Eastern Asia as a whole.”424 Among the specialists in Pauley’s team, Owen Lattimore
was in the position of having China particularly benefit from reparations from
Japan.425 The kindness showed by Pauley and Lattimore made the Chinese sanguine
about utilizing Japan’s items to rebuild the country.
After Pauley’s return to the United States, a member of Pauley’s Mission named
Hubert G. Schenck attended a cocktail party held by the Chinese Mission in Japan. As
William MacMahon Ball, the UK representative to the ACJ, noted, “He seemed to
have been very impressed on the one hand with the tremendous industrial potential of
Manchuria and on the other hand with the thorough way in which the Russians had
stripped industrial plant and thereby crippled the present productive power of the
422 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 474.
423 “Pauley to Chiang Kai-shek,” November 26, 1945, Guoshiguan, 001-112000-00007-004.
424 Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November
1945 to April 1946 (Washington D.C.: Department of State, Division of Publications, Office of Public
Affairs, 1948), 3-4.
425 Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 56.
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region.”426 Indeed, it was at the time “when U.S. policy-makers were still planning
that other nations in East Asia, led by China, would establish a new balance of power
and would make good use of Japanese reparations.”427 It was against this background
that the newly-established Chinese Mission in Japan began to survey those Japanese
properties it would like to take over.
With Pauley’s report submitted to President Truman in December 1945, an
Interim Program of reparations from Japan, which largely based on the suggestions
made by Pauley, was published in early 1946. The next procedure would be the
percentage of reparations from Japan each claimant country would possess. This
decision was to be discussed and made in the FEC, which was composed of eleven
countries that had had wars with Japan. As China envisaged the transplant of Japan’s
industrial equipment as reparations, other allies held the same view. Members of the
FEC agreed that reparations from Japan should be paid through the transplant of
industrial equipment, and the basic principles were to disintegrate Japan’s industries
for a military purpose while maintaining the minimum level of industrial capacity
upon which Japan could survive. Thus, the questions being discussed in the FEC were
“the level to which Japanese industry must be cut back” and “what should be the
various percentage shares of industrial equipment thus removed from Japan which
each claimant country should receive as reparations.”428
Undoubtedly, members of the FEC could not reach any agreement on the
percentage of the disposition. As Esler Dening noted, the FEC “suffered also from the
difficulty of reaching agreement between so many powers, more particularly on the
subject of reparations.”429 From May to December of 1946, a series of interim
reparation policies were made in the FEC, but “the subsequent inability of the
Commission to agree on a schedule of shares for division of the facilities among the
claimant countries prevented implementation of the decisions.”430 In order to prevent
426 William MacMahon Ball, Intermittent Diplomat, 71.
427 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, 71.
428 Samuel S. Stratton, “The Far Eastern Commission,” International Organization, Vol. 2, No. 1
(February 1948), 9.
429 Esler Dening, Japan (London: Benn, 1960), 87.
430 “Text of U.S. Note Halting Further Japanese Reparations,” May 13, 1949, The New York Times.
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the stalemate, the US government unilaterally declared a disposition scheme and
acquired the FEC’s approval in April 1947. In this proposal, thirty percent of Japanese
industrial plants would be immediately used for reparations, among which China
could obtain half and the United Kingdom, Dutch Far Eastern territories and the
Philippines share the other half.431
In Tokyo, General MacArthur announced in January 1946 the seizure of “all
Japanese arsenals and special war plants to be held for reparations in accordance with
the recommendations of the Interim Program.”432 In January 1947 a source noted that
SCAP had 1,000 plants earmarked for reparation but removal and shipment might
constitute a problem to the claimant nations such as China and Philippines.433 While
the FEC decided the “quantity” of the reparations from Japan to the allies, as a
Chinese source vividly described, General MacArthur determined the “quality” of
them.434 SCAP “tentatively designated 1,110 industrial plants as subject to removal
for reparations and, on authorization of the United States government, actually started
to distribute a small number of these plants as interim instalments to several claimant
countries.”435 With his dominance in Japan as well as his sympathy with the Chinese
Nationalist, MacArthur treated the Chinese delegates in Japan in a friendly way
comparing to others. With the latest instructions from the FEC, SCAP began to
arrange tours for the allies to inspect the items they preferred to take over. As a news
report noted, “Delegations, at their own request, are being conducted on tours of
selected Japanese thermal power and machine tool industries which eventually may
be claimed for reparations. The industries now are in SCAP custody.”436 According to
a report written by the Chinese Mission, the purpose of the tours was merely to “make
allies understand the current conditions of the items preserved in factories.” Despite
so, the Chinese Mission still actively participated in the inspection tours, even set up
431 Joseph Z. Reday, “Reparations from Japan,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 18, No. 13 (June, 1949), 147.
432 Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November
1945 to April 1946, Log of the Mission.
433 “SCAP Ready to Move Goods Immediately,” January 13, 1947, Nippon Times.
434 “L dong Duoshi (旅東掇拾) [Picked Stories on a Visit to Tokyo],” Diangongtongxun (電工通訊),
August 1946.
435 Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude, 141.
436 “FEC Sets Up Status for Trade Envoys,” March 26, 1947, Nippon Times.
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seven sub-division, including arsenal, chemistry, steel, ship building, electricity,
machinery, communication and transport, to enhance its efficiency.437 Based on the
practical economical situation in China, the Chinese government inclined to ship back
14,744 pieces of machines, two ship-building factories, six steel-production factories,
eleven chemical industry factories, eight electronical factories, and ten light metal
factories. The total cost of shipping and building factories in China were estimated to
be nearly 48 million US dollar.438
After a grandiose plan of utilizing reparations from Japan in rebuilding postwar
China’s economy, the new FEC decision was a striking blow to the Chinese. In a
report made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1947, it noted that the US
government had ordered SCAP to extract thirty percent of Japanese industrial
reparations to distribute to the allies, among which China could obtain half. Despite
being disgruntled, it was still better than nothing. The Chinese government then
dispatched five representatives to Japan to work on the details, and preparations for
receiving these industrial plants, such as transportation, distribution, installation, were
also being made in China.439 The Chinese government was sanguine about the
reparation from Japan, as Wang Shijie reported in the National Assembly in May,
1947:
The items we receive in the future might be colossal, from which many problems
derived. For instance, how to ship back those items to China and how to properly
utilize them after which being shipped back to China. If we lay them aside and do
not use them, the lost will be great. The Executive Yuan is now planning the ways
in which we dispense and utilize the items from Japanese reparations, which will
not only be dispensed to state-owned factories, some of which will be dispense to
437 “Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Saliunian Yiyuefen Gongzuo Baogao (駐日代表團第三組卅六年一月
份工作報告) [Chinese Mission in Japan Third Group Work Report, January, 1947],” 1947, Guoshiguan,
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失和日本賠償問題報告) [The Executive Yuan’s Report on War Damage and Japanese Reparations],”
February 1947, in Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian,
Nanjing Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 238-239.
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To coordinate plenty of requests from the claimant countries, a committee entitled
Reparations Technical Advisory Committee (RTAC) was set up on May 22, 1947 in
Tokyo. The RTAC were allowed to “make recommendations regarding administrative
procedures for inspection, claims, allocations, dismantling, crating and transportation”
as well as make protests to the decision made by SCAP, but the latter had “final
authority.”441 The RTAC were composed of representatives from the eleven countries
which were also the members of the FEC. The Chinese representative in the RTAC
was Wu Bannong, chief of the Economic and Scientific Section in the Chinese
Mission.
Minutes of the first meeting of the RTAC revealed how difficult a compromise
could be made among the allies. Wu first raised doubts whether it was reasonable for
every member of the committee to have an equal vote:
I think the majority of the nations represented here will not have been occupied
by Japanese troops; there might not be any looted properties among those few
nations which were occupied by Japanese troops. I think most of the nations are
in different positions so far as looted properties are concerned…These are the
factors which I think do not suit very well with this point; that is, the majority of
the vote and the fact that one member has only one vote.
This suggestion faced objections from other members. The member from the
Netherlands immediately responded to Wu’s suggestion:
I cannot agree with the statement of Mr. Wu. I understand there is a possibility
that in China the loot is much greater than in other countries, but it does not mean
that, of what we define here as looted property, China has a greater percentage in
such looted property than other countries. Of course, the loot can be greater in
China, but it does not necessarily mean that what we define here as looted
440 “Wang Shijie Zai Guomin Canzhenghui Shang Suozuo Waijiao Baogao (王世杰在國民參政會上
所作外交報告) [Wang Shijie’s Report on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly],” May 1947,
Zhongguo Dierlishidanganguan ed., Zhonghuaminguoshi Danganziliao Huibian, Nanjing
Guominzhengfu Shiqi, Vol. 5-3, 18.
441 “Body Formed to Aid SCAP on Reparation Problems,” May 23, 1947, Nippon Times.
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property will be for a greater per cent Chinese loot.442
Wu’s attitude reflected the mentality of the Chinese which had been brewing
since the wartime period. As a Chinese member of the FEC wrote in a report after his
visit to Japan in early 1946, “Since we have eight-year historical accomplishment in
the War of Resistance, our country’s opinions must be respected by other
countries.”443 Both Chinese members in the ACJ and FEC believed that they should
have a louder voice in negotiations with other allies on the disposition of reparations
from Japan, owing to China’s substantial contribution to the war effort, but the other
allies certainly held different views.
For the case of China, restitution of looted items constituted a substantial part of
the reparation scheme. As the concrete instructions of what could be taken from the
thirty-percent-reparation program was still unclear, the Chinese Mission first put its
mind on restitution. By July of 1947, the Chinese Mission had requested the return of
140 vessels and 25 machines plants looted by Japan to be returned. For instance,
among the 25 machines plants, one was a paper mill facility moved from Guangzhou
to Hokaido during the war. By disclosing this message to the Chinese press, the
Chinese Mission urged its compatriots to submit evidence of looted items in order to
facilitate the efficiency of restitution.444
In September 1947, the Chinese Mission set up the Committee for Reparation and
Restitution headed by Wu Bannong.445 As Wu addressed to the Chinese press in May
1947, the goal of this committee was to focus on items that could immediately put
into use in China, such as grain, cloth, locomotive and railroad track. As for the
factories in Japan that could be transplanted to China, Wu listed electricity, machinery,
442 “Restitution Advisory Committee Minutes, 1st meeting,” April 29, 1948, Archives of the Institute of
Modern History, Academia Sinica (IMHArchives, hereafter), 11-01-02-20-02-003.
443 “Canjia Yuandong Guwen Weiyuanhui Furi Kaochatuan Gongzuo Baogao,” January 1946, IMH
Archives, 11-01-02-19-01-001.
444 “Wo Zhuri Daibiaotuan Banli Peichang Gongzuo Gaikuang (我駐日代表團辦理賠償工作概況)
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ship building and chemistry as priorities.446 In the Chinese Mission’s annual report of
1947, Shang Zhen summarized its accomplishment and the difficulties it faced in
obtaining reparations:
At first SCAP contemplated Japanese economic revenue and the technical
problems, thus the progress of the reparations was frequently delayed. After our
incessant efforts, we have obtained 34 warships, 9,447 pieces of machines, half
part of arsenal-experimental equipment. Restitution of the materials such as
books, antiquities, ships, and industrial equipment looted by the Japanese Army
have been progressed relatively well. However, the incomplete evidence collected
in China brought substantial difficulties to our work. And we have to frequently
conduct investigations in Japan by ourselves.447
China’s privilege to take half of the thirty percent of reparations from Japan might
have made other countries envious, but in the reality the Chinese government could
not select items for reparations at will. Wu Bannong openly grumbled that the US
forbade private Japanese aviation and ammunition factories to be part of the
reparation program. Wu said, “We don’t understand why, in terms of the Potsdam
agreement, these types of factories are not to be dismantled.” Wu further revealed that
most of the items took over by China from the fifteen percent reparation program
could not be used, “some lack motors, most lack pieces.” In order to find the missing
part of the machinery, the Chinese Mission had to inspect the factory in Japan. As a
news story noted, “The Chinese experts wish to find the missing parts in the remnant
of the factories in Japan, but it is questionable whether they can find them. If not, we
have to buy those missing items with US Dollars in Japan.”448 In addition, after being
shipped back to China many items were not managed well. For instance, some
machines took over by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Gongshangbu 工商
部) were left at the dock in Shanghai for half year, and most of which turned rotted
446 “Wu Bannong Tan Ri Peichang Wenti (吳半農談日賠償問題) [Wu Bannong on Problems with
Japanese Reparations],” May 11, 1947, Zhongyang Ribao.
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and could no longer put into production. The North China Herald even took a photo of
these rotted items and added an satirizing description “monument of huge waste of
items (Baotian Jinianbei暴殄紀念碑).” 449 As Kazuo Kawai summarized:
At the same time, although essential to Japan for her own recovery, the plants
earmarked for reparations were in such poor condition as to be not worth the
bother of dismantling and transporting to other countries. Heavy industries
especially could not be moved from their original sites without inordinate loss of
efficiency. Moreover, many of the nations most clamorous in their demands for
Japanese industrial equipment did not have the capability of operating such
equipment. Some of the nations most insistent in their claims failed to take even
the interim instalments when SCAP got them ready for shipment, and some of the
equipment which was taken lay unused after reaching the recipient country.450
TAKING OVER JAPANESE VESSELS451
As Shang Zhen wrote in his annual report of 1947, the thirty-four warships
obtained from the Japanese reparation program were perhaps the most valuable items
received by the Chinese government in its struggle for reparations from Japan. Wu
Bannong did not detail why the Chinese government had such a substantial interest in
Japanese aviation factories. One could only surmise that the Chinese Nationalist had a
huge demand for military planes to be used in the Civil War against the Chinese
Communists. Despite of the fact that warships could be barely used in the Civil War,
they were still indispensable in building a modern Chinese navy. The navy and air
force dominance of the KMT after 1949 were in great part due to the warships
obtained from Japan as well as US military assistance.
Immediately after the Second World War, the United States Navy advised the
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451 Detailed research on Chinese vessels received as Japanese reparations has been produced by a Navy
specialist in Taiwan. See Chen Xiaodun (陳孝惇),“Zhanhou Riben Peichang Jianting zhi Jieshoubianzu
ji qi Yiyi (戰後日本賠償艦艇之接收編組及其意義) [The Takeover of Vessels from Japanese
Reparations and its Meaning],” Zhonghua Junshi Xuehui Huikan (中華軍史學會會刊) [Bulletin of the
Chinese Military History Association], Vol. 6, 173-213.
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KMT on the development of the Chinese navy. Chester W. Nimitz, chief of US Naval
operations, suggested the establishment of a construction engineering team. American
marines were garrisoned in Beijing, Tianjing, and Tanggu, but withdrew after
Marshall’s abortive mission in early 1947. Qingdao became the bastion of the US
navy in China, where a United States Naval Training group was there to train Chinese
naval forces and monitor Russian activities in Northeast China.452 At the time when
the US government was eager to upgrade China’s military capacity in East Asia,
President Truman even issued Executive Order 9843, “Authorizing the Secretary of
the Navy to Transfer Certain Vessels and Material and to Furnish Certain Assistance
to the Republic of China.”453
The disposition of the Japanese vessels after the Japanese surrender became an
extremely controversial issue. Theoretically, in terms of the Potsdam Declaration, all
the Japanese vessels should have been destroyed. In reality, however, some Allied
countries preferred to distribute them for practical use. On October 30, 1945, Wei
Daoming, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, cabled Wang Shijie that the US
government had decided to wreck all Japanese battleships and cruisers, while
destroyers and small battleships would be dispensed by China, United States, United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union.454 Upon receiving this information, Wang Shijie
instructed Wei to bargain a bigger share for the Chinese on the grounds that China
suffered more than other allies during the war.455 According to a report from the
British Foreign Office in November 1945, MacArthur intended to “hold up decision
as to whether to sink them or not until views of His Majesty’s Government in United
Kingdom, French Government and Soviet Government had been obtained.”456 From
the British point of view:
General MacArthur’s omission of the Chinese Government, as one of the
Governments whose views should be obtained, was presumably a mere slip. It
452 Tsou Tang, American Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 444.
453 Executive Order 9843, April 25, 1947,
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/executive-orders/9843/executive-order-9843.
454 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 65-66.
455 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 66.
456 “Japan,” UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.
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has no doubt occurred to you already that the Australian Government would also
be extremely put out if they were not among those consulted. They would plainly
have a serious grievance if there were a division of the Fleet in which they were
not regarded as being entitled to a share.457
In the meantime, France and the Netherlands appealed to join the disposition and
received objection from the Chinese on the grounds that “France did not actually
participate in the war in the Far East, and China did not take part in the dispense of
German battleships either.”458 On January 31, 1946, an agreement was made that “all
Japanese submarines and all Japanese combatant vessels larger than destroyers should
be destroyed but that destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage
should be divided equally between the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, China and the United States.”459 On April 6, 1946, the order given by the
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff was to “dispose promptly of vessels easily
restorable to military use, and leave sunken and beached vessels in badly damaged
condition for subsequent reduction to scrap.”460 As Robert A. Fearey summarized:
All weapons and implements of war not convertible to peacetime uses,
fortifications, and specialized war-purpose industrial equipment had been
scrapped or otherwise destroyed in the earlier period except surface naval vessels
of destroyer size or less, which the four principal Allies had agreed in October
1946 should be divided equally among them. In October 1947, after 135 vessels
had been divided, SCAP notified the four Allies that the remainder, numbering
slightly over 100 ships, were required for occupation and other tasks involved in
implementation of Japan’s surrender, and that their division would therefore have
to be deferred. SCAP has not yet found it possible to release these ships.461
News began to spread in Nanjing that the Chinese government was about to take
over some Japanese warships. On April 10, 1947, Shen Jinding revealed to the press
that this program was still at “an initial stage.”462 On 30 April 1947, Shang cabled
457 “Japan,” UK National Archives, CAB 122/898.
458 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 69.
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462 “Riben Lingxun (日本零訊) [Scattered News],” April 10, 1947, Zhongyang Ribao (Chongqing).
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Chiang that the Japanese vessels that China had received could be categorized into
three types—repairable, proposed to be written-off, and written off—according to Gui
Yongqing (桂永清 ), commander of the Chinese navy.463 The way to dispense the
Japanese battleships was decided by drawing lots. On 24 June 1947, Shang cabled
Chiang reporting that the draw to distribute the Japanese vessels would be held on 28
June in Tokyo.464 On 24 July, Gui cabled Chiang stating that Shang Zhen reported
that the Chinese Mission had just received eight Japanese vessels weighing 8,450 tons
in the second draw.465 On 20 August, Gui reported Chiang that the US decided to give
the Japanese ships it received from the draw to China and proposed Qingdao as the
port to take over.466 On 20 August, Gui reported that the Chinese Mission obtained
eight vessels in the third draw and would receive them in Qingdao.467 On 22 August,
Gui further reported the details of receiving the vessels transferred from the United
States.468 The Ministry of National Defense summarized the result of the draw as
follow:
Type of Vessel Number Tonnage in Total Note
Destroyer 6 12,195 3 in the first slot, 2
in the second, 1 in
the third.
Destroyer Escort 17 12,250 5 in the first slot, 6
in the second, 6 in
the third.
Carrier 1 1,800 Obtained from the
third slot.
Total 24 29,245
There are still 30 battleships awaited to be delivered, but GHQ has not made the final
463 “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” April 30, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00538-096.
464 “Shang Zhen to Chiang Kai-shek,” June 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-094.
465 “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” July 24, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-096.
466 “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 7, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-097.
467 “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 20, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00052-100.
468 “Gui Yongqing to Chiang Kai-shek,” August 22, 1947, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00319-052.
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decision yet.469
As Bai Chongxi, Minister of National Defense, revealed in his military report in
September 1947, those 24 warships had arrived at Shanghai and Qingdao by the end
of August. However, since most of the warships were built during wartime, the
constructions were primitive. Moreover, weapons and telecommunication equipment
on the warships were sabotaged as Japan surrendered and awaited to be repaired.470 A
book published in 1950 noted that “In October 1947, after 135 vessels had been
divided, SCAP notified the four Allies that the remainder, numbering slightly over
100 ships, were required for occupation and other tasks involved in implementation of
Japan’s surrender, and that their division would therefore have to be deferred. SCAP
has not yet found it possible to release these ships.”471
However, the engagement of the newly-received Japanese battleships into the
Chinese Civil War did not reverse the failure of the Chinese Nationalists. Believing
that the core problem of the Chinese navy was its leadership weakness, US Navy Rear
Admiral H. R. Thurber wrote a letter on August 23, 1948 to the Chinese Navy
concerning the “development of qualities of leadership and of professional fitness in
the officers of the Chinese navy.”472 But before these reforms could be implemented,
Qingdao became a battleground of the civil war, and the Guomindang navy could
barely do anything to defend the city offshore. Witnessing the Guomindang’s
irreversible failure, in February 1949 Oscar C. Badger II, commander of Western
Pacific Naval force, refused to help the Nationalists defend Qingdao. Once again,
Chiang sought assistance from General MacArthur and wonder if he could dispatch
several high-ranking generals as consultants to the Guomindang troops in Qingdao,
but eventually this request was not made.473 Qingdao fell into Chinese Communist
hands on June 2, 1949. In general, while the Guomindang had received the Japanese
469 “Guofangbu Gongzuo Baogaoshu (國防部工作報告書) [Work Reports of the Ministry of National
Defense],” September 9, 1947, in ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 612-613.
470 Jin Dequn (金德群) and Du Jianjun (杜建軍) eds., Zhongguo Xiandaishi Ziliao Xuanji (中國現代
史資料選輯) [Selected Historical Documents on Contemporary Chinese History] (Beijing: Zhongguo
Renmindaxue Chubanshe, 1989), Vol. 6, 201.
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battleships in relatively good condition, it lacked the skill and manpower to maintain
them logistically. When Ho Shailai met Admiral C. Turner Joy in Tokyo in June 1950,
Ho even had to ask Joy if he could grant permission those former Japanese warships
to be repaired in Japan. Joy replied that he could not sanction this request in case the
Soviet Union would take a similar approach to surveil Japan’s ports where the US
naval vessels were stationed.474
END OF THE REPARATION PROGRAM
Despite MacArthur had been showing generosity to Nanjing by putting Chinese
demands for its share in Japanese reparations as a high priority, KMT’s declining
military fortunes had offset what it received from the Japanese reparations. As a result,
not only did China’s continuous demands for reparations annoy the General, but
MacArthur’s attitude infuriate some Chinese as well. Many Chinese believed that
MacArthur was revitalizing Japan at the expense of sacrificing China, and deprived
China’s rights to obtain reparations from Japan. During his visit to Japan, Wang Shijie
first grumbled that the Chinese people were feeling that “the United States is building
up Japan at the expense of China.” For example, according to a report written by
William J. Sebald, the acting Political Advisor in Japan, Wang raised the following
issue:
As an example, he raised the question of the so-called “gold pot”, comprised of
looted gold and precious metals. He said that he could not understand why the
United States has taken unilateral action in placing this gold at the sole disposal
of Japan with a view to building up Japan’s trade. He said that as the gold pot is
eventually to be divided among the four Allies, he could not understand why it
would not be possible at this time to allow China also to take advantage of the
“gold pot” as a credit base upon which to encourage Chinese trade. He said
China is also in dire straits for raw materials, but that the United States
apparently overlooks this factor. He hoped that something could be worked out
along these lines.475
474 DHSL, June 23, 1950.
475 “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald),” October 26,
1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 548.
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A direct confrontation took place on October 24 when Wang had a two-hour talk
MacArthur, in which Wang directly raised the issue of reparations. Wang stated that
“the Chinese are most desirous of obtaining a larger share of reparations out of current
production”, which MacArthur rebutted by drawing “two parallel horizontal lines, the
lower line representing Japan’s present 45% production and the upper line a
theoretical 100% production.” MacArthur further gave an explanation,
…the space between the two lines could be reached only at the expense of the
United States and that the Chinese must consider us very stupid if they believe
that we would fill in the gap only to have production turned over to the Chinese
in the form of reparations. He [MacArthur] further stated that even the 45%
production had been achieved only as a result of considerable assistance from the
United States which is now $300 million behind on this venture.476
While the Chinese believed that MacArthur was rebuilding Japan at the expense
of China, the Americans also believed that China’s increasing greed for Japanese
materials was at the expense of American’s interests. MacArthur clearly knew the
increasing demand for its share in Japanese reparations was in great part due to the
deteriorating military situation in China, but he firmly believed that, as he spoke to
Shang Zhen several months earlier, any military assistance to China should be given
from the United States and not from his Headquarters. In his talk with Wang,
MacArthur further pointed out:
China has already received a tremendous share of Japan’s external assets in the
shape of capital goods in China, Manchuria, and Formosa, and that Japan has lost
huge sums in its investments in Korea and elsewhere. He [MacArthur] asked Dr.
Wang how the Chinese could possible expect Japan to produce sufficient goods
and turn over a substantial amount thereof, out of current production, when Japan
itself is just about keeping alive with American assistance.477
476 “The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs (Penfield),” October 28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 555.
477 “The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern
Affairs (Penfield),” October 28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 555.
141
Believing that China was the biggest victim of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese
government thought that its claims for Japanese reparations were justifiable. But to
MacArthur, Japanese materials should be equally divided among the four powers
through negotiations and voting. Even though China was facing severe military
circumstances, it ought to respect the procedure of the Allied Council. Thus,
MacArthur clearly showed his dissatisfaction with China’s unpractical demands for
materials from his headquarters.
In March 1948, a fire razed the building of the Chinese Mission housing
documents concerning reparations and restitution.478 This incident heralded the
eventual failure of China’s efforts in requesting reparations from Japan. 1948
witnessed a significant reverse of the US policy toward Japan. Instead of punishing
Japan and depriving it of the military potential to generate wars in the future, the
United States decided to lay the foundation for Japan’s economic revival and make it
a bastion to contain the growing threat of Communism in East Asia as Chiang
Kai-shek faced increasing setbacks in the Civil War. To revive Japan’s economy
meant the termination of the reparation program, since “the burden of reparations
would jeopardize Japanese economic recovery.”479 On May 13, 1949, the US
government announced the termination of the reparations program.480
This decision certainly infuriated the Chinese, especially during a period when
the KMT was about to lose the Civil War. On May 26, 1949, Li Weiguo, Chinese
representative in the FEC, protested that the US policy was “drastic,” and “we fear it
is, above all, prejudicial to a just and lasting peace in the Far East.”481 On May 15,
1949, representing the Chinese Mission, Wu Bannong issued a statement urging
SCAP not to relinquish the entire reparation program on the grounds that those
countries suffered from Japan’s invasion had the right to require reparations and the
final decision should be made in the FEC where all eleven nations should be present.
Wu also reiterated that based on the essence of the Potsdam Declaration, all Japanese
478 “Administration Building of Chinese Mission Razed,” March 12, 1948, Nippon Times.
479 Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude, 141.
480 “Text of U.S. Note Halting Further Japanese Reparations,” May 13, 1949, The New York Times.
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142
plants for military production should be destroyed but that this policy had merely
been implemented thirty percent. He further pointed out that even the aviation
factories and private factories “were never touched upon,” not to mention the
“industry that assist the war.”482
RESTITUTION
In his report to President Truman, Pauley stated honestly that restitution is “a
problem in which the United States has relatively little direct interest; but there should
be an American attitude and policy on restitution, because we are the friend and ally
of countries and peoples to whom restitution is important.” As for the case of China,
Pauley noted,
It is well known that a number of Japanese generals were connoisseurs of Chinese
art, and other officers, with less educated tastes, were equally ready to appropriate
any art objects which they thought might be valuable. It is to be expected that
there will be claims from China for the restitution of specific works of art carried
off by known Japanese individuals from private and public Chinese collections,
and also claims for reparations in cases where art and similar valuables were
carried off by unidentifiable Japanese.483
Categories of Chinese properties looted by the Japanese army during the war
were too many to be detailed. The Chinese Mission paid equal attention to restitution
with reparations. Upon arriving at Tokyo, Zhu Shiming immediately signed a receipt
for Chinese rare books being returned to China, as Nippon Times wrote, “Ten cases of
rare old Chinese books, part of a collection seized by the Japanese at Hongkong in
1942, were formally returned on Sunday through the Office of the Civil Property
Custodian, SCAP, to the Chinese Government.”484 Restitution of Chinese books
482 “Riben Peichang Jihua Buying Quanbu Quxiao (日本賠償計劃不應全部取消) [Japan’s Plan for
Reparations Should Not be Canceled],” May 15, 1949, Xinwen Bao.
483 Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November
1945 to April 1946, 9.
484 “Rare Books, Seized by Japan During War, Returned to Chinese Government, Sunday,” June 4,
1946, Nippon Times.
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looted by Japan during the war was faced with little difficulty since it required no
credentials to prove its attribution. Chinese books, 107 boxes in total, preserved in
Ueno Library were shipped back to China in February 1947. As for the 36,000
Chinese books preserved in Kyoto Imperial University, SCAP assured their return to
China, but asked the Chinese Mission to send persons to work on details.485 Besides
ancient books, plenty of copper bells and stone lion were seized by the Japanese army
and placed in Japan. According to Wu Bannong’s estimation after his inspections in
Japan, ninety-five percent of items seized by Japan came from China.486
Shen Jinding, counselor to the Chinese Mission, recounted that when he studied
in Japan when young, he saw two anchors from the Chinese battleships captured by
the Japanese navy as war booty during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 placed in a
park. When Shen returned to Japan after the war, he found the two anchors in the
same place. In case the Japanese government concealed this war booty, as some
Japanese officials had been doing at that time, Shen immediately wrote a
memorandum to GHQ to order the Japanese government to return those anchors to
China.487 In terms of decisions made by the FEC, however, items requested for
restitution from Japan must have been looted after 1937. In this case, after an
amendment of regulation of the FEC could the Chinese Mission requested the return
of the anchors.488 Shen also noted that Zhu Shiming forced the Japanese to return a
jade screen, which was sent by a big “Han traitor” in Northern China to Japan.489
Except for Chinese antiquities, the Chinese Mission in Japan paid much attention
to the restitution of Chinese steamships. In later 1946, the Chinese Mission asked ship
factories in China to submit credentials for the purpose of retrieving ships looted at
485 “Zhuri Daibiaotuan Disanzu Saliunian Eryuefen Gongzuo Baogao (駐日代表團第三組卅六年二
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war.490 The first Chinese steamship being retrieved was Jianshehao(建設號), which
arrived at Shanghai in June.491 In May 1947, SCAP dispatched eight representatives
of the Allied countries to inspect ports along the western coast of Japan to examine if
the Japanese were still concealing ships seized from the Allies during the war. The
Japanese government reported to SCAP that only 70 ships were taken from the Allies,
and those records were destroyed by bombings in Tokyo in the final period of the
war.492 According to the Chinese calculations, however, there were 220 ships looted
by Japan during wartime.493 The Chinese Mission was obliged to find the
whereabouts of those ships harboured at Japan’s docks. For instance, it found a
steamship of 2,000 tons named Yongyuan concealed at Osaka and a steamship of 969
tons named Xingan in use at Hokkaido.494 The obstruction, however, was providing
credentials to reclaim the property. SCAP requested the Chinese government to
provide credentials of the ship’s nationality, details on the ship’s functions, dates and
places that the ship was looted or expropriated by the Japanese. The Chinese Mission
complained in a report that some credentials of the ships were incomplete and urged
the Ministry of Transportation and Bureau of Maritime Affairs to gather more
evidence.495 Due to the procedural difficulties, by May 1947 only four of one hundred
steamboats taken by Japan during the war had returned to China’s hands.496
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In comparison to the reparations, China’s restitution of looted properties from
Japan generally progressed well. According a calculation in March 1949, items that
had been restored to China were as follows: “(1) 47,632 assorted hand tools at Kobe,
Japan. (2) 4,860 books and 17,500 pamphlets at Kobe, Japan (3) 90 books at Kobe,
Japan (4) 835,335 metric tons of copper coins and 3,788.210 kgs of nickel coins at
Nagoya, Japan (5) Check in the amount of ¥ 22,292.63 representing proceeds from the
scale of the hull of the vessel “KinshuMaru” and accumulated interest at Tokyo, Japan.
(6) 157.176 kgs and 112,423 pieces of sheep and goat skins at Tokyo, Japan. (7) 1,000
kgs of cotton yarn at Tokyo, Japan. (8) Approxximately 17761.42 lbs of raw silk and
25,000 lbs of wild silk at Tokyo, Japan. (9) 100,265 lbs of wool at Tokyo, Japan. (10)
54,093 yds of cotton cloth, at Tokyo, Japan.“497 On some occasions, the Chinese
Mission was instructed not to ship the items back to China but instead sell them to
Japanese enterprises to earn foreign exchange. For instance, in March 1949 the
Chinese sold leather, wool and textile worth 80,000 USD to Japan.498
THE FORMER MANCHUKUO PROPERTIES
Many staff in the Chinese Mission in Japan possessed working experience in
Northeast China. For example, Ho Shailai started his military career when his father,
Sir Robert Ho Tung, recommended that served as a lieutenant under Zhang Xueliang.
Despite Zhang’s political downfall after the Xian Incident in 1936, due to his father’s
influence in Hong Kong as well as his own ability, Ho Shailai was not sidelined by
Chiang. In the postwar era, Ho was appointed to take charge of coordinating Japanese
repatriation in Huludao, a port of significant strategic position in Northeast China. As
Ho assumed leadership in Tokyo in 1950, he turned toward his old acquaintances
from Northeast China and promoted them to certain strategic positions. As Hong
Kong merchant Dong Haoyun recounted, Ho brought Chen Yanjiong and Liu Yutang
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to Japan.499 Chen was the closest staff member and an important counselor to Ho, and
Liu served as chief of the Overseas Chinee section of the Chinese Mission. Moreover,
staff of the Chinese Mission in Japan witnessed how the Russians thwarted their
efforts. In the case of reparations from Japan, the most notable case was that the
Russians removed Japanese properties worthy of 2 billion, according to Pauley’s
estimation, in Manchuria, leading to a debate on whether those items should be
regarded as “war booty” or “reparation.”500 As the US government halted the
reparation program in 1949, the Chinese Mission in Japan put its focus on the
restitution of the former Manchukuo properties left in Japan.
According to a memorandum sent by SCAP to the Japanese government
(SCAPIN- 2188) on December 10, 1951, one can see the substantial value of
Manchukuo’s properties left in Japan:
1. NAIGAI building, also known as the KO TOKU KAIKAN and as Empire
House, being a 6-story reinforced concrete office building located at No. 18,
2-chome, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.
2. TO TO TEI building, 5-story reinforced concrete restaurant and club house
building located at No. 2, 1-chome, Yurakucho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.
3. MANCHUKUO EMBASSY, Main building, located at No. 50, Sakurada-cho
Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo.
4. MANCHUKUO EMBASSY, former residence of military attache at No. 30,
Sakurada-cho, Azbu, Minato-ku, Tokyo.
5. MANCHUKUO STUDENT GUIDANCE ASSOCIATION PROPERTIES
consisting of:
a. Land and buildings located near Korakuen, Koishikawa, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo (Dormitory and Office Building)
b. Land and buildings of Girl Students Dormitory located at No. 91,
Benten-cho, Ushigome, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
c. 2,140 tsubo of land located at Oza Nakakura-aza, Serigazawa,
Karuizawa-cho, Kitasakugun, Nagano-ken
d. Funds in SCAP CustodyAccount, Bank of Japan ----- ¥ 908,132.45
e. Account in Yokohama Specie Bank, a closed institution in
liquidation-----¥ 99.998.94501
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Among all these items, the first objective of the Chinese was the “Manchukuo
Students Guidance Association.” It was an association built in 1935 for students from
Manchukuo who studied in Japan. One Chinese correspondent wrote in 1939 that
“whoever visited the Association will not only be amazed by its impeccable facilities
but will envy the diligent students from Manchukuo who enjoyed their stays in this
mentally and physically perfect Association.”502 In 1947, the Chinese Mission began
to inquire with SCAP regarding the possibility of retrieving the Manchukuo Students
Guidance Association, only to receive a reply that it was not possible “without
definitive instructions from higher authority.”503 In an investigation, SCAP
determined that the Association was co-founded by the Japanese government and
Manchukuo, and most of the funds came from Japan. The Chinese Mission, however,
believed that following the demise of Manchukuo and its restoration to China, all
properties belonging to Manchukuo, whether in China or abroad, should be taken over
by the Chinese government. The Chinese Mission also protested in October 1948 that:
It has been reliably reported to this Mission that one particular Japanese national
by the name of Ogo, appointed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to serve on the
Liquidation Committee, is living with his whole family in the building of the
Institution and is collecting on various pretexts rents and “entrance fees” ranging
from 100,000 Yen too 1,000,000 Yen from the Japanese occupants on the
premises. This Ogo is said to have been pocketing all such payments as his own
personal income. The Chinese students residing therein, being the persons
concerned, are pursuing the right course of action by appealing to law for
arbitration. When a just solution is reached through the good offices of the
General Headquarters, whereby the properties of the Institution in question will
be restored to China, the Chinese Mission in Japan believes that the Chinese
Government will see to the return of normalcy to the Institution which is to serve
the interest of Chinese students in Japan.504
In order to persuade SCAP, the Chinese Mission made a detailed study of
502 “Canguan Manzhouguo Liuri Xuesheng Huiguan (參觀滿洲國留日學生會館) [Visit to the
Manchukuo Student Association in Japan],” Huawen Daban Meiri（華文大阪每日）, 1939, Vol. 2, No.
11, 30-31.
503 “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” November 26, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.
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Association funds. The Chinese Mission stressed the point that the Association was in
fact sponsored by the puppet government of Manchukuo, rather than the Japanese
government, by listing the funds donated by private individuals and organizations in
Manchuria. Of the original 883,000 Yen in donations, 10,000 came from Pu Yi, 1,000
came from Hsia Kai-shek [Xie Jieshi 謝介石 ], 300,000 from the South Manchuria
Railway Company, 30,000 from the Manchu Power Company, 40,000 from the
Manchu Central Bank, 40,000 from the Manchu Imperial Association, 20,000 from
the Manchu Den-den Company and 100,000 from the Manchukuo Government. By
tracing the composition of funds in the Association, the Chinese Mission was eager to
prove that the funds were raised by the “Chinese common masses” in Manchuria.505
On July 18, 1949, the Chinese Mission sent a memorandum to the Diplomatic
Section of SCAP with regard to the former Manchukuo Embassy located in Tokyo:
The said Embassy occupied a land of 3,567 tsubo, price paid therefor being
5351344.00. The buildings which were later burned cost 238,902.60. At the time
of taking over by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, the Embassy still owned three automobiles……An emergency fund
leaned from the Manchurian Central Bank and amounting to 20,000,000.00 is still
pending further investigation, as the accounts for same are not complete.
The Chinese Mission requested SCAP to conduct an investigation on these items
and wished to “file hereby a claim for the title thereof” and “very much to make use
of the land because of its location in the vicinity.”506
The former-Manchukuo property that interested the Chinese Mission the most
was the Ko Toku Kaikan, a clubhouse for Manchukuo officials visiting Japan during
wartime. The Chinese Mission expressed its willingness to take over the property in
February 1949, but again SCAP stated “[i]nstructions from higher authority relative to
the disposition of interests of former puppet regimes in property in Japan are not yet
available.” The Chinese Mission also urged SCAP to prohibit an attempt from the
505 “The Chinese Mission to Diplomatic Section,” October 2, 1948, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.
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Japanese government to sale this property to a third party.507 While stationed in
Tokyo, Ho Shailai spent much of his time trying to recoup this property. On July 4,
1951, Ho received Junzaburō Yamada, a Japanese revolutionary zealot who had
assisted Sun Yat-sen’s revolution in China, who wished to offer evidence in support of
retrieving the Association.508 The controversies laid in disputes between the Japanese
vendor and the Manchukuo official who bequeathed this property, and negotiations
should be conducted by a third party. A possible solution was to give this property to
the Chinese and used the funds to support Sino-Japanese cultural interaction.509 Ho
later referred this case to an American lawyer named Remond Bushell and asked
SCAP to intervene. After years long investigation and judicial procedure, the
properties remained in Japan’s hands.
CONCLUSION
On September 30, 1946, the Chinese Mission hold a press conference, at which it
complained that SCAP denied its quest for Japan’s silk cocoons. Mark Gayn wrote
down MacArthur’s reaction upon hearing this news:
I am told that when General Marquat rushed to General MacArthur with the news
of the Chinese statement, MacArthur said irritably: “What do they[sic] want?
They’ve forgotten they’re in debt to us.” I am also informed that it was General
MacArthur himself who turned down the Chinese application. General
MacArthur’s reason was given to me by one of his silk advisers: “It just doesn’t
make much sense to build up the Chinese silk industry when you’re trying to help
Japan.”510
MacArthur’s response exemplified his thoughts of postwar Japan policy. KMT’s
historiography finds fault with the reparation policy and stresses Chiang Kai-shek’s
“kindness” for abandoning China’s quest for “astronomical” reparations, which
507 “Diplomatic Section to the Chinese Mission,” March 11, 1949, Guoshiguan, 020-010105-0028.
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contributed to postwar Japan’s economic recovery.511 It barely mentions how China
struggled vehemently for its share in disposition of the Japanese reparations with
other allies, as well as how it privately lobbied the United States to grant China some
additional reparations. Only until these efforts became hopeless after the US halted
the reparations program in 1949 did the Nationalist Chinese begin to claim their
“generosity.”
Edwin Pauley’s concerns over China’s ability to make use of Japanese plants and
half of the thirty percent allotment assigned to China indicated how the US
government endeavored to prioritise China before other allies in regards to Japanese
reparations. From the viewpoint of Chinese public opinion, the function of the
Chinese Mission in Japan was to investigate reparations from Japan and discuss the
occupation policy with other allies.512 Located in Tokyo, the Chinese Mission in
Japan perceived how difficult it was to obtain reparations from Japan and how
impractical it was to reach agreements with other interested Allied countries.
Consequently, the Chinese Mission paid more attention to restitution of Chinese
properties. However, difficulties in finding credentials proved to be no easier than
obtaining reparations. Consequently, the Chinese Mission focused on restitution of
Chinese books, which were the least controversial items.
This chapter also suggests that many staff in the Chinese Mission had intense
affiliations to the Northeast. Many of them witnessed the Mukden Incident in 1931
and suffered during the War of Resistance against Japan. After the bitter victory, once
again they witnessed the Russians plunder Japanese plant and material in the
Northeast. The anti-Japanese mentality in the Northeast, exacerbated by the Soviet
plunder in that region, bestirred them to deal fervently with reparations regarding
Northeast China. The incessant struggle to gain control over the properties of the
former Manchukuo still in Japan exemplifies this mindset and deserves more
scholarly research in the future.
511 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 620.
512 “Lun Zhuri Daibiaotuan (論駐日代表團) [On the Chinese Mission in Japan],” January 30, 1947,
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CHAPTER SIX: THE KOREANWAR
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and its progress had become a
constant preoccupation for Chiang Kai-shek, who had been seeking for an opportunity
to counterattack Mainland China after being defeated in the Chinese Civil War in
1949. Chiang’s plan was to dispatch three divisions of his troops to participate in the
Korean War and, after South Korea won, to further attack the Chinese Mainland and
retake the territories he lost. Ho Shailai, the newly-arrived head of the Chinese
Mission in Japan, was empowered with the mission to persuade General MacArthur to
accept this offer. While this plan was rejected by the US government and never come
into effect, the Chinese Mission in Japan had cultivated a tight relationship with
SCAP and played a supportive role during the Korean War.
Chiang Kai-shek’s offer of using his 33,000 troops to take part in the Korean War
and General MacArthur’s secret visit to Taiwan in August 1950 have been widely
mentioned in previous accounts.513 However, their importance has been overlooked.
General Ho Shailai, whose significance has been downplayed and omitted in modern
Chinese history, was the key figure of this overlooked episode. By using General Ho
Shailai’s diaries, this chapter details the interactions between Ho and MacArthur as
well as the full story of Chiang’s unfulfilled mission. As the leading PRC historian in
Cold War studies Shen Zhihua (沈志華) has calculated, although the period between
the dispatch of PRC forces and the end of the war was thirty-three months, the
escalation and aggrandizement that occurred in the first four months at the outbreak of
the conflict – from June 1950 to October 1950 before the PRC’s involvement
constituted “the significant part of the origins of the war.”514 By the same token,
513 Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Pan, 1988), 67; Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean
War (London; New York, Longman, 1986), 178-180; Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political
History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 111, 116-117; Edgar O’Balance, Korea:
1950-1953 (London: Faber, 1969), 34, 46; Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the
Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 67; Sheila
Miyoshi Jager, Brothers at War: the Unending Conflict in Korea (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2013), 80; David Cheng Chang, The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War,
83-84.
514 Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng (毛澤東斯大林與朝鮮戰爭) [Mao
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although the debate whether to accept Chinese Nationalist forces into the war only
lasted several months, it was during this time that US policy toward Taiwan and the
fate of the island were settled.
Following Lin Hsiao-ting’s sketch of the course of Taipei’s dealings with SCAP,
this chapter looks again at the relationship, but does so in a more thorough way than
previously possible. As the Korean War rekindled his eagerness to recover mainland
China, Chiang immediately ordered Ho Shailai to approach MacArthur with the offer
of Chinese military assistance. In Tokyo, Ho then shared frequent exchanges with
General MacArthur and his high-rankings military officers – men such as Charles
Willoughby and Edward Almond – as events unfolded. Many details unknown to
previous historians are revealed by Ho’s diaries. Regrettably, however, due to the
limitations on access to Korean War records in the US, some details revealed here by
Ho’s diaries have not yet been crosschecked using documents from that side. By
exploring these unnoticed stories, we could measure the extent to which Chiang’s
regime was involved in the Korean War as well as how Washington learnt the lesson
of MacArthur’s disobedience and adjusted its policy toward Taiwan.
THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREANWAR
At dawn on June 25, the Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel,
marking the beginning of the Korean War. It was not until 6 p.m. that Ho received the
news, and not from his staff in the Chinese Mission but from a call by Wei Jingmeng
(魏景蒙), a famous Chinese journalist. “I heard that there was a radio report at 9 a.m.
this morning,” wrote Ho in his diary, “and the military and media group in our
Mission don’t even know yet, which dissatisfies me a lot.”515 When inquiring why his
staff had no information on the war, Cao Shicheng, head of the military group, simply
replied that his responsibilities were only related to Japanese intelligence.516
Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2003), 24.
515 DHSL, June 25, 1950.
516 DHSL, June 26, 1950.
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Meanwhile, the crisis of the outbreak of the war earned Ho a chance to meet with
John Foster Dulles on the same day. The first question Dulles asked Ho was what
would be the effect on Taiwan if South Korea was defeated. “It depends on how South
Korea is defeated,” Ho replied, “If South Korea resisted well and is supported by
others, the morale of Taiwan will be enhanced. But if South Korea is defeated like
Czechoslovakia, then its effect will certainly be terrible.” Dulles then enquired about
the potential CCP invasion of Taiwan, to which Ho replied that no potential attack
was detected.517 In his diaries on that date, he added that Dulles then suggested
Chinese Nationalists should be aware of intelligence gatherings, as there was no
intelligence in South Korean now that such a big event had happened. Dulles also told
Ho “not to bring disappointing news back to Taiwan.”518 In this meeting, the most
important issue was the Korean War’s effect on Taiwan and dispatching Nationalist
troops to South Korea was neither raised nor even considered.
On June 27, for the purpose of preventing either Taiwan or mainland China from
attacking each other, President Truman made a statement stating that “I have ordered
the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am
calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations
against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.”519 While this
statement was regarded as a guarantee from the United States, Ho regarded it as a
disappointment. Ho immediately requested his staff to discuss all possible
implications of the statement. Their biggest concern was that the prohibition on all air
and sea operations against Mainland China would greatly weaken the morale of the
Nationalists. On June 30, Ho visited Sebald and asked for clarification on the Truman
Statement. Sebald replied that he did not know the details but could affirm that the
statement expressed goodwill towards Taiwan.520
The Truman statement forced Chiang Kai-shek to change his strategy of retaking
517 “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” June 26, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00031-002.
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Mainland China. Instead of a direct military counterattack on Mainland China, Chiang
envisaged a plan of dispatching an army of 30,000 soldiers to join the Korean War
and placing them under the command of General MacArthur. Chiang instructed Gu
Weijun, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, and Ho Shailai to deliver this
offer to Washington and SCAP respectively. According to a memorandum written by
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Gu told him that the
Nationalists “are unable to spare naval or air force units but that they are prepared to
furnish one army of approximately 33,000 men, composed of three divisions with the
best field equipment available to the Chinese. They lack sufficient shipping to
transport the entire body.” Gu also mentioned Ho’s activities in Tokyo to Washington,
as the memorandum wrote, “The Ambassador also said that the Chief of the Chinese
Mission in Tokyo was approaching General MacArthur since it was their intention
that any forces supplied would come under his command.”521 Chiang’s proposal was
immediately discussed in a White House meeting held on June 30, at which Secretary
Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the idea on the grounds that the use of
Chiang’s forces might render intervention by the Chinese Communists. Additionally,
the quality of Chiang’s troops was equivalent to that of South Korea, which made
transporting them from Taiwan to the Korean peninsula by the US Navy of little
practical value. In the end, President Truman agreed to reject this offer.522 According
to the official history of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on July 1 Chiang was “tactfully
informed,” via the Chinese Embassy in Washington, about the kindly refusal of his
offer.523
In the meantime, when Chiang asked Ho to transmit this offer to General
MacArthur, he further wanted Ho to ask the General, if the offer were to be accepted,
the exact number of soldiers he needed and the possible material support that the
United States could offer to Nationalist troops. Ho was later requested by Ye
Gongchao to immediately visit General MacArthur, and Ho thereupon called Sebald
521 “Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the
Secretary of State,” June 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 239.
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to relay this message to the General.524 Upon receiving this offer, MacArthur
informed officials in Washington about his interest in “accepting two divisions offered
by the Chinese Nationalist Government” at 5 A.M. on June 30, several hours before
the White House’s decision was made to turn down Chiang’s offer.525 The Joint
Chiefs of Staff might have already foreseen that the Nationalist Chinese would
approach MacArthur directly, thus it cautioned the General that the decision “whether
to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly
be made at highest levels in Washington.”526
Besides requesting Ho to make contact with General MacArthur, Chiang
Kai-shek also ordered Shao Yulin (邵毓麟 ), the Chinese Ambassador in Korea, to
approach Syng-Man Rhee, the President of Korea. Shao recollected that both he and
Ho received instructions from Taipei, saying that “Our government has decided to
dispatch three divisions and twenty transport planes to South Korea…You should
inform General MacArthur and President Rhee about this message respectively.”527
Chiang’s eagerness and passion for sending his troops to Korea was best described by
Michael Schaller, “During July, the Nationalists on Taiwan pushed hard to establish
ties between MacArthur, the war effort in Korea, and their own pretensions to
reconquer the mainland.”528 From the beginning of July, Ho Shailai, serving as the
conduit between Taipei and Tokyo, immersed himself on establishing ties between
Taipei and Tokyo. On July 1, Ho planned to visit General MacArthur with Admiral
Charles M. Cooke, who just arrived at Tokyo from Taiwan, but depressingly found out
that the General had no intention to meet him. However, Kim Yong Ju, the Korean
Minister in Tokyo, brought an important message to Ho. President Syng-Man Rhee
asked Ho to relay his gratitude to Chiang and ordered Kim to persuade General
MacArthur to accept Chiang’s offer, but the General refused to meet Kim as well. “On
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526 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War, 61.
527 Shao Yulin, “Jiang Zongtong Yuanhan Juece yu Lianheguo Yuanhan Jueyi (蔣總統援韓決策與聯
合國援韓決議) [President Chiang’s Decision to Assist South Korea and the United Nation’s
Resolution on Assisting South Korea],” Zhuanji Wenxue, No.33-1, 137.
528 Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 286.
156
this issue,” speculated Ho in his diary, “General MacArthur must not dare meet our
official staff before obtaining instructions from the White House.”529
In the meantime, foreign diplomats in Tokyo were eager to meet MacArthur to
gather information. As Sebald recalled, “Although the outbreak of the Korean War
transformed Tokyo into a military command post, the parade of foreign visitors
continued and the complex problems of the Occupation grew more numerous. The
demands upon MacArthur’s time were incredible.”530 For instance, Sir Alvary
Gascoigne, head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, had “sought to call upon
MacArthur for several weeks, without success.” Sebald believed this was “due partly
to MacArthur’s increased burdens.”531 While not being able to meet the General, Ho
was suggested by Sebald to write a formal note to the General, which he delivered to
Sebald on the next day. In his memoir, Sebald recalled the American’s reaction when
they received this note:
The Chinese (Nationalist) Mission in Tokyo sent me a formal note on July 2,
offering three combat divisions to the United Nations cause in Korea. I took this
offer to the Chief of Staff, Major General Almond. His tentative reaction was that
the logistic problems of such a force would be too great to make the proposition
practicable. General MacArthur, to whom we referred the offer, thought it
necessary to let Washington decide.532
Ho correctly observed the fact, which officials in Taipei failed to recognize, that
MacArthur had no authority to accept Chiang’s offer and thus kept Chinese officials at
a distance. However, the Nationalists were eager to know the result and had no
patience to wait. According to a CIA document, around 50,000 soldiers began to move
to the ports at Keelung and Kaohsiung before June 30 and were “awaiting sailing
orders.”533 This fact indicated that Chiang Kai-shek had mobilized his troops to the
ports before formally enacting the proposal on June 30, which gave Ho only a day to
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530 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 118.
531 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 118.
532 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 189.
533 “Preparation of Nationalist Military Units for Korean Aid,” July 12, 1950, General CIA Records,
CIA-RDP82-00457R005200700001-0.
157
deliver this offer to MacArthur. On July 2 Ye Gongchao insisted that Ho meet General
MacArthur in person, and on July 3 he even requested that Ho bypass Sebald and
make contact with the general directly. Receiving continuous pressure from Taipei,
Ho had no choice but to keep asking Sebald to arrange a meeting with the General,
and Sebald promised to try his best to help. On the afternoon of July 3, Ho received a
call from Sebald, informing him that the General agreed to meet him the next day. “It
proves that the estimation of the Foreign Office is wrong and mine is correct,” wrote
Ho in his diary, “people who are not here clearly cannot understand the situation and
could only rely upon speculation.”534
On July 4, Ho met General MacArthur for the first time since June 12. The
General revealed that he regarded Truman’s Statement as a victory for him and
Chiang Kai-shek, for he always held the view that Taiwan must be protected from
falling into the hand of the communists. The General also mentioned, for the first time,
that he would be willing to visit Taiwan, but the schedule might be delayed due to
urgent war related matters.535 In a telegram sent to Secretary Acheson on July 7,
Sebald reported that MacArthur wanted Ho to personally explain his viewpoints to
Chiang, which were:
(a) He fully concurs with Washington view that defense of Taiwan should
not be weakened at present.
(b) In view of breathing space which interposition of American naval
forces affords to forces on Formosa, intervening time should be spent in
augmenting strength logistics and readiness of Nationalist forces to meet any
contingency.
(c) Since Nationalist army offered for Korea without artillery, transport,
logistic support and short of ammunition, it would not be effective force on
534 DHSL, July 3, 1950.
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Korean front under present conditions.
(d) While discussions suggested in aide-mémoire of 1 July are not practical
at present, MacArthur plans visit Taiwan at first available opportunity to
investigate situation first hand.536
From Sebald’s telegram and Ho’s diaries, we could see that although MacArthur
was eager to increase the troops under his command in Korea, he believed the
self-defense was Taiwan’s top priority. Thus, he decided to inspect Taiwan’s military
capability. MacArthur openly indicated his willingness to visit Taiwan when he told J.
Lawton Collins, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, that he intended to visit Taiwan “as
soon as the situation in Korea was reasonably stabilized.”537 Soon after, MacArthur
wrote a note to Ho with regard to his future plan to visit Taiwan:
General MacArthur to Colonel b[B]unker ([a] personal aide):
Go and deliver this message to General Ho Shailai. “In furtherance of our
recent conference, please tell the Generalissimo that I am sending to Formosa
Vice Admiral Struble, who commands the Seventh Fleet to confer with naval
staff on some technical questions of naval liaison and co-operation. Admiral
Struble will arrive on a destroyer Saturday or Sunday at Keelung. This doesn’t
alter in any way my own plan to visit Formosa as soon as the operation in Korea
will permit.”538
Chiang was excited upon receiving this reply, and asked Ho on July 5 to express
his welcome to the General and to inquire whether the General would be willing to
meet him in Tokyo, for Chiang was planning to visit Korea. Furthermore, on the same
day Chiang cabled Ho to ask President Rhee whether he would be willing to receive
him in Korea.539 Ho clearly opposed these plans as he received the instructions, since
he believed that “now is not the right time to tackle with such things.” On July 6 Ho
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cabled Taipei to suggest the immediate cessation of these actions. But before the cable
was sent, Ho received a further order to proceed with the instructions from Taipei, and
he replied that he would find General Willoughby to ask.540 This proposal, as Ho had
anticipated, was kindly rejected by General Willoughby, who replied that the General
was unable to meet Chiang due to the severe military situation.541 According to Ho’s
observation, Willoughby scoffed when telling Ho that at present Taiwan should not
behave in such a way and that he would not transfer this message to MacArthur.542
Chiang was furious upon learning that Willoughby refused to transfer his request
to the General. In his diary, Chiang scoffed at Willoughby’s reaction and said it
represented “the fickle and capricious personality of American generals.”543 While
Chiang’s proposal to visit MacArthur in Tokyo was rejected, the General’s future visit
to Taipei was still on the agenda. Ho went back to Taipei on July 7 and spent a week
arranging more details. On July 10, Ho met Chiang Kai-shek and discussed the
methods of contacting General MacArthur.544 Four days later, Chiang met Ho again
and instructed him on “four points to be discussed with General MacArthur.”545
While Chiang did not detail what the four points were in his diary, Ho noted in his
diary that Chiang asked him to ask for MacArthur’s permission to bomb the Yixu (義
序 ) Airport in Fuzhou, which was under construction.546 Ho returned to Tokyo on
July 15 and immediately delivered this request to MacArthur and submitted a
memorandum to SCAP to bomb the airport in Fuzhou.547 Three days later, MacArthur
sent a reply to Ho saying that the proposal had been rejected by Washington.548 At
this point, Chiang’s requests were certainly not a priority to MacArthur, for he was
preoccupied with building up the UN forces to Korea. On July 14, General Collins
formally presented a UN flag to MacArthur in Tokyo. Two weeks later, on July 25,
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MacArthur set up the United Nations Command (UNC) in Tokyo.549
In sharp contrast to Chiang’s impatience, Ho Shailai had been patiently waiting
for MacArthur’s notice about departing for Taiwan. Meanwhile, Ho immersed himself
on maintaining a positive Chinese image among the general public in Tokyo. For
instance, Ho led seventy-four members of the Chinese Mission in Japan to donate
their blood for soldiers in the Korean frontline. As the newspaper revealed, Ho
himself donated “600 cubic centimeters of his blood”, and he and his wife “were the
first among the mission personnel to donate their blood to the United Nations forces
who were fighting on the Korean front for the cause of freedom.” Moreover, “Twenty
wives and daughters of the officials of the Mission have volunteered for membership
in the Red Cross to render services for the United Nations forces on the Korean
front.”550 The blood donation from members of the Chinese Mission reflected the
Chinese eagerness to make contribution to the Korean War effort. At 6 p.m. on July 28,
Ho received a call from MacArthur, who invited him to a private meeting, at which
the General presented the nuts and bolts of his trip to Taipei.551 According to Sebald,
the General also told Karl L. Rankin in July that “If he has horns and a tail, so long as
he is anti-Communist, we should help him. Rather than make things difficult, the
State Department should assist him in his fight against the Communists-we can try to
reform him later!”552
MACARTHUR’S VISIT TO TAIPEI
At 6 a.m. on July 31, Ho accompanied General MacArthur on the same plane
departing for Taipei. According to Stratemeyer’s diary, “Those accompanying us: Joy,
Struble, Ho, Almond, Whitney, Canada (CINCFE’s physician) and an orderly. The
others left in the standby C–54 (FEAF flagship out of commission because of faulty
engine): Marquat, Willoughby, Wright, Eberle, Navy member, my Materiel (Alkire),
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7th Fleet member, and an orderly left in GHQ C–54.”553 After landing at Taipei, they
were warmly received by Chiang. As Peter Lowe described, the General was “greeted
effusively by Chiang.”554 Later a joint conference was held, at which nearly all
significant Nationalist military officers were present. According to Stratemeyer’s
diary, MacArthur held a meeting with the American officials, at which he stated that
……the Chinese forces had a poor organization, that they were not
deployed properly, that if they had about 75,000 to 100,000 people properly
organized on paper and on the ground, the proper commanders in charge,
they could hold Taiwan; that our job would be to send without delay a
liaison group made up of Army, Air and Navy and that although we would
not command, we would assist and direct what we as Americans considered
proper in the defense of the islands. There would be no integration of forces,
but that we would work along parallel lines, that our activities on Formosa
would be concerned with defense only, that we would assist the Chinese,
that we would in no way get involved with political aspects and that our
activities would be purely professional.555
Before the visit, MacArthur might not have anticipated that Nationalist forces
were in such a poor state. While investigating the feasibility of accepting Chiang’s
offer was not one of the main purposes of his Taiwan visit, MacArthur may have had
a slight anticipation of receiving Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea. But after
hearing the Chinese officers’ reports, this idea was totally dismissed and what
MacArthur wanted the Nationalist to do was to merely defend Taiwan. As Carl Berger
summarized, “it was agreed that the United States and Nationalist China would
coordinate their efforts to defend Formosa and that Chiang’s offer of 33,000 troops
would be held in abeyance.”556
One outcome of this visit was that MacArthur decided to establish a liaison
between Tokyo and Taipei, in which Ho Shailai served as the interlocutor. Ho was
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asked by Willoughby to inform Taipei that he would dispatch General Alonzo Patrick
Fox, Vice Chief of Staff of the United Nations Forces, to lead 25 officials to Taipei on
the next day in order to “make a survey of the supply and manpower requirements of
Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Forces there.”557 MacArthur also
recommended sending jet fighters to Taiwan, which raised doubts from the Pentagon
whether those planes would be used to fight mainland China. Truman instructed
MacArthur to understand the limit of his authority in making decisions and the
General assured the President that he understood “thoroughly the limitations on my
authority as theater commander and you need have no anxiety that I will in any way
exceed them.”558
MacArthur’s unannounced visit to Taipei infuriated Washington D.C., which
immediately dispatch Averell Harriman to Tokyo to meet MacArthur.559 Harriman’s
trip raised doubts among foreign representatives in Japan. The British Mission in
Japan was eager to know the purpose of his visit and invited Harriman for a meeting
but was refused. The head of the British Mission then approached Sebald to squeeze
him for some information. After being asked whether “Formosa had been listed on the
agenda,” Sebald replied that “he knew no details of what had passed between the two
men [Harriman and MacArthur].” Depressed at obtaining nothing, the British official
protested to Sebald that he was “getting desperate about not having any access to
MacArthur” and “found myself completely cut off from the oracle, MacArthur could
find time to see Randolph Churchill (he actually gave him luncheon!), but he could
not see the senior official representative of His Majesty’s Government in Japan.”560
As the British diplomat sensitively surmised, both Americans did discuss the Taiwan
issue but reached no agreement. Michael Schaller has summarized that the General
still “ridiculed the administration’s China policy and boasted of his own credentials as
the greatest American expert on Oriental psychology” and believed that “Washington
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should delegate the task of handling Chiang to an expert like himself.”561
Despite facing opposition from Washington D.C., Chiang did not cease to
pressure General MacArthur. MacArthur’s journey to Taiwan not only encouraged
Chiang but significantly enhanced Ho’s status in Tokyo as well. On their flight back to
Tokyo, MacArthur invited Ho to attend the daily military briefings on the Korean War
in Tokyo.562 In his diaries, Ho summarized the gist of every military briefing. For
instance, in a briefing held on August 23, at which Ho was presented, MacArthur
examined the Inchon landing plan with Admiral Forrest Sherman, who was visiting
Japan and Korea.563 The fact that Ho was allowed to receive this highly classified
military intelligence, when his country was not even a part of the UN force to Korea,
demonstrated how much faith MacArthur had in him.
On August 10, Chiang asked Ho to confer with General MacArthur on whether
the Nationalist government should identify with echo the statement issued by the
General.564 On August 18, Ho arranged a meeting between Gu Weijun and MacArthur.
Gu mentioned Chiang’s proposal to dispatch his own troops as well as to organize an
“Asian Volunteer Army” to Korea. After hearing this, the General simply replied that
it would be meaningless to have Taiwan dispatch its troops abroad, for its status was
extremely important. As to the Asian Volunteer Army question, the General believed it
should be decided by the United Nations.565 In the meantime, Chiang also proposed
to send observers, in the name of the Republic of China, to the Korean battlefield. Ho
discussed this issue with Courtney Whitney, political advisor of SCAP, who replied
that it would be better to propose this issue to the United Nations and SCAP would try
its best to help.566 MacArthur also told Ho that there had been 31 countries requesting
to send observers to the battlefield but were denied, and it would be difficult to fulfill
Chiang’s request. In the future, the General added, if other countries were allowed to
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send observers, China could do the same thing as well.567
While Chiang had been keeping his eyes on the Korean War and searching for
the best moment to reoffer his deals with General MacArthur, the General had no
intention to accept Chiang’s offer. On one hand, MacArthur must obey Truman’s
instruction. On the other hand, he firmly believed that the Korean War could be
finished in several months and there was no need to have the Nationalists involved. In
the meantime, Ho was actively propagating the idea that “neutralization of Taiwan”
would benefit the Chinese Communist on the grounds that the PLA could concentrate
its forces to attack Taiwan without being harassed by the KMT air force and navy. Ho
reiterated that even though “Free China” was now based on Taiwan, it still possessed
significant power to stop the People's Volunteer Army from entering Korea.568 In a
meeting between Ho, Dong Xianguang, and MacArthur on October 5, MacArthur
clearly stated that “the 38th parallel must be crossed and after that the war will be over
in a month. Until now the amount of the US soldiers in Korea is enough, even if the
Soviet Union or the Chinese communists joined the war they could not stop our
troops’ advance.”569 The General’s message was clear. At the outset of the war, the
General was contemplating to accept Chiang’s offer but needed Washington’s
approval. Now the situation had changed, and the General believed he could win the
war without causing more trouble. At this point, MacArthur firmly believed the
intervention of the Chinese communists was impractical, even if it happened, it would
not affect the outcome of the war. Based on this evaluation, on September 29 Marshall
gave the green light, instructing MacArthur that “We want you to feel unhampered
tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.”570
On October 15, President Truman held a meeting with MacArthur on Wake Island
to discuss the progress of the Korean War and to reiterate the United States
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government principle not to attack Chinese territory.571 Furthermore, both of them
believed that the PRC would not enter the war, even it did, MacArthur predicted that
“American forces would simply mow them down as they tried to cross the Yalu-“the
greatest slaughter in military history”.”572 The Nationalists regarded this meeting as
the best opportunity to figure out Truman’s intention, and the news media in Taiwan
assumed that Ho was to stay in Japan to investigate this meeting.573 Ho was infuriated
by this rumor and immediately announced resignation on October 18.574 However,
Ho was persuaded to remain in his position. Ho acutely sensed the fact that although
the atmosphere in the Wake Island Conference was cordial, the divergence between
Truman and MacArthur would widen. In a meeting with Wang Shijie, they discussed
Chiang’s recent decision to send officers to visit MacArthur, which they both believed
imprudent. They believed that Tokyo and Washington maintained a subtle relationship,
so MacArthur might refuse to meet Chiang’s envoys. In that case, the Chinese would
be embarrassed. Thus, Wang asked Ho to express their concern to the President if
Chiang inquired about this issue.575 In sum, from the outset of the Korean War on
June 25, Chiang had been vying for the chance to counterattack Mainland China and
participate in the Korean War, and never stopped reminding MacArthur that he was
ready to join the war at any time.
THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ENTERED THE WAR
MacArthur was confident that the Chinese communists would not intervene. As
the British representative in ACJ noted on October 3, MacArthur dismissed Zhou
Enlai’s warning to Panikkar that if US forces crossed the 38th parallel they would face
Chinese resistance as “pure bluff.”576 Unfortunately, MacArthur’s evaluation
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eventually proved to be wrong. On October 19, the People’s Voluntary Army (PVA),
which was commanded by General Peng Dehuai, joined the fighting when it launched
the First Phase Offensive on October 25. The CCP’s intervention not only thwarted
MacArthur’s victory but made the Americans reconsider the feasibility of having the
Chinese Nationalists take part in the Korean War. MacArthur was also confused about
the intention of the CCP and the extent of its involvement in the war, as Michael
Schaller summarized that the General “did not know if Peking intended to fight a
major war with the United States or whether it would make only a token, face-saving
effort on behalf of a Communist ally.”577 Perhaps for the purpose of better
understanding the CCP’s motivation, the General wanted to utilize the Chinese
Nationalists. On November 4, Ho received a cable from SCAP, wishing the Chinese
Mission in Japan to recruit ten or more Chinese translators.578 At this moment,
Chiang and many high-ranking officials in Taipei began to firmly believe that
MacArthur would appeal for Taipei’s assistance. For instance, Xiao Yisu (蕭毅肅 ),
Vice Chief of Staff of the Nationalist troops, and Wang Shijie both suggested that Ho
return to Tokyo several days later in case SCAP asked for Nationalist troops before a
final decision would be made by Chiang.579 On November 9, Chiang held a meeting
with Ho. In his diary, Chiang noted, “I discussed MacArthur’s attitude with Ho
Shailai. If the General once again requested me to dispatch troops to assist South
Korea, the plans are the same as before. But the U.S. government must renounce the
statement that forbids me to counterattack Mainland China, which is a natural
principle.”580 In Ho’s diary, he also noted that Chiang told him to ask MacArthur to
help rescind Truman’s order and to allow Nationalist troops stationed in Vietnam to
retreat to Taiwan.581
Ho returned to Tokyo and found that his status was enhanced again, for a China
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expert was urgently needed to explain the motivations of the Chinese communists’
intervention. To some extent, MacArthur might regret that he did not inquire Ho
Shailai about the possibility of the Chinese communists’ intervention into the war
before making his overconfident judgement. As a study suggested, at this point
“American policy makers did not know Chinese plans and objectives but were instead
relying on guesswork and speculation for their analyses.”582 Hence, as a CIA
document revealed, opinions of the Nationalist officials were attentive to the
Americans for none of them really knew what the real CCP intentions were. The
Americans were eager to know whether it was Beijing itself or Moscow which
ordered Beijing to intervene in the Korean War, since the two possibilities would lead
to two entirely different scenarios. In the first case, the Chinese communists probably
intended “only a defensive action to protect electric power supplies for Manchuria,
and may plan to hold only a narrow buffer area.” But if it was the second case, the
CCP would be following the “Indochina cold war pattern” and might “include an
attempt to drive United Nations (UN) forces back to the 38th Parallel.”583 As the
closet Nationalist Chinese officials to SCAP, Ho’s opinions were of abundant
usefulness. For instance, Courtney Whitney told Ho that “based on current
circumstances, there are many things you could help SCAP. I suggest you to have a
deep conversation with the General once you meet him.” George E. Stratemeyer,
commanding general of Far East Air Force, also suggested Ho to give more
information on the Communists forces to the General.584 In early November,
MacArthur favored advancing UN troops to the Yalu. In his conversation with
MacArthur on November 14, Sebald noted that the General believed his immediate
objective was to “destroy the bridges across the Yalu River in order to isolate the area
between the present line of the UN Forces and the border.” Sebald noted:
The UN Forces would, of course, stop at the boundary. If this can be
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accomplished during the next several weeks and before the river freezes, General
MacArthur feels that the Korean campaign would be at an end. Should the
planned operation fail and the Communist Forces continue to stream into North
Korea from Manchuria, however, he saw no alternative, from a military point of
view, to bombing key points in Manchuria. He said that if this should become
necessary “the fat would be in the fire”, because such operations would, in his
opinion, bring about a counter-move by Soviet Russia. Such counter-move, he
felt, could only lead to a spreading of the war and he therefore hoped that it
would not be necessary to resort to such drastic action.585
Two days later, on November 16, MacArthur had a long conversation with Ho, at
which they conferred about progress of the Korean War. The first question Ho raised,
of which Chiang was eager to know the answer, was whether there was anything that
Nationalist China could help; the General expressed his “deep gratitude” but replied
that to defend Taiwan was still the priority for the Nationalists. Ho summarized
MacArthur’s viewpoints as follows: military operations of the UN Forces must stop at
Sino-Korean border, and the General was ready to fight the CCP (at the border);
however, it was not likely to happen, and the General’s opinions on the Taiwan
problem became much prudent in comparison to that before his visit to Taipei. The
General also told Ho that if the Soviet Union attacked, he would bomb Vladivostok
and Shenyang; if the CCP “still refused to repent” and insisted on elevating the
warfare, the General would use atom bombs.586
Analyzing MacArthur’s conversation with Sebald and Ho, one could sense
MacArthur’s insistence on the UN Forces approaching the Sino-Korean border (the
Yalu River). MacArthur firmly believed his objective was to stop the PVA from
dispatching more troops crossing the Yalu, and bombardment at the border would be
an effective means to achieve this goal. The General also believed that the PVA had
no intention to confront him on a massive scale, which made Chiang Kai-shek’s
request a trivial issue. Despite so, the General kept showing his kindness to the
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Chinese Nationalists. On November 19, a decision was made between Ho and
Willoughby that the Chinese government would dispatch officials to Korea to
interview prisoners of war.587 Ho was in a position to have the captured PVA soldiers
returned to Taiwan on the grounds that fifty percent of the PVA soldiers, according to
his own estimation, were “conscripted from former Nationalist ranks.”588
At this point, Ho served as an advisor to SCAP to gather information about the
PVA. According to a CIA document, most American officials believed the Nationalist
troops “are experienced and familiar with Chinese Communist tactics.”589 By the
same token, Ho’s military commander experience in the Chinese Civil War made his
opinions extremely useful to the American generals in Korea. For instance, Whitney
conferred with Ho about the mentality of the PVA and believed that the Chinese
Communists were not willing to fight the Americans, were deeply afraid of being
bombed by the Americans, and their morale was depressed and weapons were poor.
Perceiving Whitney’s underestimation of the PVA’s determination, Ho kindly
reminded Whitney that the communists were not willing to fight the nationalists
during the Chinese Civil War either and should not underrate them.590
Regrettably, Ho’s warnings did not affect the stubborn general. Two days later,
on November 25, the PVA launched the Second Phase Offensive to counterattack
MacArthur’s “end the war offensive.” The embarrassed MacArthur persisted on
escalating the war, which faced opposition from the Pentagon. On November 28
MacArthur admitted that “We face an entirely new war.”591 “Yesterday I read the
newspaper and learned that the progress of the American Force was not well,” wrote
Ho in his diary on that day, “after reading the newspaper this morning it is confirmed
that the American troops are retreating in an orderly fashion. The situation is
worsening, as I have expected, the bandit troops [the PVA] concentrate their main
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force to attack South Korean units, resulting in overwhelming momentum.”592 The
morning following the PVA offensive, MacArthur suggested to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff the use of Chiang’s troops, whose trained manpower could supplement the UN
Force in Korea. The General noted that the reasons for turning down Chiang’s
previous offer, notably the Chinese Communists’ potential invasion of Taiwan and
intervention in Korea, were no longer applicable.593 In his memoir, MacArthur also
recounted his request to Washington, saying “the theater commander be authorized to
negotiate directly with the Chinese government authorities on Formosa for the
movement north and incorporation into United Nations command of such Chinese
units as may be available and desirable for reinforcing our position in Korea.”594
However, MacArthur’s suggestion was immediately turned down by President
Truman on the same day. Truman rejected the proposal because it would not only
“extend hostilities to Formosa” but also would disrupt the allied relationship between
the United States and other countries involved in the Korean War.595
Ironically, Chiang learned nothing about MacArthur’s interest in using his troops.
Perceiving the fact that the US Army was facing consecutive defeats, Chiang cabled
Ho on December 1 to inform General MacArthur that “if there is anything that China
could do to help, we will definitely do our best to assist and face either victory or
defeat together.”596 MacArthur immediately replied Ho on December 2 and expressed
his “deep gratitude” to Chiang’s kindness.597 While this reply seemed a kind rejection
to Chiang’s proposal, Chiang’s attitude boosted MacArthur conviction. The General
had begun to reconsider the feasibility of using Chiang’s forces since later November,
as many studies have discovered.598 On December 2 the Republican Senators in the
United States began to urge Truman to dispatch Chiang’s troops to Korea.599 Five
days later, on December 7, MacArthur once again proposed to use the Nationalist
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forces in Korea, as Stratemeyer wrote, “General MacArthur then pointed out the great
reservoir of Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and urged that he be permitted to use
them in Korea under the UN banner. He indicated that the Generalissimo would give
him 60,000 or 100,000 - or all of his troops if he needed them.”600 The amount
MacArthur mentioned were never seen either in Chiang’s telegram to Ho or his
personal diary, clearly it was Chiang’s letter a week earlier that made MacArthur
firmly believe that Chiang would give him any amount of troops he needed to join the
Korean War. In a meeting on December 7 with General Collins, who was on an
inspection tour in Japan, MacArthur urged the use of Chiang’s troops.601 The General
went on to elaborate that if restrictions on air action against and naval blockade of
China could be withdrawn, and if he could “secure 50,000 – 60,000 Chinese
Nationalist troops from Formosa,” he thought “he could hold a line across Korea.” If
the PVA stopped at the 38th Parallel, an armistice based on the Parallel could be
accepted.602
In the meantime, news media in Tokyo was curious about the Chinese
Communists’ intention and found Ho an ideal person to interview. For instance, when
being asked “Why have the Chinese communists intervened in Korea?” in an
interview with Richard Kallsen, Tokyo correspondent of the Mutual Broadcasting
System, Ho replied that the communists “are merely carrying out orders from the
Kremlin in the execution of Soviet world strategy.” The second question was “Would
the Chinese Communist aggression in Korea lead to World War III?” Ho replied,
If the United Nations was willing to stop the North Korean aggressor and not the
Chinese Communist aggressor, a global war may not break out right away, but no
aggressor has ever stopped on its own volition. The sooner the aggressor is
stopped, the less will the aggression spread, and still less will be the chances of a
global conflict. Stop aggression now and there may not be a world war. Let the
aggressor get away with it now and world war will be a dead certainty.603
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Perhaps the most challenging question to Ho, which was once again raised by
another journalist on December 7, was “whether Manchuria should be bombed.” Ho
first answer on November 30 was “Whether or not Manchuria too should be bombed
depends on whether the United Nations has courage to face the fact that the Chinese
communists are now the aggressors.” A week later, Ho held the same view on this
question and answered that “If the United Nations should at last consider the
Communist Chinese intervention as aggression, then naturally the United Nations
commander should be allowed to use all available means to fight the aggression
wherever and whenever necessary.” When the journalist went further and asked “How
about using the Atom Bomb in Korea or in Manchuria?” Ho replied, “There are no
such targets in Manchuria, with the possible exception of Dairen and Port Arthur.
However, Soviet Russia would like to see the atom Bomb dropped as soon as possible
over Manchuria, to see what the effects of the newest atom bomb would be like and to
further fan the frenzy of the Chinese Communists.”604
The answers given by Ho were carefully worded. As a strongly patriotic
militarist whose career began in Northeast China, Ho clearly objected to any
bombardment on Chinese civilians; however, as an ally to the United Nations faction,
it would be unwise to directly object this idea. Consequently, Ho threw this issue back
to the United Nations and believed it was its duty to make the decision. While not
willing to see the outbreak of World War III, Ho still firmly believed that the
counterattack on Mainland China would be feasible, which was epitomized in his
answer to the question “If the U.N. decided to fight China, what would be the best
way of going about it? By land? By sea? By air?”:
I think you mean Communist China. The situation in Communist China is
actually more precarious than the outside world thinks. Guerrilla activities have
multiplied in the past two months; the mind of the people is drifting to rebellion.
Any landing by the United Nations with Chinese Government forces would start
rolling the snowball of a nationwide anti-Communist upheaval through instant
604 DHSL, December 7, 1950.
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physical contact with the one and a half million guerrillas scattered all over
China. Millions more of the Chinese people who have been disillusioned by their
Red rulers can be counted on to join the anti-Communist forces.605
While answering this question with great humor and rosy anticipation, Ho did
not mention a single word about the plan of dispatching the Nationalist troops from
Taiwan to join the war. In his mind, Ho had to keep this plan secret lest he infuriated
MacArthur and altered his decision. Ho’s main task, as he accomplished in these
interviews, was to illustrate how favorable the anti-communist forces would be and
wait for the General to seek for the Nationalist’s assistance.
In a meeting with Ho Shailai and Dong Xianguang, both the Nationalist officials
skillfully inquired the General about reconsidering Chiang’s offer, and the way in
which they asked questions were much cleverer than before. “Will the United States
use their allies in Asia to fight against the satellite countries of the Soviet Union?”
asked Dong, the General directly replied that he was in favor of using the Nationalist
forces in Korea and even proposed this idea to General Collins. “In order to disperse
the enemy’s forces,” Ho continued to ask, “our troops might land at Guangzhou and
we would like to know your opinion.” The General suggested the troops should be
dispatched to Hong Kong so there would be no need to land at coastal areas, but the
British would not agree with it because they were “scared like a rat.” Realizing that
the General probably answered their questions in an amusing attitude, Ho seriously
asked the General whether the Nationalist forces would be used in the Korean War or
not. “Definitely not,” the General replied, “The United Nations will object it, and the
United States will not support it either. However, if a battle between Taiwan and
Mainland China broke out that would be another case.”606 “Because the Chinese
communists’ participation in the war is out of the General’s expectation,” added Ho in
his diary, “so his understanding of the communists’ mentality is much clearer than
before.”607
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MacArthur’s reply to Ho and Dong was by no means accidental. This
conversation took place against the background of the retreat of UN forces, which had
significantly tarnished MacArthur’s prestige. To a great extent, MacArthur ascribed
the PVA initiative to restrictions imposed on him, which he believed prevented him
from taking a “hot pursuit” against the PVA, such as crossing the Yalu River and
bombing Northeast China.608 By implying to the enthusiastic Chinese Nationalists
that there was the possibility of US support if fighting erupted between Taiwan and
China, the General preferred to escalate the war to redeem his military initiative and
reputation. However, Washington interpreted the ongoing warfare in another way. As
the future of the Korean War was uncertain, the US government believed that “Korea
is not the place to fight a major war.” The US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the
General to preserve his units since the withdrawal of the UN Forces from Korea was
likely to happen. In the worst scenario, the Forces should retreat to Japan, since it was
the main focus of US strategic interest in East Asia.609
On December 30, the General remonstrated that since the Chinese Communists’
forces had been concentrated in Korea and Northeast China, “other parts of the
country were vulnerable” but “existing policies prevented exploitation of this
opportunity.” MacArthur suggested blockading China’s coast, destroying its industrial
war-making capacity, reinforcing UN forces with Chiang’s troops, and allowing the
Chinese Nationalists to undertake “diversionary action” against the mainland.610
Before receiving the final decision from Washington, MacArthur encountered another
PVA offensive initiated.
PROPOSAL OF OPENINGA SECOND FRONT
On New Year’s Eve of 1950, the PVA launched the Third Phase Offensive and
forced the UN forces to retreat southward. Perceiving this news, on January 2, 1951
608 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War, 238-239.
609 “The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur),” December 29, 1950,
FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 1625.
610 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War, 181-182.
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Ho speculated that due to the insufficiency of the UN forces, the opportunity of using
the Nationalist troops was about to come.611 Two days later, the fact that PVA
conquered Seoul seemed to prove Ho’s prediction prescient. But similar to MacArthur,
enacting any military plan was futile and meaningless unless this mission was
approved by Washington. Hence, what Ho could do was to wait and cultivate his close
relationships with the Americans. On January 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again
rejected MacArthur’s proposal of using Chiang’s troops, based on a survey conducted
by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, on the grounds that “the Nationalists could
not significantly affect the outcome in Korea.”612
In January 1951, He Yingqin visited Tokyo. This action alerted the Mao Zedong,
as he speculated that the KMT might attack Xiamen and Shantou and requested the
fortification of the cities.613 Although these assaults did not occur, Mao’s worries
were not groundless. In late January the US Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously considered
the plan of supporting Chiang’s troops to attack mainland China in order to contain
the Chinese Communist’s capability of opening fronts in other places.614 In
mid-February 1951, MacArthur formulated a plan in which he proposed to “use the
500,000 Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa (plus two Marine divisions) to
make amphibious and air landings simultaneously on both the east and the west coasts
of the neck of Korea, to join up overland and so cut off and contain the CPVA.”615 On
February 12, Congressman Joseph Martin vehemently blamed the Truman
administration for preventing Chiang Kai-shek from opening a second front in Asia.616
Several days later, MacArthur’s proposal “to bomb Manchurian bases and to use
Chiang Kai-shek’s troops” were again rejected.617 Congressman Martin echoed
611 DHSL, January 2, 1950.
612 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War, 184.
613 Mao Zedong, “Guanyu Fangyu Guomindang Jundui Jingong Xiamen Shantou de Dianbao (關於防
禦國民黨軍隊進攻廈門、汕頭的電報) [Telegram about Defending KMT Troop’s Attack on Xiamen
and Shantou],” January 13, 1951, in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (中共中央文獻研究室)
ed., Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (建國以來毛澤東文稿) [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the
Founding of the State] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1988), Vol. 2, 24-25.
614 James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: the Korean War, 202.
615 Edgar O’Balance, Korea: 1950-1953, 94.
616 James McGovern, To the Yalu: From the Chinese Invasion of Korea to MacArthur’s Dismissal, 164.
617 I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (London: Turnstile Press, 1952), 264.
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MacArthur’s viewpoints and became his firm supporter in the United States, a letter
on March 20 in which the General supported the idea of allowing Chiang’s forces to
land on the mainland, was read out on April 5.618 The letter revealed the General’s
discouragement of the limitations on him, as he wrote, “Your view with respect to the
utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this
tradition.”619
Ho was attracted by the debate in the United States and was attentive to
Americans who visited Tokyo. On April 6, Ho paid a visit to Warren Magnuson, a
Senator of the Democratic Party.620 On April 8, Ho met Paul C. Smith, editor in chief
of the San Francisco Chronicle, conferring about the progress of the Korean War.621
In the meantime, O. K. Armstrong and W. J. Bryan Dorn, two US congressmen who
were visiting Japan, strongly endorsed MacArthur’s plan to bomb Manchuria and to
use Nationalist Chinese forces in the war.622 In a joint statement, the two
congressmen further claimed that “We fail to see how the war can be won if our
forces cannot carry the action to enemy territory,” and MacArthur and his field
commanders “should not be restricted in military actions which they consider
necessary.”623
Ho’s contacts with the American visitors did not cease after MacArthur’s
dismissal but sharply increased. Under the arrangement of William Sebald, Ho met
Edgar A. Mowrer, a famous American journalist on May 13.624 When Congressman
Martin, a firm supporter of General MacArthur, paid a visit to Japan on November 10,
1951, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Ho Shailai to invite him to visit Taiwan.625 Three
days later, Ho replied to Chiang that Martin would depart for Taipei on November 16
618 Edgar O’Balance, Korea: 1950-1953, 101; James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
National Policy: the Korean War, 243.
619 J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime, 281.
620 DHSL, April 6, 1951.
621 DHSL, April 8, 1951.
622 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 224-225.
623 “Truman Unswayed by M’Arthur Plan,” April 7, 1951, The New York Times.
624 DHSL, May 13, 1951.
625 “Chiang Kai-shek to Ho Shailai,” November 10, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00018-034.
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and his main purpose was to investigate whether the US military and economic
assistance was timely and satisfied the needs of the Nationalists.626
THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE MISSION IN THE KOREANWAR
Although direct Nationalist Chinese participation never came into effect, the
Chinese Mission had been endowed with several additional missions that contributed
to the United Nations military operations in Korea. Since Ho Shailai had long
experience of dealing with the Chinese communists, their fundamental psychology
would have been known to him. Thus, Ho and the Chinese Mission began to serve as
an advisor to the psychological warfare operation adopted in the Korean War. Two
months after the Chinese communists joined the battlefield, General Roderick R.
Allen secretly asked Ho Shailai to submit a refinement to the psychological warfare
strategy and without informing General Willoughby, who was de facto in charge of
the intelligence operation.627 In his refinement, Ho placed painted leaflets as the most
important propaganda item.
Ho’s refinement probably made MacArthur believe that a psychological warfare
played by the Chinese Nationalist would be feasible. On January 2, 1951, MacArthur
informed the US Consul in Taipei to request twenty linguists from the Ministry of
Defense in Taiwan.628 On January 9, Ho also asked Jiang Jingguo, head of the
Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense, to search for two comedic
painters with experience in psychological warfare and offer materials on
psychological warfare from the Political Department.629
In middle February, the PVA launched the Fourth Phase Offensive, during which
the famous “Gettysburg of the Korean War” took place from February 13 to 15 and
626 “Ho Shailai to Chiang Kai-shek,” November 13, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-090103-00007-119.
627 DHSL, December 29, 1950.
628 “CINCFE to US Consul, Taipei,” January 2, 1951, MacArthur Papers, RG 9, China,
January-February 1951, Box 13, MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk VA; Quoted in Callum A.
MacDonald, “‘Heroes Behind Barbed Wire’ The US, Britain and the POW issue in the Korean War,” in
James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., The Korean War in History (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1989), 138.
629 “Ho Shailai to Jiang Jingguo,” January 9, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00662-082.
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resulted in a UN forces victory. It was perhaps this significant victory that encouraged
the UN Command to invite the Chinese Nationalists to join the psychological warfare
in favor of the forthcoming battles. In February, MacArthur sent another two
telegrams to the US Consul in Taipei, requesting an additional 55 linguists from
Taipei and dispatched an officer to Taipei to coordinate plans for psychological
warfare.630 On February 17, Ho cabled Jiang Jingguo informing him that the chief of
the Psychological Warfare Branch might accompany Ho to visit Taiwan and that he
wished to meet Jiang.631 Jiang Jingguo replied to Ho on February 19 saying that the
request had been granted.632 On the same day, Ho informed Jiang that the two staff
accompanied him were J. W. Greene and Joseph Ambrose and asked authorities in
Taipei to sanction their arrival as soon as possible.633 Jiang probably met the
representatives of the Psychological Warfare Branch in Taipei, but the details of the
meeting still remain classified. On March 22 Jiang cabled Ho to arrange the
formalities of some Nationalist staff who would be departing for Japan to conduct
psychological warfare in Korea.634
Jiang spent the next two months selecting people capable of undertaking this
mission. On May 21 Jiang listed the names and passport numbers of the four
candidates who were ready to depart for Japan and asked Ho to secure entrance cards
for them from SCAP.635 The four candidates were Liang Dingming (梁鼎銘), Kong
Qiuquan (孔秋泉), Yang Longsheng (楊隆生) and Chu Songqiu (楚崧秋 ), among
which Liang and Yang were painters who were expected to design propaganda
paintings leaflets delivered to the PVA soldiers.636 Kong and Chu later became a
630 “CINCFE to US Consul,” February 3, 1951; “CINCFE to US Consul,” February 18, 1951; Quoted
in Callum A. MacDonald, “‘Heroes Behind Barbed Wire’ The US, Britain and the POW issue in the
Korean War,” in James Cotton and Ian Neary eds., The Korean War in History, 138.
631 DHSL, February 17, 1951.
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634 “Jiang Jingguo to Ho Shailai,” March 22, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-059. Jiang asked
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consultant to the SCAP and a correspondent to the UN command respectively.637 On
June 26 Jiang told Ho that he was looking forward to receiving J. Woodall Greene in
Taipei in one or two months to discuss more details on the psychological warfare.638
Accurate assessments of these activities were fraught with difficulties, as a report
noted, there is “no positive way of judging the effect of propaganda on the enemy
soldier or civilian, as apart from artillery, bombing and strafing or any other weapon
that may be employed.” Despite this, the psychological warfare “produced positive
results in World War II and is now again proving useful in the Korean conflict.”639
Yet, although psychological warfare in the Korean War has attracted much scholarly
attention over the past several decades, the role of the Chinese Nationalists has
regrettably been barely mentioned.640
In the meantime, Ho Shailai’s importance to the UN troops in Korea was
enhanced. General Frank Lowe wrote President Truman about Ho on March 16, 1951:
Now I wish to visit Formosa just as soon as possible and for the following
reasons: I have received some very interesting reports of very unique, to say the
least, battle training given to the Chinese Nationalist troops on Formosa. I wish
to go incognito, or at least very much off the record, and with no press comment,
if it can be arranged. Furthermore, I have no wish to, or expectation of, seeing
the Generalissimo. I shall undertake this mission with Lt. Gen. Ho, Shai Lai,
Chief of the Chinese Mission here in Japan, Ambassador and member of the
Allied Council of Japan. He is a good friend, has been very kind to me, and if I
remember correctly, is a graduate of West Point or of our service schools, or both.
If General Ho is not available to go at the moment, he will send one of his staff.
We will go there quietly, keep away from official Taipai [sic] and stay there just
long enough to view this training which, by the way, is being undertaken at the
south end of the Island and far removed from Taipai [sic]. Of course, I shall not
undertake this mission without the knowledge and approval of The Boss.641
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On May 24, 1951, Ho Shailai met General Ridgway, at which the General
introduced Ho to Riley F. Ennis, assistant Chief of Staff of the G2 section.642 On May
25, General Ennis spent an hour asking Ho about the situation of the Chinese
communists.643 SCAP also asked the Chinese Mission to dispatch officials to Korea
to investigate the prisoners of war.644 Ho instructed Hu Weida (胡維達 ) and Deng
Huagao (鄧華高 ) to visit Korea to undertake this mission and had them report the
situation to him.645
Ho Shailai’s opinions were regarded as important when it came to the armistice
negotiation. On July 19, 1951, General Ennis suggested that Ho submit his opinion on
negotiation methods with the Chinese communists.646 Ho then paid a visit to General
Ennis two days later, at which several G-2 section members were presented and eager
to know Ho’s opinions.647 On October 30, 1951, Ho asked Jiang Jingguo to offer
background on Bian Zhangwu (邊章五 ), the new Chinese communist negotiator,
whom he had no previous knowledge.648 Jiang replied provided Ho with a brief
introduction of Bian’s background in a telegram two days later.649
RIDGEWAYREPLACED MACARTHUR
MacArthur’s differences with Truman became greater as the Korean War
progressed, which eventually led to his dismissal. Previous studies have agreed that
MacArthur’s visit to Taiwan and his support to Chiang Kai-shek were the main causes
of his political downfall. In MacArthur’s views, his visit to Taiwan, which was to
inspect whether Taiwan was able to defend itself, was his responsibility as a military
Files, 1945-1953, Part 4: Korean War Files, General Frank Lowe's reports from Korea.
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commander. The State’s Department, however, believed that it was ultra vires— an
American official’s visit to Taiwan was regarding as a diplomatic issue.650
Some opinions attributed MacArthur’s dismissal to his statement published on
March 24, in which the General gave the following warnings to the Chinese
Communists,
The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the
United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of
Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and
interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military
collapse.651
In his memoir, President Truman revealed how he was offended upon receiving
this statement which “was a most extraordinary statement for a military commander
of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility.” Truman further pointed out
that,
It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations
on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as President and as
Commander in Chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the President
under the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations. By this
act MacArthur left me no choice—I could no longer tolerate his
insubordination.652
In his diaries, Ho did not reveal anything in regard to this statement. In Tokyo, Ho
sensed the atmosphere that MacArthur might be dismissed. In his conversation with
Paul Smith on April 8, they exchanged opinions about the possible outcomes if
MacArthur would be discharged.653 On April 9, Ho attended a cocktail party
organized by General Allen, at which Frank Pace, US Secretary of the Army, was
presented. Ho noted in his diary that Pace was “only 38-year-old and had good
650 Hiroshi Masuda,MacArthur in Asia: the General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan and Korea
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manner in socializing.”654 Presumably Ho did not figure out the real purpose of
Pace’s visit to Japan. Pace, authorized by President Truman, was to deliver the
President’s message in person that MacArthur was dismissed. On the next day, Ho
inquired Hodgson’s opinion about MacArthur’s potential departure. The Australian
representative was not willing to directly answer this question but claimed that he
believed MacArthur might be admonished and left after obtaining the number of the
PLA battleplan in Manchuria from Ho.655
Ho expressed his regret after hearing MacArthur’s dismissal in his diary on April
11, “I believe replacing MacArthur is the biggest mistake that Truman has made. In
addition, the order wording is impolite and there was no news about it.”656 On April
16 when MacArthur left Japan, Ho attended the farewell and felt that the sorrow was
even deeper than the day Walton Walker’s remains were sent back to the United States
several months ago.657 Ho heard some navy soldiers screaming “Good-Bye! General!
We Are For You!” Ho was also impressed by the manner in which Ridgway sent off
MacArthur, as he was standing at the front of the line and his attitude, based on Ho’s
observation, was like a subordinate bidding farewell to his officer. Last, Ho wrote
about how the 19-gun salute rolled in the ceremony, and he was astonished that the
US Department of Defense reduced the salute in San Francisco to 17 instead of 19.658
Although MacArthur, who was perhaps the strongest American supporter of
Chiang Kai-shek after the Chinese Civil War, left, departed, several proposals were
still progressing. In early 1951, Chiang sent He Yingqin to Tokyo to undertake several
missions, including a visit to South Korea. When receiving the news that He was
about to meet the President of Korea, Willoughby was infuriated and asked Ho to
cancel this trip.659 After Ridgway assumed MacArthur’s position, He even told him
that the leaders of the Nationalist troops in Taiwan were either his subordinates or his
654 DHSL, April 9, 1951.
655 DHSL, April 10, 1951.
656 DHSL, April 11, 1951.
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students, and as long as the United Nations gave the order, the troops in Taiwan would
be immediately sent to Korea and placed under the command of Ridgway.660 On
April 30, 1951, He Yingqin paid a twenty-minute visit to Ridgway and told him that
the Nationalist troops had extremely high morale and were ready to fight their mutual
enemies.661 He’s activities in Tokyo not only enraged the American generals, but also
embarrassed Ho Shailai, who had been doing his duties prudently.
Chiang Kai-shek relied on Ho’s ability to maintain a constructive relationship
with General Ridgway. In a meeting between Chiang and Ho Shailai on June 19, 1951,
Chiang asked Ho whether there were other methods to approach Ridgway, Ho replied
that General Ridgway was stubborn and some time was needed in order to obtain his
“sympathy” and it might trigger unintended problems if they rashly approached
Ridgway.662 However, although Ho was circumspect about approaching Ridgway
about providing Nationalist troops in Korea, he defended the idea of committing
Nationalist troops in Korea in front of Ridgway when the opportunity presented itself.
For example, in a banquet held by William Sebald where General Ridgway and
delegates of Brazil, Australia, France, and the Philippines were presented, Ridgway
asked Australia and Brazil to dispatch more troops to Korea. In the discussion, when
William Roy Hodgson, the Australia delegate, said that he opposed a Nationalist
counterattack on Mainland China, Ho Shailai argued that he should not tell this to the
Chinese communists in case they mobilized their troops to Northeastern China.
Additionally, Ho suggested to Hodgson that although a large scale counterattack was
infeasible, a small-scale counterattack was able to disturb the Chinese communists.663
This case shows that Ho stubbornly defended the party-line and maintained the image
of the Chinese Nationalists in front of Ridgway in Tokyo.
After July 1951, the Korean warfare entered a stalemate and left Ho Shailai very
limited space to advance Chiang’s goals. The next two years witnessed intermittent
armistice negotiations, during which Ho Shailai left Tokyo after a peace treaty
660 DHSL, April 30, 1951.
661 “He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek,” April 30, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080101-00029-017.
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between Republic of China and Japan was concluded in April 1952. However,
Chiang’s hope for dispatching his troops to Korea continued nevertheless, and his
target shifted to General Mark Wayne Clark, who succeeded General Ridgway as the
commander of the United Nations Command on May 12, 1952. General Clark
recollected the offer proposed by Chiang during his visit to Taiwan in his memoir as
follows:
Our discussions finally led to the subject of the employment of Chiang’s forces.
As I said earlier, I had long before recommended that two Nationalist divisions
be sent to Korea. The recommendation was not accepted. On Formosa during our
talks Chiang volunteered the offer to send up to three of his best divisions to
Korea to serve as part of the United Nations Command if my Government
requested the troops from him. I informed Washington of his offer, but the
request was not forthcoming. By that time, of course, every day seemed to bring
an armistice closer, and, since a cease-fire was the objective, it would have been
contradictory for our Government to have made such a provocative move.664
According to the Chinese records, the meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and
General Clark took place on March 25, 1953. In the minutes, Chiang did propose the
idea of dispatching one or two divisions of his armies to join the Korean War if
General Clark thought it necessary. After hearing this offer, the first reaction of Clark,
which duplicated those of his predecessors MacArthur and Ridgway, was to reply to
Chiang that the offer must be conferred by the two country’s governments. However,
Clark went further to tell Chiang that if this offer eventually came a reality, it would
definitely astonish the enemy. Moreover, Clark suggested the armies dispatched to
Korea should be rotated. By doing so, the Nationalist troops could obtain fighting
experience and learn the CCP’s potential threat.665 But this plan, like all the other
possible military schemes the Nationalists had envisioned since the beginning of the
Korean War, was never carried out and remained theoretical.
664 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (London: G.G. Harrap, 1954), 303.




This chapter traces Ho Shailai’s efforts from the outbreak of the Korean War in
June 1950 to the beginning of the stalemate stage in July 1951, during which Ho’s
mission was to lobby for having the Nationalist troops participate in the war. Ho had
been serving as Chiang Kai-shek’s spokesman in Tokyo and strenuously presented
Chiang’s offers, some of which were favored by General MacArthur but all of which
were ultimately turned down by Washington. In sharp contrast to people in Taipei,
who kept urging Ho to directly approach MacArthur, Ho respected the chain of
command of SCAP and knew the significance of William Sebald. Moreover, Ho
devoted himself to maintaining a tight relationship with MacArthur and Ridgway,
making his advice valuable to the American generals.
MacArthur’s attitudes towards the Nationalist China position during the Korean
War was a continuation of his stance on Taiwan in late 1949 and early 1950. His visit
to Taipei signified the extent to which he regarded Chiang’s force could be conducive
to the success of the Korean War effort. As William Sebald recalled, MacArthur
“never traveled within Japan and left Tokyo only for infrequent appearances at nearby
Haneda Airport for the visits of high-ranking persons. Until the Korean War, his
journeys outside the country were limited to quick flights to Manila in 1946 and to
Seoul in 1948 for the independence ceremonies of these two nations.”666 MacArthur’s
prestige as well as his proficiency were utilized by the China Lobby in debating with
Dean Acheson, as the latter wrote in his memoir:
While waiting for dinner to be announced, Secretary Johnson asked General
Bradley to read a memorandum that he had brought from General MacArthur on
the strategic importance of Formosa. I recognized this as an opening gun in a
diversionary argument that Johnson wished to start with me. Evidently another
did also, for when General Bradley had finished, the President announced that
discussion of the Far Eastern situation had better be postponed until after dinner
when we would be alone.667
666 William Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 104-105.
667 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton,
1969), 405-406.
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But in the end, the idea of using Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in the Korean War
turned out to be a failure. As Dean Rusk recounted in his memoir:
As for Taiwan’s offer to send troops to Korea, the whole idea was a fraud. Just
after the North Korean invasion I received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek that
Taiwan had earmarked two divisions—thirty-three thousand—for service in
Korea, but Chiang also said these divisions needed outfitting from boots to
helmets, the most modern weapons, and two years of intensive training before
they would be ready. From an operational point of view, this offer was virtually
worthless. Indeed, some years after the Korean War, I was having a drink with a
high-ranking official in the Taiwan government and Chiang’s offer came up. He
laughed and said, “I was the one who proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that we offer
our forces for Korea.” He said that everyone in the government, including
Chiang, adamantly opposed the idea, but he prevailed after giving categorical
assurances that Washington would reject the offer. But our refusal to take Chiang
up on his offer to “unleash” his forces on Korea hurt us politically as American
casualties mounted.668
Regrettably, Ho Shailai’s efforts during the Korean War has been neglected by
previous studies. As Samuel C. Chu, a professor of history who was the son of Zhu
Shiming, presented at an academic conference in Norfolk in 1982 on the occupation
of Japan: “Ho was the spokesman for the Chinese Nationalist offer of troops to
General MacArthur at the outbreak of the Korean War, an offer which was not
accepted by Washington. Otherwise Ho, serving at a time when the mainland of China
was already lost to the Communists, could do even less than his two predecessors.”669
This conference was sponsored by The MacArthur Memorial Foundation, at
which Samuel C. Chu presented a brief paper on Zhu Shiming’s role in Tokyo.
Concerning the close relationship between General MacArthur and Ho, who was
76-years-old and remained in good health when the conference was convened in 1982,
it was regrettable that the MacArthur Foundation had not invited Ho to share his own
experience. Although Samuel Chu correctly portrayed Ho as the “spokesman” for
668 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, 154.
669 Samuel C. Chu, “General S. M. Chu on the Allied Council and Sino-Japanese Relations,” in
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Chiang Kai-shek in Tokyo, he failed to recognize that Ho’s efforts during the Korean
War were far greater than anyone had presumed at the time. In fact, Ho’s
accomplishments were not merely as a spokesman at the beginning of the Korean War,
as this chapter illustrates. As later chapters will demonstrate, Ho did much more than
his two predecessors.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SECURING THE ROC’S POSITION
1950 proved a pivotal year for the survival of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, as the
CCP also made the “emancipation” of Taiwan one of its major objectives.
Undoubtedly, the outbreak of the Korean War bailed Chiang out, but there were other
struggles contributing to this temporary victory. Using the lens provided by the
Chinese Mission in Japan, this chapter examines the Chinese Mission’s efforts to
lobby MacArthur for his support, compete with the PRC for the Chinese seat in the
ACJ, monitor activities of the Japanese Communist Party, and secure support from
overseas Chinese based in Tokyo. Finally, the confiscation and eventual return of S.S.
Hai-lieh was of great significance to the Chinese Nationalists in their effort to
maintain the ROC’s diplomatic position at this time, and the affair exemplified the
arduous negotiation process that often took place between the Chinese Mission and
SCAP.
ANTI-CCP BATTLES IN EARLY 1950
While deploying military forces to attack Hainan Island and Taiwan in early 1950,
the CCP also made substantial efforts abroad in the hope of undermining the KMT’s
fighting capacity. The CCP faced great difficulty obtaining international recognition,
thus it had to open multiple fronts from where to do battle against the KMT overseas.
In Japan, the CCP proposed a barter trade between northern China and Japan -with
SCAP permission- in April 1949.670 American intelligence noticed the existence of
unofficial trade occurring between the CCP and Japan. In May, a CIA report
confirmed that “The Chinese Communists are now carrying on an extensive trade
with such places as South Korea and Japan. The Chinese Communist vessels
rendezvous at sea with ships from Japan and Korea to exchange good. The advance
arrangements are made in Chinese Communist ports. Some Chinese Nationalist Navy
ships are knowingly protecting and escorting the Chinese Communist trading
670 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 85.
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vessels.”671 While SCAP denied the legitimacy of the CCP regime, it connived with
them to enable a limited amount of trade between mainland China and Japan on the
grounds that it was conducive to Japan’s economic revival.672 This ambivalent
attitude infuriated the Chinese Mission in Japan. In early 1950, when Zhu Shuming
found out about newly-established, secret trade links between mainland China and
Japan, the Chinese Mission immediately urged their termination. In a meeting on
January 25, MacArthur told Zhu that he could not “totally put an end to trade between
the CCP and Japan” but assured the KMT representative that he would “do his best to
ensure it dwindled,” and, if the CCP dispatched representatives to Japan to conduct
business, whether official or unofficial, he would definitely reject them.673
A more serious problem bothering Zhu was the latent threat of the Japanese
Communist Party (JCP). At the beginning of the occupation, General MacArthur had
been leery of Russian influence behind the JCP. But later, as MacMahon Ball wrote in
his diaries, MacArthur “had certain knowledge that the Russians had established a
great number of close connections with Japanese of a secret kind. He believed that the
Communist Party in Japan was directly inspired and controlled by the Russians.”674
General Willoughby spoke frankly to MacMahon that the G-2 Section had details
about Russian’s “spying activities and their connection with the Japanese Communist
Party”.675 A CIA report published in 1948 also revealed that “overt communications
take place through the Office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council and of the
USSR Representative at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.”676 In all, the
671 “CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE WITH SOUTH KOREAAND JAPAN,” May 3, 1949, General
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672 For the discussion of the positive effects of trades between mainland China and Japan, see Thomas
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Americans ascertained that the JCP was aided by the Russians, while the CCP played
very little part in supporting them.
Robert A. Scalapino believed that the return of Nosaka Sanzo to Japan and a
statement issued by the JCP on January 14, 1946, reflected “influences from Yenan”,
he concluded that “Chinese influence on the Japanese Communist Party, in certain
respects, can be dated from January 1946.”677 Sebald recounted in his memoir that
“Nozaka said his task was to create the image of a “lovable Communist party,” a
policy he pursued for years in opposition to more belligerent Japanese comrades, until
Moscow itself changed the line.”678 Due to Nosaka’s background and his connections
with the CCP in Yenan, the Chinese Mission was interested in his return to Japan and
disputes over the “party line” within the JCP.679 The Chinese Mission had also been
tracking activities, such as strikes, organized by the JCP since 1946, but it did not
regard the JCP as anything posing anything close to a lethal threat.680 As the KMT
was taking the initiative in the Chinese Civil War, the activities of the JCP as well as
the possible JCP-CCP alliance were not worthy of close surveillance. As a
consequence, while the Chinese Mission submitted annual reports sketching out
political parties in Japan, the JCP was only briefly touched upon.
The Chinese Mission’s concerns about the JCP’s activities only increased after
Chiang’s retreat to Taiwan in 1949. At about the same time, SCAP also became more
suspicious of the JCP and its support by the Russians. As Esler Dening summarized,
For the main aim of Peking as well as of Moscow is to try to destroy the present
relationship between Japan and the United States, and of this there is no attempt
at concealment. To this end the Japan Communist Party is a useful ally for, being
on the spot, it is in the best possible position to exploit every incident which is
capable of causing Japanese-American friction-and, if the forces of one country
are stationed in the territory of another such incidents are bound to occur from
time to time. In other respects, the Communist Party fulfils its usual function of
exploiting discontent: for example, amongst labour elements and amongst
677 Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966, 53.
678 William Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan, 50-51.
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680 “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” October 11, 1946, IMH
Archives, 11-01-02-02-01-002.
191
teachers and university students.681
It was against this background that the Chinese Mission began to speculate about
the JCP’s covert activities in Japan. On April 18, 1950, the Chinese Mission wrote a
report introducing the serious internal conflicts between two factions within the JCP:
the “Cadre faction” and “International faction”.682 This dispute derived from an
incident from several months ago. On January 6, 1950, the Cominform, the Soviet
Union’s leading apparatus for conducting the international communist movement,
openly criticized Nosaka for his “bourgeoise attitude” as well as for being a “servant
of “American Imperialist occupiers””.683 The Cominform criticized Nosaka’s theory
that “it was possible to establish a people’s democratic regime in Japan while Japan
was occupied.” They claimed it was misleading and argued that “The leaders of the
people and the people’s patriots in Japan should realize that Japan can arise and
become a great independent power only if it renounces imperialism and imperialist
alliances—only if it takes the path of democracy and socialism.”684 In other words,
Nosaka believed that Japan could be democratized under Allied Occupation and the
JCP should employ a peaceful strategy to fulfill this goal – an approach which was
labeled as “making communism lovable” - while Moscow insisted that more drastic
means should be undertaken by the JCP to serve the Russian’s strategies in its
international competitions with the United States.685
Due to Nosaka’s background (he had been at Yenan and also his close
relationship with the CCP), the Chinese Mission monitored the progress of this
incident with huge interest. The KMT was eager to know whether Nosaka’s theories
were influenced by the CCP, as well as whether Moscow had seized on this incident to
681 Esler Dening, Japan, 113.
682 “The Chinese Mission in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” April 18, 1950, IMHArchives,
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criticize other communist leaders in East Asia, such as Mao Zedong. In the meantime,
Mao was visiting Moscow for the purpose of signing a new treaty with the Soviet
Union. Exploring further what lay behind the story might give the KMT a clearer
view of the evolving relationship between Moscow and Beijing. In the meantime, the
JCP consolidated its position by ousting opponents such as Nakanishi Ko (中西功),
who echoed the Cominform’s criticism of Nosaka.686 On January 12, the Chinese
Mission reported that the JCP had expelled Nakanishi Ko from the party on the
grounds that he supported Pravda’s criticism of Nosaka and speculated about a
potential split within the JCP.687 The JCP’s resistance to its critics from the
Cominform reached a stalemate, after which the CCP stepped in. As Scalapino put it,
“It is difficult to know how far the Tokuda-Nosaka group might have carried their
defiance of the Cominform had not the Chinese comrades joined the Soviets in
interfering in the internal affairs of the Japanese Communist Party.”688 Mao Zedong,
during his visit to the Soviet Union, cabled Hu Qiaomu instructing that the CCP
should support the Conminform’s critics on Nosaka.689 The CCP then expressed its
position by publishing an editorial entitled “Path of the emancipation of the Japanese
People” in the People’s Daily on January 17. It used the piece to criticize Nosaka and
stated that his opinions were entirely wrong, were causing ideological turmoil, and
assisting the enemies of the Japanese.690 The CCP’s attitude disappointed the JCP and
forced its acceptance of the Cominform’s criticism. As Scalapino summarized,
“Probably this editorial came as a great disappointment to the Mainstream leaders. It
is possible that they had hoped for some aid from Peking. Relations between Nosaka
and Mao Tse-tung were supposedly close.” Scalapino gave a well-grounded
explanation of Mao’s conformity with the Cominform and the Russian line. Since the
686 Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50, 204.
687 The expel of Nakanishi Ko from the JCP had been noticed and examined by Max Beloff and Robert
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PRC and the Soviet Union signed the mutual defense agreement on February 14, the
CCP would definitely “choose to join their Russian allies in condemning any theory
or tactic that suggested cooperation with the American Occupation forces.”691 From
the CCP’s viewpoint, the American’s support of Chiang Kai-shek also rendered the
JCP’s policy of leniency toward SCAP intolerable.
As Scalapino described, “Given the solidarity between the Soviet and Chinese
parties, the Mainstream had no choice except to capitulate.”692 Three days after the
CCP revealed its attitude, on January 20, the JCP announced its acceptance of the
criticism from the Cominform and Nosaka also made a self-criticism admitting his
own theoretical faults.693 Observing this progress, the Chinese Mission noted that
although the JCP decided to admit the faults of Nosaka and his theories, they would
not alter his position within the party.694 While the Chinese Mission did not explore
whether the JCP’s shifting attitude could be attributed to the stance taken by the CCP,
it was correct in predicting that Nosaka’s status in the party would not be challenged.
Indeed, while Nosaka’s faction made concessions to the critics, its hold on the
leadership remained intact. As Scalapino concluded, “Considering the severity of the
attack on Nosaka, his survival is almost without precedent in the history of the
international Communist movement.”695
With little leeway, the JCP had to take a more drastic approach to their work, a
move which eventually led to the party’s suppression by SCAP.696 On June 6,
MacArthur ordered the Japanese Government to exclude 24 JCP members from
political activities and ordered six JCP members in the House of Representatives and
one JCP member in the House of Councilors to retire.697 While the CCP disagreed
with Nosaka’s arguments of several months earlier, now it firmly criticized
MacArthur’s “purge” of the JCP by publishing articles in the June 9 edition of the
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People’s Daily.698 At this point in time, the Chinese Mission was preoccupied with
the arrival General Ho Shailai and did not follow up the progress of the “Red Purge.”
Two days later, on June 11, Ho Shailai arrived in Tokyo. Based on his diaries, he
made no mention of the activities of the JCP or SCAP’s purge of the party. On July 1,
General MacArthur ordered an attack on the JCP. According to Ho’s diary entry for
July 2, he “heard that the Americans arrested 500 Japanese communists, and anyone
who held a leaflet would be arrested.”699 The “Red Purge” of Tokyo was a unilateral
decision made by MacArthur himself and the Chinese Mission played no part in it.
From this point onward, the Chinese Mission paid less attention to monitoring the
activities of the Chinese and Japanese communists in Japan. After the red purge the
JCP shifted underground, while Nozaka Sanzo and Tokuda Kyuichi secretly fled to
Beijing to prepare for future actions. A G-2 intelligence report noted,
According to information received by a former army officer who is a repatriate
from the Soviet Union, through a certain Chinese Communist named YEH, with
whom he maintains contact, TOKUDA kyuichi and NOZAKA Sanzo were in
Peking on 17 March, assisting the Chinese Communists in formulating political
strategy and activities to be employed against Japan. They were also said to be
directing and training a Special Operations Corps composed of Japanese in
Peiping. The same source said that NOZAKA was going from Peking to Moscow
to attend a political and military conference of satellite countries as the Japanese
delegate. The details of this matter are said to have been transmitted orally by
Major General KISLENKO to SHINO Etsuro.700
Based on a report from the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, the JCP
was believed to have organized guerrilla troops as a way to support possible Soviet or
Chinese communist aggression in Japan in the Spring of 1951. According to the G-2
FEC, however, it was intelligence “of low or intermediate value”:
The possibility exists that these reports are intentionally “planted” either to boost
the morale of Japanese Communists or to enhance the prestige of local
Communist leaders. Some of the reports may be meant as psychological warfare
698 Zhang Pengzhou, Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji, Vol. 4, 293.
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against the non-Communist Japanese. The reports are usually either vague or
silent on where the revolutionaries are to obtain weapons for their proposed
uprising. Nevertheless it is a fact that since the Cominform criticism of Jan 50,
and particularly since the outbreak of the Korean war, the JCP has increasingly
thought in terms of violence to achieve its ends.701
Ho Shailai’s diaries corroborate this evaluation. In his diaries, Ho did not mention
anything about the JCP and its possible connections with the CCP during 1951. Ho
only mentioned that he witnessed a small-scale uprising organized by the JCP in 1952.
To him, the threat of JCP activity in Japan was no longer urgent and of less
importance, comparatively, than other issues.
PRO-COMMUNISM IN THE CHINIESE MISSION
Factional struggles had been a feature of the Chinese Mission in Japan ever since
its establishment in 1946. According to Zhang Lingao, a secretary to Chiang Kai-shek
in Chongqing, some of the KMT’s Japanese specialists – men such as Wang
Pengsheng（王芃生）- had been competing to become the head of the body.702 From
Chiang’s point of view, however, since Japan was to remain under MacArthur’s
stewardship, having persons deft at dealing with American officials serving at the
head of the Chinese Mission would be more pragmatic. Thus, from 1946 to 1952
Chiang dispatched Zhu Shiming, Shang Zhen and Ho Shailai to Japan, all of whom
had experience in working with the Americans but, conversely, had relatively little
knowledge about Japan. These appointments contributed to incessant infighting and
mistrust between them and their subordinates with a background in Japanese issues.
The latter doubted the capabilities of their superiors who, for example, could not
speak Japanese. The mistrust came to a head during Ho Shailai’s tenure, between
1950 and 1952, a period not only complicated by American/Japanese proclivities
amongst the Chinese, but the CCP’s ability to penetrate inside the Chinese Mission.
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Initially, the internal struggles at the Mission were not too complex. During his
period of service in Japan, for instance, Zhu was reported to have been having an
affair with Li Xianglan（李香蘭） , a famous singer in Shanghai under Japanese
occupation – a peccadillo which Zhu’s wife reported to Song Meiling and which
eventually led to Zhu’s removal.703 As for Shang Zhen, according to Zhang Lingao’s
account, he was frustrated with the downfall of the KMT regime and resigned in 1949
and began managing a business in Japan.704 Zhu’s subsequent reappointment to the
leadership position only lasted for a year. This time, the reason for Zhu’s removal (in
early 1950) was much more serious, as Zhu was believed to have leftist tendencies
and it was thought that he might swing further to the left and align with those with
links to the CCP. A CIA report indicated that, “CHU Shih-ming [Zhu Shiming], head
of the Chinese Mission to Japan, is being replaced because of incompetence, failure to
obtain aid from SCAP, and use of pro-Communist advisers. He would have been
replaced sooner except for his close friendship with Madame CHIANG.” And, “HO
Shih-li [Ho Shailai], who will replace CHU [Zhu], first learned of CHU[Zhu]’s
Communist affiliations while on a trip to Japan in early January 1950; Hollington
TONG [Dong Xianguang] and WU Te-chen [Wu Tiecheng], in Japan in January and
April, made similar reports.”705 Ho visited Japan in late December 1949, ostensibly
after “accepting invitations from Japanese friends to visit the country.”706 Whether
Dong Xianguang and Wu Tiecheng had then made their reports is still unclear, but
Zhu’s pro-CCP leanings were mentioned in several dispatches.
In the meantime, some other members of staff at the Chinese Mission gravitated
towards the CCP during 1950. For instance, when the left-leaning Japanese-Chinese
Friendship Association was established in Tokyo in January, a member of the Chinese
703 Zhang Lingao, Wo zai Jiang Jieshi Shicongshi de Rizi, 229.
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Mission named Xie Nan (謝南) was in attendance.707 This person should be referred
to as Xie Nanguang(謝南光). His story symbolized some people’s shifting minds of
loyalty to the Chinese government in postwar Japan. Born in 1902 in Taiwan under
Japanese colonization, Xie graduated in Tokyo and moved to mainland China. Due to
his Taiwanese background, Xie became a leading figure of the Taiwanese
Revolutionary Allied Association (Taiwan Geming Tongmenhui 台灣革命同盟會) in
Chongqing and later became a member of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Xie resigned
in 1950 and went to Beijing in 1952, where he was promoted to a member of the
National People’s Congress (representing overseas Chinese) in 1959.708 Another staff
of the Chinese Mission who resigned his post and joined the newly-established PRC
was WuWenzao （吳文藻）, who was already a famous socialist before he worked in
Japan. As Zhu Shiming’s classmate in Qinghua, Wu was invited by Zhu to work in
Japan and worked as the head of the Second Section of the Chinese Mission since
1946.709 Huang Renyu, who worked inside the Chinese Mission at the time, recalled
that Wu advocated for the Chinese Mission to surrender to the CCP in late 1949.710 It
was perhaps due to the influence from Zhu and Xie Nanguang that Wu voluntarily
went back to mainland China in 1951. Xie Wanying（謝婉瑩） , Wu’s wife and a
famous writer under the pseudonym Bing Xin（冰心）who worked in the Chinese
Mission at that time also left for mainland China with her husband.711
It was against this background that Ho Shailai succeeded Zhu and began to wipe
out any pro-CCP leanings – and any other opposition - inside the Chinese Mission. Ho
succeeded in preventing more staffs from defecting by means of a strict control over
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the organization. Ho only dispatched his henchman to deal with confidential issues
and communicate with SCAP officials in case their missions were leaked to the CCP.
Ho also held firm control over the Chinese Mission by sidelining staffs who had tight
relations with his two predecessors. As Tian Baodai, the Chinese consul in Yokohama,
recalled, due to his relations with Zhu Shiming, Ho Shailai had requested his transfer
to Tokyo but this proposal was turned down by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Taipei.712 Ho also instructed the Chinese Mission to keep a distance from the KMT
Branch in Tokyo, as the relationship between them remained little more than cordial.
A CIA report noting the “Hostility of HO Shih-li [Ho Shailai] to Kuomintang Program
of Reform” recorded that the Central Reform Committee of the KMT had appointed
Zhang Bojin (張伯謹 ), chief of the Second Section of the Chinese Mission, to
“implement reforms outlined by the Committee and to extend the influence of the
KMT in Japan.” The report also clarified that the reform had to be undertaken slowly
due to the “animosity” between Ho Shailai and Zhang, and at first Ho had not allowed
Zhang “to attend any KMT meetings in Japan, but eventually granted permission for
reform and reorganization to proceed.” The report also revealed that a meeting was
convened at Yokohama on 20 April, 1951. At the gathering, seven people were elected
as members of the Reform Committee of the KMT headquarters in Japan. In addition,
it was recorded that “plans have been made to re-register all party members in Japan.
This will be helpful in determining which members are loyal and which should be
purged.”713
While the CIA report correctly sensed the hostility between Zhang Bojin and Ho
Shailai, it misread the true relationship between the Chinese Mission and the KMT
Branch in Japan. The Chinese Mission in Japan, especially Ho Shailai, barely
meddled in the tasks of the KMT branch, and vice versa. Of the seven members of the
Reform Committee mentioned in the CIA report, only one member, Chen Dongting
(陳洞庭), also worked for the Chinese Mission. In fact, the election held at the April
712 Tian Baodai, Tian Baodai Huiyilu, 42.
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Yokohama meeting was actually for the Overseas Chinese Committee in Japan, but
was misinterpreted by the CIA as a Reorganization Committee.714 Dealing with KMT
influence in Japan was not, in any case, Ho Shailai’s responsibility. As Zheng Yanfen,
head of the KMT’s Reform Committee in Taipei, asked Ho to chair several KMT
Reform Committee in Japan, Ho rejected the offer.715 In other words, the two organs
operated separately. The Chinese Mission concentrated on relations with SCAP and
the Japanese Government, while the KMT Branch focused on the party’s general
affairs in Japan. But towards one goal they remained wholly united: “to Combat
Communist Influence among Chinese Students in Japan.”
LEFT-LEANING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN JAPAN
The national and ethnic identities among the overseas Chinese in Japan has
received scholarly attention in Taiwan, mainland China and from abroad. The case of
the overseas Chinese in Japan is unique on the grounds that the identity of those
people developed into four general types: pro-Japanese, who were influenced by
previous Japanese colonial rule; pro-Taiwanese independence; pro-KMT, who
opposed Taiwanese independence; and pro-CCP.716 This dissertation takes another
approach by focusing on the Chinese Mission’s policies to consolidate overseas
Chinese support for the Chinese Nationalist regime, with a special focus on 1950 and
1951.
As the Japanese surrendered in 1945, overseas Chinese in Japan began to
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reorganize overseas Chinese associations. At first there were two associations
representing Taiwanese and mainland Chinese respectively, but they merged into one
under the title Overseas Chinese Allied Association in Tokyo (Dongjing Huaqiao
Lianhe Hui 東京華僑聯合會 ) in May 1946.717 Additionally, there were plenty of
other associations set up by overseas Chinese, some of which began to express an
inclination towards the Chinese communists. The 228 Incident of February 1947
severely weakened Overseas Taiwanese’s leanings towards the Chinese Nationalists,
and some amongst them began to consider the possibility of Taiwanese independence.
At this point, the main bone of contention among the overseas Chinese in Japan,
regardless of their geographical origins, was whether to lend their support to the
Nationalist regime or endorse Taiwanese Independence. Due to political orthodoxy,
CCP historiography has wrongly asserted that the 228 Incident shifted the affiliations
of Overseas Chinese in Japan to the CCP.718 While of course the gravitation of some
individuals towards the CCP would have been apparent in 1947, no significant trend
in this direction occurred until much later, in October 1949. Since 1947, some
left-leaning Chinese had been actively encouraging their overseas compatriots to
support the CCP, but the Chinese Mission viewed these activities as harmless and did
not feel the need to place them under surveillance, nor were interactions between
overseas Chinese and the JCP deemed worthy of investigation.
The success of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War won the sympathy of many
Chinese students in Japan, and even their acceptance of the CCP regime. This became
even more pronounced after the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949. As a
report written by the Chinese Mission noted, some left-leaning Chinese planned to
publish an announcement celebrating the establishment of the PRC on October 10 but
were successfully refrained from doing so.719 Upon his arrival in Tokyo, Ho Shailai
placed consolidating the support of overseas Chinese in Japan at the top of his
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political agenda. On June 15, 1950, the sixth day after his arrival in Tokyo, Ho
received three representatives from the Chinese Students Association in Japan. He
informed them that the Mission would assist any students who study and obey the
Nationalist government. “Starting from July,” said Ho, “subsidizes will be suspended
for those who openly insult the Nationalist government, and the funds will be used to
support other poor students.”720 On June 19, Ho enjoined representatives of the
Overseas Chinese to ensure they do “not to become left-leaning.” They assured Ho
that, “businessmen wish to earn money, and students hope to study.” Seemingly
satisfied with their answer, Ho replied that, “Along these lines, the Chinese Mission in
Japan will offer firm support.”721
Nevertheless, throughout 1950, the CCP upped their efforts to win the hearts and
minds of overseas Chinese in Tokyo. Support for the Nationalists, especially amongst
students, began to splinter, and support for their enemy became increasingly obvious
and increasingly vocal. For instance, people began to display the Five-Star-Flag and
portraits of Mao Zedong and Stalin. Then, at a sports event held by the Overseas
Chinese and Student Association on October 7, songs about the CCP were openly
sung. Deeply embarrassed by this, Ho asked Lin Yiwen（林以文） for information
about the incident. Lin replied that the signing took place not “inside the sporting
event” but “outside,” where some CCP cadres had set up a stall to exhibit CCP
portraits. Beginning to take the threat of CCP infiltration more seriously, Ho asked the
guards to enhance security around the Chinese Mission building to guard against CCP
leaflet drops.722 At the ceremony marking National Day on October 10, Liu Zenghua
（劉增華）, chief of the Overseas Chinese section in the Chinese Mission, addressed
the fate of Zhang Yufeng（張玉峰）, former head of the Chinese Students Association
in Tokyo. Liu noted how Zhang had “surrendered” to Beijing, and he asked the
audience not to repeat that mistake. Ho noted in his diary that at the previous year’s
National Day celebration students had, at the behest of the CCP, “hung the
720 DHSL, June 16, 1950.
721 DHSL, June 19, 1950.
722 DHSL, October 9, 1950.
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Five-Star-Flag, invited leaders of the Japanese Communist Party to make speeches,
and sent CCP leaflets,” but that scenario did not play-out this year. Ho concentrated
on inhibiting pro-CCP tendencies among overseas Chinese, achieving positive results.
On November 15, 1950, the Japanese police force shut down the branch of the
Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association in Osaka and arrested several suspects.723
Among those arrested, Ho noted, none of them was an overseas Chinese.724
In order to systematically inhibit the increasing sympathy for the CCP, Ho
adjusted his policy towards the Chinese students in Japan. Ho’s goal was to make
overseas Chinese students tow the Nationalist line by utilizing their subsidies as
leverage. Redoubling his efforts to win over the Chinese students’ allegiance, Ho
believed money, instead of political ideology, was key. As the CIA noted, “The funds
from which the Mission in Japan has been drawing US $5,000 per month to subsidise
Chinese students in Japan will soon be exhausted. The Mission has requested the
Nationalist Government to provide additional funds so that the program can be
continued as a means of controlling the political activities of students in Japan.”725
This report reflected Ho’s new approach, according to which only those who
recognized the Nationalists as the legitimate representatives of the Chinese could
receive funding from the Chinese Mission.
On March 20, 1951, a general assembly of Chinese Residents Associations in
Japan was convened. The Nippon Times reported on Ho’s address to the meeting:
…the Chinese residents associations in Japan of every possible assistance from
the Nationalist Government. He said that remarkable progress has been made in a
democratic form of local governments in Formosa, while thousands of people are
being slaughtered by the Chinese Reds on the mainland. He stressed the necessity
of close cooperation between the Chinese residents in Japan and the Nationalist
Government to set up peace in the world.
Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, Gen. Ho said, is greatly concerned about the Chinese
residents in Japan, and had asked Gen. Ho to return to Japan so that he could
attend the assembly. During the meeting, all participants unanimously approved a
resolution supporting Gen. Chiang. They also decided to do everything possible
723 Lin Daizhao, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxishi, 45.
724 DHSL, November 18, 1950.
725 “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records,
CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.
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to provide comforts for the Nationalist air, army and navy forces. At present,
there are 38,829 Chinese residents in Japan. They have 50 associations.726
On occasion, disturbances caused by the left-leaning overseas Chinese also
occurred. As a news report briefed:
Deep regret was expressed by a spokesman of the Chinese Mission here Saturday
over the reported use of a Tokyo Chinese Overseas Association car for the
transportation of anti-American literature, and revealed that various Chinese
overseas associations in Japan had unanimously requested Gen. Ho Shai-lai,
Chief of the Mission, to thoroughly investigate the case and take appropriate
action against the culprits in order to uphold the reputation of the overseas
Chinese in Japan. The case, as reported in the Yomiuri April 2, concerned the
discovery of a large quantity of anti-American newspapers and pamphlets in a
raid carried out by the Japanese police on April 1.727
This event might have made Ho more determined to place the Chinese student
associations more tightly under his control. As a report revealed, “It was recently
decided by the Mission to start a rumor among the overseas students to the effect that
subsidies will be granted only to those who vote for Mission-approved candidates in
the coming election of officers for the student organization. These students who do
not cooperate will have their subsidies suspended.”728 His applying this type of
pressure was substantiated by Ho’s diaries. On May 4, 1951, for instance, Ho
expressed his sympathy towards those students under economic pressure, but claimed
that the government might not be able to offer their subsidies in such a difficult
situation. Ho stated that the Chinese Mission would do its best to argue for the money
from Taipei, but, those students who needed it should “express something on this
issue.”729 Under Ho’s guidance, the KMT retained control over the main Chinese
associations. As a CIA observer noted, “Two of the students nominated for president
of the Chinese Students’ Association in Japan are WANG Shu and LIANG Kuo-tung,
726 “Chinese Meet Here,” March 20, 1951, Nippon Times.
727 “Chinese Mission Regrets,” April 9, 1951, Nippon Times.
728 “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records,
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both of whom have proven themselves loyal to the Nationalist Government.”730 Wang
Shu later organized an organization to compete with CCP-sympathizers at schools and
received compliments about his efforts from Ho.731
The utilization of student funding proved to be effective in consolidating Chinese
students’ support for the KMT in Japan, but also led to a misunderstanding between
Ho Shailai and He Yingqing. In a private conversation held on July 4, 1951, He
blamed Ho Shailai for granting the Chinese Students Association the right to allocate
the funding.732 According to Ho’s account, on February 18 Ho met He at Tokyo,
explaining that he had not permitted the Students Association to allocate the funds
themselves.733
In February 1951, Ho consummated his plan by proposing three steps to
undermine support for leftist politics and the CCP among the overseas Chinese. First,
he ordered that all overseas Chinese and Chinese students in Japan re-register so that
those whose politics were suspect could be weeded out. Second, he ordered that the
overseas Chinese associations be reorganized and expel any left-leaning members, - a
task which he expected to be finished within three months. Third, Ho conferred with
SCAP about the repatriation of certain bad members to Taiwan if necessary.734 In all,
Ho’s efforts were successful in stabilizing the Chinese Nationalist’s image and their
support during a period of constant political turmoil in 1950.
DEFENDING THE CHINESE SEAT IN TOKYO
As the CCP secured its victory over the Nationalists and declared the
establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, it began actively searching for
international recognition. To the Nationalists, in opposition, the events of 1949 were
730 “ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE MISSION TO JAPAN,” August 7, 1951, General CIA Records,
CIA-RDP82-00457R007900010010-7.
731 DHSL, October 25, 1951.
732 “yu He Jiangjun Jingzhi Tanhua Jianlue Jilu (與何將軍敬之談話簡略紀錄) [Record of a
Conversation with General He Yingqin],” July 4, 1951, IMHArchives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.
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detrimental to how they were perceived internationally. One calculation revealed that,
“Early in the year the Nationalists had 135 separate missions abroad with nearly 1,100
men. Late in the year there were fifty-three missions (but only 19 embassies) with
about 450 diplomats.”735
To the CCP, the main object was to have its own seat replace that of the KMT at
the United Nations (UN). On January 19, 1950, Zhou Enlai cabled the UN to request
that the Republic of China’s seat be nullified, but his appeal was rejected.736 In the
meantime, besides striving for the Chinse seat in the UN, the CCP also turned its
focus to seats in other international organizations, such as the Far Eastern
Commission and the Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo.
At a Far Eastern Commission meeting on January 19, 1950, the Soviet member
proposed that the Chinese representative be expelled as he represented nothing more
than “Kuomintang Group,” and the Soviet member also announced that his country
would take no part in the Commission so long as the KMT representative remained.
Furthermore, the USSR would not “recognise [sic] as legal any action taken by
Commission in the meantime.”737 The motion raised by the Soviet member was a
burden for the FEC, and whether it could function in the absence of the Soviet Union
would be particularly controversial. However, a resolution made on February 2
declared that “in the view of the United States Government the absence of a
permanent member from the Council in no way diminished its power or authority to
act.” The man who made the announcement was the Commission chairman and the
United States’ representative to the body. After hearing this, the Chinese
735 Donald Klein, “Formosa’s Diplomatic World,” in Mark Mancall ed., Formosa Today (London:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 101. The reasons for this sharp deduction, based on a Chinese resource,
was in great part due to diplomatic ties with several countries being cut off, Chinese diplomats aboard
being disqualified due to embezzlement. See Ye Zhenhui (葉振輝), “Qiantai Chuqi Zhongyang Jiguan
de Zuzhi Tiaozheng (遷台初期中央機關的組織調整) [Organizational Adjustment of the Central
Apparatus at the Initial Stage of the Relocation to Taiwan],” in Zhonghua Minguoshi Zhuanti Lunwenji
Diwujie Taolunhui Mishuchu (中華民國史專題論文集第五屆討論會秘書處) ed., Zhonghua
Minguoshi Zhuanti DIwujie Taolunhui: Guoshi zhongde Zhongyang yu Difang Guanxi (中華民國史專
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Vol. 2, 200.
737 “Summaries of business of the Far Eastern Commission,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83800.
206
representative stated that “the position of his delegation was in complete agreement
with that of the United States.” However, the French representative supported the
Soviet proposal, agreeing that the FEC could not properly take action without the
Soviet Union. The dispute reached a deadlock, with the United States and the
Republic of China on one side, and France and the Soviet Union on the other. It would
only be broken when other members made their own decisions on the issue in the
future.738
The incident alerted SCAP in Tokyo, and MacArthur assumed that a similar
scenario would occur at the ACJ. In contrast to the larger FEC, however, the ACJ only
comprised four members, and thus disputes between them were easier to resolve.
When the dispute erupted in Washington, in January 1950 MacArthur notified Zhu
Shiming that the Soviet representative to the ACJ “might not propose their objection
to a Chinese KMT having a representative at the ACJ”, and that he had thus already
told Sebald, chairman of ACJ, to prevent the Soviet from making such a proposal. If
the Soviets insisted on doing so, Sebald should rebuke him with “the most severe
tone.” MacArthur also suggested the Chinese “take a tranquil attitude” but should not
“display its weakness” either.739 Out of the blue, though, the Soviet representative did
not raise any issue with regard to the Chinese seat at the ACJ. Instead, during ACJ
meetings held in the first few months of 1950, the Soviet member immersed
themselves in heated exchanges with other members about the repatriation of
Japanese from the Soviet Union and showed no interest in debating who occupied the
Chinese seat at the body.
Then, on June 19, Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a
letter to Sebald, stating that “the so-called “delegates” of the remnant clique of the
Chinese Kuomintang reactionaries no longer qualify to participate in the Allied
Council for Japan and should be expelled from its various organizations and
meetings.” The CCP had chosen Zhou Shidi (周士第), a general who had graduated
738 “Summaries of business of the Far Eastern Commission,” UK National Archives, FO 371/83800;
Zhang Pengzhou, Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji, Vol. 4, 280.
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from the Whampoa Academy, as the replacement of Ho Shailai.740 Only at this
moment did the Soviet representative officially step in to support the PRC’s
demands.741 Col. S. Polyashenko, acting member of the USSR at the ACJ, wrote a
letter to William Sebald, stating that
With reference to the telegram of the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic
of China, Chou En-lai, of June 19, 1950, I have the honor to state that I, as acting
member of the Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, support the demand of
the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China and on my
own part insist on the exclusion of the representative of the Kuomintang group
from the membership of the Allied Council for Japan and on the recognition of
General Chou Shih-ti, appointed by the Central People’s Government of the
People’s Republic of China, as the sole legal representative of China in the Allied
Council for Japan.742
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 immediately sidelined disputes over
the Chinese seat in the ACJ. For this reason, the KMT did not regard the threat to their
position at the ACJ as a serious one. Nevertheless, on June 28, Mao Zedong officially
appointed Zhou Shidi as the PRC’s representative to the ACJ.743 The date of this
appointment was of great significance, as Mao Zedong declared at the eighth meeting
of the Central People’s Government Committee that “American’s aggressions in Asia
would only raise wide and stubborn objections from Asian people.”744 It was at the
same meeting that Mao announced Zhou’s commission. The CCP knew that SCAP
would never accept Zhou Shidi so soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, but
Zhou’s appointment to the ACJ was announced as another demonstration of the CCP’s
attitude and in strong protest against American interference in Asian affairs and its
support of Taiwan and South Korea.
As the next chapter will suggest, the outbreak of the Korean War spurred-on the
740 Zhang Pengzhou, Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji, Vol. 4, 294; Yang Hong (楊弘), Zhoushidi
Jiangjun (周世第將軍) [General Zhou Shidi] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2002), 389.
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KMT regime in Taiwan, and Chiang began to pay increasing interest to the wider
situation in East Asia. Thus, while believing it would be difficult to make work, the
KMT were still worried about Zhou’s departure for Tokyo. On September 29, Jiang
Jingguo informed Ho that Zhou Shidi had departed for Japan and asked Ho to be
aware of it. Three days later, on October 2, Ho replied that information saying that
Zhou had already arrived at Japan was not accurate, although it seemed that
subordinates of Zhou had been active in Japan. In response, Ho had sent his staff to
secretly investigate.745 Throughout September and October, Ho never mentioned a
single word about Zhou Shidi in his diaries, reflecting probably the fact that Ho did
not regard the issue as a pressing one. In sharp contrast to Jiang’s anxiety, Ho knew
that at this point the Chinese Nationalists were of great importance to SCAP. As a
consequence, Ho was able to judge the situation correctly and remained confident that
his seat in the ACJ would not be threatened. The last challenge faced by Ho revealed
itself on November 8, when Kislenko once again raised the issue of the ACJ’s Chinese
representative at a meeting of the body, but his point was dismissed and was “ruled
out of order.”746
Despite their proposal again being rejected, the CCP never ceased trying to
penetrate its forces into Japan. According to intelligence received by Mao Renfeng,
the CCP had been secretly recruiting retired Japanese navy technicians through the
Japanese communists. Receiving this intelligence, on August 7, Ho cabled the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reporting that he had asked the intelligence department of
SCAP to make investigations and block those activities by all means.747 On
November 18, 1950, Jiang Jingguo informed Ho that five CCP agents were applying
for the Visas to Japan, using the cover of a ship company in Hong Kong.748 Japan
also became a base for the KMT’s secret operations, but the details are still not known
to the public. On June 16, eight days before the outbreak of the Korean War, Jiang
Jingguo cabled Shao Yulin, Chinese Ambassador to South Korea, informing that four
745 “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie and Jiang Jingguo,” October 2, 1950, Guoshiguan,
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personnel who had been dispatched to Northeast China would pass through Japan and
then onto Korea, where they would enter via the Northeast border.749 Given the fact
that Ho did not mention this in his diaries, it was extremely likely that Ho did not
know about the mission.
THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN JAPAN
The 228 Incident in 1947 soured the fragile relationships between local
Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders. To a great extent, it also sharply changed the
ideology of local Taiwanese, some of whom began to pursue Taiwan Independence or
reunion with Japan.750 Being suppressed so vehemently, the Taiwanese Independence
movement shifted its base to Japan and approached SCAP.751 In early 1949, the CIA
had noticed the activities of Huang Jinan, a leading figure of the Taiwan
Independence Movement, in Japan.752 The Chinese Mission also began to keep his
movements under close surveillance.
Representative of the entire movement as it played out in Japan, the case of Liao
Wenyi (廖文毅) is typical. Liao had joined the Taiwan Independence Movement after
the 228 Incident.753 In late 1948, Liao organized several associations, claiming to
represent the will of 6 million Formosans, to petition the Allied Countries in order to
prevent Taiwan from becoming further involved in the Chinese Civil War.754 Liao
sought support from the United States Consulate in Taiwan and the British
Government in Hong Kong, only to receive noncommittal replies.755 After his failure
in lobbying the Americans and the British, Liao switched his battleplan to focus on
749 “Jiang Jingguo to Shao Yulin,” June 16, 1950, Guoshiguan, 002-080200-00641-006.
750 Mark Mancall ed., Formosa Today, 24-28.
751 Lin Hsiao-Ting, Accidental State, 130.
752 “POLITICAL INFORMATION: POSSIBLE SPLIT IN FORMOSAN LEAGUE
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753 For a brief review of Liao’s activities, see Ong Joktik, “A Formosan’s View of The Formosan
Independence Movement,” in Mark Mancall ed., Formosa Today, 163-170.
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Japan. On January 27, 1949, “[w]ith the tacit consent of the SCAP” the Formosa
League for Re-emancipation “publicly appealed for a comprehensive U.S. mandate
for Taiwan, so as to prevent the fall of the island to the Chinese Communists.”756
Upon Liao’s arrival in Japan on March 14, 1950, the Chinese Mission immediately
required SCAP take actions against him.757 Liao was arrested and sentenced to six
months in prison for illegal entry on March 22.758 But what the Chinese Mission did
not realize was that before Liao’s sentence, William Sebald had already held several
meetings with Liao and sent a secrete telegram to the Department of State to evaluate
to possible outcomes of the Taiwanese Independent Movement.759 Suspicious of
Liao’s future movements, on October 8, 1950 Jiang Jingguo asked Ho to update him
with the latest information about Liao Wenyi.760 On October 13, Ho replied that Liao
had just been released and was asked to leave Japan within two months.761
Similar to the previous appointment of Zhou Shidi, the differing attitudes toward
Liao Wenyi’s case between Jiang Jingguo and Ho Shaiali reflected the large gap in
knowledge about events happening in Japan and the priorities of the two parties. Ho
only mentioned Liao Wenyi once in his diaries (January 10, 1951), noting that the
Taiwan Democratic Independence Party organized by Liao hold a press conference in
Tokyo on that day.762 In sharp contrast to Jiang Jingguo’s anxiety, Ho did not care
about keeping up to date on Liao. From his viewpoint, and as Ho and the KMT
maintained the support of the majority of overseas Chinese in Japan, the Taiwan
Independence Movement was not likely to become a threat worth worrying about.
THE CASE OF S.S. HAI-LIEH (海列)
Before China’s War of Resistance began in 1937, 1,500 thousand tons of shipping
capacity plied along China’s coastal and inland water, but this amount sharply
756 Lin Hsiao-Ting, Accidental State, 130.
757 Zhang Pengzhou, Zhongri Guanxi Wushinian Dashiji, Vol. 4, 284.
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dwindled to 100 thousand tons in the aftermath of the conflict. In order to enhance its
shipping capacity after the war, the Chinese government began purchasing ships from
the United States. By March 1946, the Chinese government obtained an additional
370 thousand tons shipping capacity.763 Among this acquisition was vessel named
Hai-lieh, which was originally built in United States and named S.S. Arthur Dobbs in
memory of the British colonial official who served as the seventh governor of North
Carolina between 1754 and 1765. The Hai-lieh arrived at Shanghai in 1946 and was
put under the command of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company
(Zhaoshang Ju, 招商局). In August 1946 the ship was dispatched to Taiwan to carry
Japanese materiel back to the mainland.764
Since the late Qing period, the Chinese shipping industry had been dominated by
Western powers. It was against this background that the Hai-lieh was deemed as a
symbol of China’s reinvigoration in the postwar era. In 1947, this 11,000-tonne vessel
arrived at Bangkok, marking “the first time that China navigates its own vessel to
travel abroad.” On this voyage, the Hai-lieh loaded 8,500 tons of rice and returned to
Shanghai.765 Later the Hai-lieh was put in to use in the Chinese Civil War. In July
1948, it carried the 42nd division of the KMT army from Qinhuangdao to nearby
Qingdao.766 Soon it was ordered to carry the same troops to Shanghai.767 Details of
the extent to which the Hai-lieh was involved in the Civil War are not known, but in
1949 it resumed the carriage of grains for military purposes.
On August 13, 1949, the Hai-lieh arrived at Kawasaki with iron ore from Hainan
island. Five days later, SCAP officials found contraband on the vessel. As later
announced by the Office of Deputy Contraband Property Administrator, the
contraband included 18,499 pounds of saccharin, 3,791 vials of penicillin, 32,295
vials of streptomycin, 2,367 plastic belts, 559 pounds of plastic sheets, and 12 bolts of
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cloth.768 Five Chinese staffs were then arrested, after which the Chinese Mission in
Japan bailed three of them out. In the meantime, the Chinese Mission also asked
SCAP to return the Hai-lieh for the purpose of carrying Japanese reparations back to
China. At first SCAP granted this request, but soon after it decided to withhold the
vessel. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company then hired an American
lawyer named Thomas D. Altken to pursue lawsuits on the grounds that the United
States government had no right to detain other countries’ vessels. After redundant
negotiation, SCAP decided to take this case to trial.
On March 10, 1950, the Nippon Times reported that,
Trial of six Chinese and six Japanese involved in what was described by the
prosecution as the biggest smuggling attempt in postwar Japan ended Wednesday
with the conviction and sentencing of 11, and confiscation of the SS Hai Lieh,
owned by the China Navigation Steamship Company.
Yee Yen-chen, captain of the vessel, was sentenced to two and one-half years
and fined $3,000. Wai Chai-fee, Ah Long-dong, Tsing Liang-tsu, and Cheng
Chung-tong were charged with attempting to bring contraband goods into Japan.
Tong was convicted also of illegal entry into Japan.
The Japanese nationals convicted and sentenced were: Shigemori Sakata, six
years and &10,000; Kiyoshi Itagaki, six years and $5,000; Taku Mikami, five
years and $3,000; Kindan Okubo, three years and $2,500; Chubei Shima, four
years and $2,500; and Takeshi Hashimoto, four years and $4,000.769
Upon Ho Shailai’s arrival to Tokyo, the Hai-lieh case became one of his major
concerns while in Japan. On June 18, Ho held a conference in his residence to address
the issue. Nearly all participants in the conference believed that the fact of smuggling
was undeniable, but it seemed unreasonable that SCAP had decided to confiscate the
vessel. Ho thereafter would do his best to negotiate with SCAP but he believed that
“some political issues were involved.” In his dinner with General Cooke that same
night, Cooke also agreed that from a juridical perspective the Hai-lieh could not be
confiscated.770 The next day, Ho then asked General Winfield P. Shepard, the head of
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SCAP’s Civil Affairs Section, to help him investigate the “inner story” of the case.771
In his mind, Ho believed that the Hai-lieh case was more a political issue rather than a
juridical one. In his conversation with William Sebald on June 30, five days after the
outbreak of the Korean War, Ho finally confronted Sebald about the Hai-lieh affair.
Ho told Sebald that he firmly believed that the confiscation of the Hai-lieh was
definitely not the outcome of proper juridical procedure but was instead the result of
some “revengeful motives.” In the end, Sebald said that the case was outside his remit,
but assured Ho that he would relay his opinion to the upper echelon of SCAP.772
On July 17, Sebald suggested to Ho that the case should be appealed to
Washington.773 On the next day, Ho told Chen Dekun (陳德坤 ), manager of the
China Merchants Steam Navigation Company Tokyo office, and Aitken that he saw
no chance in having a successful negotiation in Tokyo but in Washington.774 SCAP
decided to send the Hai-lieh to auction. On July 21, an advertisement was published
in the Nippon Times.775 Upon reading the advertisement, Chen and Aitken
immediately visited Ho and asked him to approach the ACJ. Believing that this would
not work, Ho promised to dispatch his subordinates to negotiate for an extension of
the auction with SCAP. Ho’s subordinate reported that ACJ rejected their request,
informing them that they could further appeal the case to the Far Eastern Committee
in Washington.776 On August 23, six days before the scheduled auction, Chen and
Aitken once again paid a visit to Ho to ask the Chinese Mission to petition SCAP to
delay the auction and request that Ho personally visit General MacArthur. It was at
this time that General MacArthur had just returned from Taipei and had begun to
consider the feasibility of using KMT troops in the Korean War. Given this fact, Ho
had no desire to approach MacArthur about the Hai-lieh case, which was a relatively
minor issue in comparison with Taiwan’s possible role in the war. As a result, Ho told
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Chen and Aitken that he would be willing to give another try if they first discuss the
issue with Courtney Whitney, who said that the two could appeal the Hai-lieh case to
the Navigation Court. At the same time, Ho approached General Willoughby, who
promised Ho that he could “strive with all efforts.”777
The negotiation of the Hai-lieh case nevertheless came to a standstill. A
breakthrough finally occurred on September 29 when Ho spent an hour discussing the
case with General Alonzo Patrick Fox, vice chief of staff of the United Nations
Command in Korea. Ho believed that “the door of negotiation seems not closed
yet.”778 On October 13, Ho sent another letter to SCAP, in which he once again
referred to the Fly Arrow case, arguing the unfairness of the two cases.779 In his
meeting with Carpenter, Ho sensed a different attitude from the US officials.
Carpenter told Ho that if the debts of the Hai-lieh could be paid off, he might try to
return the vessel. “I speculated that at first SCAP’s higher echelon did not pay much
attention to this case,” wrote Ho in his diary, “after reading the memorandum sent by
our mission, they believed our explanations are fair enough, thus we could know
move into a more favorable stage.”780
During his short stays in Taiwan, Ho informed He Zhonghan (賀衷寒), Minister
of Transportation, that as long as the debts of the Hai-lieh were paid off, the vessel
could be returned.781 On November 11, 1950, when Ho reported his handling of the
Hai-lieh case, “all presenters clapped their hands.”782 Eventually, on June 30, 1951,
the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company’s office in Tokyo took over the
Hai-lieh, marking the end of two-year-long negotiation. At this point, the Hai-lieh
was worth one million US dollars.783
On July 1, Xu Xueyu admitted that the return of the Hai-lieh was in great part due
to the contribution of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Xu knew that the Foreign
777 DHSL, August 23, 1950.
778 DHSL, September 29, 1950.
779 DHSL, October 13, 1950.
780 DHSL, October 17, 1950.
781 DHSL, October 31, 1950.
782 DHSL, November 11, 1950.
783 “Hailiehao Huolun Mei Jiaohuan Woguo (海列號貨輪美交還我國) [US Returns S.S. Hai-lieh to
China],” July 3, 1951, The Kung Sheung Daily News.
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Ministry believed the negotiation was doomed to be futile and had asked that the
Chinese Mission to stop the negotiation, while the Chinese Mission insisted on
continuing the negotiation and eventually won back the vessel.784 After its return to
Nationalist China’s hands, the Hai-lieh was arranged to be repaired in Japan.785 From
Ho’s diaries, one can see the great amount of effort that he put into the negotiations
for the return of the vessel and the rationale behind his actions. To Ho, as well as to
the ROC, it was the symbolism rather than the vessel’s value that prompted the
Chinese Mission to argue for its return.
CONCLUSION
Fraught with extreme tension and insecurity, 1950 was a year which can be
counted as a crucial watershed for Chiang Kai-shek and his regime, one during which
the Chinese Mission in Japan worked to gain more leverage for the Nationalist
Chinese in Tokyo. Snuffing-out the Taiwanese independence movement in Tokyo
occurred in tandem with dissuading MacArthur from placing Taiwan in trusteeship, as
chapter two suggests. Also, protecting the Nationalist’s seat at the ACJ was a
prerequisite for suppressing the CCP’s and JCP’s activities, as well as for
consolidating support for the KMT amongst overseas Chinese in Japan. In all, the
battles fought on different fronts by the Chinese Mission in Japan reflected the
Chinese Nationalist’s stance towards the wider international arena during that period.
To some extent, the arduous negotiations and the eventual return of the S.S. Hai-lieh
was a victory for the Chinese Mission. Although Ho did not mention this event
directly in his diaries, one could sense that an important factor contributing to SCAP’s
willingness to return the vessel was the increasing significance of the ROC during the
Korean War.
784 DHSL, July 1, 1951.
785 “Zhaoshang Ju Shouhui Hailielun (招商局收回海列輪) [China Merchants Steam Navigation
Company Takes Back S.S. Hai-lieh],” July 25, 1951, The Kung Sheung Daily News.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE PEACE TREATY
The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty signed on April 28th, 1952 terminated the
wartime enmity between the Republic of China and Japan. Its historical and legitimate
significance, especially regarding its decision on the status of Taiwan, has been
carefully examined by scholars for decades.786 To scholars in mainland China, they
regretted that this Treaty enabled the Japanese to exploited the “un-unification of
China” to escape its duties of reparations.787 Moreover, PRC refused to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the “Chinese” appeared in the title of the treaty by unilaterally
renaming this treaty into “Japan-Taiwan Treaty (Ritai Tiaoyue 日台條約 ).” The
legacy of this treaty continued to resonate. In Taiwan, the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party interpreted this Treaty into the concept of the “unsettled status of
Taiwan（Taiwan Diwei Weidinglun 台灣地位未定論） ,” paving the way for its
proposal of establishing a genuine country without any tie to the ROC. On the other
hand, the KMT believed the Treaty legitimated the ROC’s takeover of Taiwan in 1945
and argued that the DPP finds no grounds to claim the legitimacy of Taiwanese
Independence based on the context of this treaty.
The role of John Foster Dulles in the signing of this treaty has been examined by
Howard Schonberger, who argues that Dulles successfully “mollified the angry
Nationalist Chinese and their supporters in Congress.”788 Hans van de Ven has traced
the original ideas in the treaty from the Cairo Conference in 1943 to the convoluted
negotiations process in Taipei from 1951 to 1952, including disagreements on “the
786 Huang Zijin (黃自進), “Zhanhou Taiwan Zhuquan Zhengyi yu Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue (戰後台灣
主權爭議與中日和平條約) [Disputes on the Sovereignty of Postwar Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese
Peace Treaty],” in Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Vol. 54, December,
2006, 59-104.
787 Zeng Jingzhong (曾景忠), “1952 Nian Taibei Heyi zhong Riben Liyong Zhongguo Butongyi
Taotuo Zhanzheng Peichang (1952年台北和議中日本利用中國不統一逃脫戰爭賠償) [Japan
Utilized China’s Disunity to Escape from War Reparations in 1952]”, in Su Zhiliang (蘇智良), Rong
Weimu (榮維木), Chen Lifei (陳麗菲) eds., Riben Qinhua Zhanzheng Yiliu Wenti he Peichang Wenti
(日本侵華戰爭遺留問題和賠償問題) [Unresolved Issues from Japan’s War of Aggression in China
and the Issue of Reparations] (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2005), Vol. 1, 92-113.
788 Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-52 (Kent:
Kent State University Press, 1989), 277.
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name of the treaty, the formulation to be used to describe its territorial scope, the
wording of China’s agreement to forego war reparations, and definitions of the nature
of the war.” Van de Ven has also pointed out that many of today’s political disputes in
Taiwan are grounded in this treaty.789 Due to its highly controversy and political
significance to date, scholars have been eager to explore the detailed stories behind
the curtain. In recent years, Taiwanese historians began to focus on the role of Chiang
Kai-shek and Ye Gongchao in the negotiation of the Treaty.790 Although the Chinese
Mission did not directly participate in the negotiation of the Treaty, it successfully
lobbied SCAP in Tokyo, pressuring Japan to sign the treaty with the ROC rather than
the PRC after the negotiation in Taipei reached a stalemate. Drawing on Ho Shailai’s
diaries and archival sources preserved in the Academia Historica in Taipei, this
chapter examines the role of the Chinese Mission in the conclusion of the treaty.
EFFORTLESSATTEMPT BEFORE 1950
As the Allied Occupation in Japan began in 1945, the Allied powers had been
conducting negotiations for a peace settlement with Japan, but these efforts were
effortless in great part due to the opposition of the Soviet Union. On October 23, 1947,
Zhang Qun and Wang Shijie visited MacArthur in Tokyo for the purpose of revealing
789 Hans van de Ven, “The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan,” in Hans van de Ven, Diana
Lary, and Stephen R. MacKinnon eds., Negotiating China’s Destiny in World War II (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2015), 220-238. The significance of the treaty to contemporary China is
further examined by Lin Manhong (林滿紅). See Lin Manhong, “Zhanzheng Heyue yu Taiwan (戰爭、
和約與台灣 ) [War, Treaty, and Taiwan],” in L  Fangshang ed., Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzhengshi
Xinbian (中國抗日戰爭史新編) [New History of China's War of Resistance against Japan] (Taipei:
Academia Historica, 2015), 465-522.
790 For the discussion on the role of Chiang Kai-shek, see Liu Weikai (劉維開), “Zhongri Heyue
Qianding Jingguo: yi Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong wei Zhongxin de Tantao (中日和約簽訂經過：以蔣
中正總統為中心的探討) [The Process of the Conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty: a
Discussion Based on the Role of President Chiang Kai-shek],” in Jindai Zhongguo (近代中國)
[Modern China], Vol. 148, April, 2002, 28-39. For discussion on the role of Ye Gongchao, see Tang
Yan (湯晏), Ye Gongchao de Liange Shijie: Cong Ailuete dao Dulesi (葉公超的兩個世界：從艾略特
到杜勒斯) [The Two Worlds of Ye Gongchao: From Eliot to Dulles] (New Taipei City: Weicheng Press,
2015), 277-327.
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China’s stance on the peace treaty negotiation.791 In his inauguration speech on
May 20, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek reiterated his attitudes with regard to the peace treaty
that China should ask other allies to grant China a “special status” in the negotiation
of the treaty.792 In September 1948, Zhang Qun visited Japan to observe the
implements of Allied Occupation policies and confer with MacArthur and other
Japanese politicians about postwar issues between China and Japan.793 As a United
Kingdom report summarized, Zhang Qun’s opinion represented that of the majority of
the Chinese. “In particular the consensus of Chinese opinion is in favour of an early
peace treaty and adverse to the building up of Japan as an arsenal of democracy,
which policy has perhaps gained some adherents in the United States in the course of
a year during which Chinese incompetence was so convincingly demonstrated.”794
From the Russian perspective, this visit signaled “an attempt to form a close military
and political combination between Nationalist China, Japan, and South Korea under
American auspices.”795
TENTATIVE CONTACTAFTER THE OUTBREAK OFTHE KOREANWAR
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 made the United States expedite the
conclusion of the peace treaty. For the Nationalists, however, the focal point was not
the peace treaty, but rather seizing this opportunity to participate in the war and
launch a counterattack against mainland China.796 This onerous task was given to
General Ho Shailai, the newly-arrived head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. In Tokyo,
Ho frequently attended SCAP conferences, at which he discussed military strategy, as
well as issues related to the Nationalists’ participation in the war. Only at the end of
1950 did Ho gradually shift his focus to the process of conducting a peace treaty
between China and Japan. In December, Ho began to meet Japanese politicians to
791 “Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek,” October 23, 1947, Guoshiguan, 001-062500-00001-006.
792 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 636.
793 Shen Jinding ed., Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji, 19.
794 “Sir R. Stevenson to Mr. Bevin,” February 3, 1949, UK National Archives, FO 371/75731.
795 Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951, 61.
796 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, 70-71.
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exchange opinions on the peace treaty. The first individuals Ho met with were Ashida
Hitoshi (蘆田均), former Prime Minister of Japan, and Yada Shichitaro (矢田七一郎),
former Japanese Consul in Shanghai. According to Ho’s diary entry from December 6,
“Ashida asked me whether it would be possible to have Japan sign the treaty with the
Chinese Communists. I replied that not even the Soviet Union and Japan could sign
the treaty, and it would be even more difficult to add one more Communist party. He
agreed with my opinion.”797 Ashida also mentioned this meeting in his diary, in
which he wrote that General Ho had expressed his inability to understand the attitude
of Yoshida Shigeru. However, further details were not given.798 The fact that Ashida
inquired about the possibility of signing a treaty with the Chinese Communists
implied that this opinion had been spreading among members of the Japanese
administration. In his diary, General Ho also praised the uprightness of Ashida and
Yada, and mentioned his willingness to befriend them. At this point, Ho began to
establish contact Japanese politicians, especially those who possessed a past
relationship with China.
On December 18, Ho dined with three prominent Japanese politicians. As he
wrote in his diary, “Tonight I invited Ota Ichiro (太田一郎), Kusaka Ryunosuke (草
鹿淺之介), and Oda Takio (黃田多喜夫) to dinner. Although Ryunosuke was drunk, I
had a great impression of him.”799 On December 21, Ho invited Yoshizawa Kenkichi
(芳澤謙吉), Yamazaki Motoki (山崎元幹), Takasaki Tatsunosuke and three others, all
of which were prominent figures in the Sino-Japanese War, holding positions such as
head of economics in Manchukuo.800 Since Ho did not jot down their conversation in
his diary, the contents of their discussion remain unknown to the public. Although
they might have discussed issues on the Japanese reparations in Northeastern China, it
was more likely that they were exchanging opinions on the conclusion of the peace
797 DHSL, December 6, 1950.
798 Ashida Hitoshi, Ashida Hitoshi Nikki (芦田均日記) [Diaries of Hitoshi Ashida] (Tokyo: Yanbo
Press, 1986), Vol. 3, 406.
799 DHSL, December 18, 1950.
800 DHSL, December 21, 1950.
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treaty. In either case, Ho’s activeness in meeting the Japanese politicians reflected the
fact that he was trying to create an advantage for the Nationalists in the negotiations
that were to follow. As Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原喜重郎) applauded Ho in an event on
February 3, 1951, “Mr. Ho Shailai is a friend with full understanding to Japan, whom
I deeply trust. For those rely on Ho in regard to adjust Sino-Japanese relations are
significantly important.” Shidehara also cited a Western proverb “After winter comes
spring” to anticipate the forthcoming cooperation between China and Japan.801
DULLES’VISIT TO JAPAN
The Chinese mission had been paying close attention to the attitude of the US
after it embarked on negotiations for the peace treaty after the outbreak of the Korean
War. In his late-1950 report on “the future of the peace treaty with Japan”, Zhang
Bojin, head of the second division of the Chinese mission, wrote,
Facing the difficulties of signing the peace treaty with Japan, the US government
not only decided to declare the termination of the Korean War the following
spring, but also to dispatch a significant figure to Japan to negotiate this process.
Issues under discussion would include restoring the Japanese privilege of
self-defense, replacing the name of the current occupation forces with “United
Nation garrison”, and other issues related to politics and economics.802
The significant figure mentioned in this report was John Foster Dulles, whose
mission to Japan attracted massive political attention in Tokyo.803 Dulles was
appointed as Truman’s Special Representative for peace treaty negotiations on
January 10, and he arrived in Tokyo on January 25, 1951.804 On January 23, two days
before Dulles’ arrival, Yoshida Shigeru held a private meeting with Ho Shailai. As Ho
wrote in his diary, “Premier Yoshida has invited me to visit him tomorrow afternoon. I
801 He Yingqin, Riben Fangwen Jiangyan Xuanji, Appendix 5.
802 Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II (中日和平條約(二)) [The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty], 9, Guoshiguan.
803 For the discussion on the role of John Foster Dulles in the conclusion of the peace treaty, see
Frederick Sherwood Dunn, Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963).
804 William J. Sebald,With MacArthur in Japan, 260.
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have heard that this person is arrogant. He has not been in touch with us for five years,
and this opportunity could be the first step towards breaking the ice. However, I do
not know what the atmosphere will be during our discussion, which worries me.”805
In his report to Taipei written on January 24, Ho expounded upon his reasons for
accepting Yoshida’s invitation:
Due to SCAP restrictions, as well as Yoshida’s preconceived ideas about our
mission, I have not interacted with Premier Yoshida since my arrival in Tokyo
seven months ago. The GHQ has loosed its restrictions recently and Yoshida sent
me Christmas gifts last year, and therefore I paid a visit to him on January 24.
Yoshida was very polite and laid-back, without any of the arrogance he usually
possesses.806
The timing of his meeting with General Ho reflected Yoshida’s eagerness to
exchange opinions on the peace treaty with the Chinese Mission before Dulles’ arrival.
The context of their conversion can be found in neither Chinese nor Japanese official
records, but was summarized in General Ho’s diary:
I paid a visit to Premier Yoshida at four this afternoon. Whether what his real
intention is, I had a deep sense of his humility and humor. However, one thing he
mentioned deserves special attention. He said he had discussed the fifth column
strategy frequently used by the Communist party with his American friend, and
did not understand why our democratic nations did not also undertake this
method. The best way would be to undertake the fifth column strategy,
dispatching the Japanese into mainland China and disturbing its rear…..I have
always believed that if were to have Japanese participation in our mission, it
would be difficult to terminate our cooperation, which would be a trouble in the
future.”807
The secret mission mentioned by General Ho was the “White Group”, which at
the time was operating in secret. Based on his writings, General Ho did not know
about the operations of the White Group, nor did he exchange any of his opinions on
the peace treaty with Yoshida. During Dulles’s visit to Japan, Ho kept an eye on his
805 DHSL, January 23, 1951.
806 Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II, 68, Guoshiguan.
807 DHSL, January 24, 1951.
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movements and detailed Dulles’s speeches in his diary. On January 27, Ho suggested
that the Chinese government “sign the peace treaty as soon as possible, or else we will
not be able to increase the strength of democratic states, nor will we be able to protect
their safety. However, I could not offer any suggestion with regard to the solutions of
Japan’s safety after the conclusion of the peace treaty.”808 At this moment, Ho was
still struggling for the opportunity to have the Nationalist troops participate in the
Korean War. The conclusion of the peace treaty would be favorable to this mission.
On January 29, Ho feted Ota Ichiro, Saito Noboru (齋藤 昇 ), chief of the
Japanese police, and Matsui Akira (松井明), chief secretary of Yoshida. According to
Ho’s diary, Ota believed that “the peace treaty might be concluded very soon. The
biggest problem we are facing is the Chinese problem, for we are not willing to sign
the treaty with mainland China, and we have no motive to sign with Taiwan either.”809
On February 7, Ho held a half-hour meeting with Dulles. Afterward, Ho stated that
“my biggest thinking of this meeting is that the American understanding of us has
gradually been clearer, and their attitudes toward the communists have gradually been
tougher.”810
These tentative contacts with Japanese politicians in Tokyo enabled Ho to
become familiar with Japanese political and diplomatic issues. Ho proved this during
discussions on Japanese diplomacy and party issues with Chiang Kai-shek at dinner
on March 11.811 After returning to Tokyo, Ho continued to meet with Japanese
politicians, soliciting their advice on the peace treaty. Ho paid special attention to the
opinions of Okamura Yasuji, who believed that the Japanese government was “willing
to sign the treaty as soon as possible. While there are differences of opinion within the
Japanese administration, in fact it is a political effect for the purpose of wheeling and
dealing, to get itself a better bargaining position.”812 Due to Okamura’s significance,
Ho held another meeting with him on April 10. During the meeting, Okamura once
808 Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II, 69, Guoshiguan.
809 DHSL, January 29, 1951.
810 DHSL, February 7, 1951.
811 Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, March 11, 1951.
812 Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II, 198, Guoshiguan.
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again emphasized that the treaty could be concluded in the near future.813 On April 18,
Ho had a fifteen-minute talk with Dulles.814 After listening to a speech given by
Dulles, Ho believed that “Dulles’s viewpoint on Taiwan is benign.”815 On May 8, Ho
visited Hayashi Joji (林讓治 ), head of the House of Representatives in Japan, and
summarized his thoughts of the meeting in his diary, stating that “if the Liberal Party
succeeds, especially with regards to the signing of the peace treaty, it is in great part
due to the support of the United States. However, some people in our country believe
that we should keep close contact with Japan, and loosen our ties with the United
States. Their opinions are too naïve.”816 Through his contacts with Dulles and
Japanese politicians, the savvy Ho clearly understood the United States’ significant
impact on Japan.
Aside from Okamura Yasuji, another significant figure Ho befriended in Japan
was Hatoyama Ichiro (鳩山一郎), who later became Prime Minister of Japan in 1954
and was famous for “autonomous diplomacy”. On May 21, Ho feted Hatoyama Ichiro
and Ishiii Mitsujiro (石井光次郎). Ho wrote, “He believed the peace treaty could be
concluded before July 1, but I doubt it and believe the possibility is extremely low.”817
In general, Ho chose to engage those Japanese politicians with a background in China,
inquiring about their attitudes toward the conclusion of the peace treaty, while also
being skeptical about their opinions. In the meantime, Ho realized that the peace
treaty would not be concluded in the near future. The United States’ pressure on Japan
would be the decisive factor.
THE INTERIOR STRUGGLE
The original task of the Chinese mission was to participate in the operation of the
Allied Council for Japan. However, due to China’s complicated circumstance and
813 DHSL, April 10, 1951.
814 “Prime Minister Sees President’s Envoy Twice Wed.,” April 19, 1951, Nippon Times.
815 DHSL, April 23, 1951.
816 DHSL, May 8, 1951.
817 DHSL, May 21, 1951.
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dramatic changes in the status of Japan, the Chinese mission gradually devoted itself
to Sino-Japanese cooperation, rather than to cooperation with other powers. As Cao
Shicheng, Chinese military attaché to Japan, wrote in a report submitted to Chiang
Kai-shek in early 1951,
The Chinese Mission in Japan should be responsible for our country’s tasks in
Japan, but the head of the mission has been changed four times in the past five
years. What exactly does this accomplish? On one hand, the policies in our
country are not clear enough. On the other hand, the appointment of the head of
the Chinese Mission leans on SCAP too much. Of course we had no choice but
to choose a person to cooperate with GHQ after Japan’s surrender, but we should
adjust the proportion of these jobs as the circumstances change.
Cao further pointed out that the proportion of the Chinese mission’s tasks on the
United States and Japan were 90 to 10 after Japan’s surrender, changed to 50 to 50
after the outbreak of the Korean War, and should be adjusted to 10 to 90 for now.
Although Ho had strong ties with the United States, his unfamiliarity with Japan, as
well as some jealousy generated by him within the Chinese Mission, caused many to
be critical of him. As Cao sarcastically wrote, the Chinese mission should be led by a
person who “deeply understands the Japanese and us Chinese.”818 Shao Yulin,
Chinese ambassador to Korea, also mentioned that the work of the Chinese mission
“shows a discernable bias towards SCAP, which possesses limited power, and ignores
the potential of Japan.”819 As Ye Gongchao also revealed,
MacArthur is stubborn and is not willing to meet guests, especially those whom
he does not know. In order to accommodate this situation, our government chose
persons with the appropriate backgrounds, including Zhu Shiming and Ho
Shailai, to become head of the mission. Both of them were successful in
engaging MacArthur and GHQ staff. When MacArthur visited Taiwan, he told
me in person that he had a good impression of Ho.820
Chiang’s dilemma rested in the choice between allying with SCAP and Japan; he
818 Zhongri Heping Tiaoyue II, 98-104, Guoshiguan.
819 “Shao Yulin to the Executive Yuan,” July 28, 1951, IMHArchives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.
820 “Congress Record,” January 8, 1951, IMHArchives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.
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decided to maintain Ho’s position but dispatch envoys to Japan to work independently.
The first envoy Chiang sent to Japan was He Yingqin, who arrived in Japan with his
wife on January 6, 1951.821 According to Shao Yulin’s report, He was not warmly
received by the Chinese mission during his visit in Japan, which caused rumors in
both Tokyo and Taipei.822 There might have been some discord between He and the
Chinese mission, but the person who actually triggered a confrontation that lasted for
several months was Dong Xianguang, an influential journalist who would become the
first Chinese ambassador to Japan after the conclusion of the peace treaty.
In 1950, Dong had been entrusted by Chiang with the task of obtaining United
States support for Taiwan. On December 14, 1950, during his stopover in Tokyo
before returning to Taiwan from the United States, Dong held a meeting with
MacArthur, which was arranged by Ho.823 Dong had planned to visit MacArthur
again on April 14, 1951, but the General refused to meet anyone after being dismissed
by President Truman.824 While the meeting with MacArthur failed to come to fruition,
Ho still managed to arrange a meeting between Dong and General Charles A.
Willoughby.825 According to Ho’s diary, on April 26 Dong discussed issues with
regard to the US Military Assistance Advisory Group in Taiwan with him.826 On April
28, Ho feted both William C. Chase, head of the Advisory Group, and Dong at his
residence.827 In general, Dong’s missions in Japan and the United States were to
arrange the arrival of the Advisory Group, of which Ho had entirely no knowledge.
Dong also met Okazaki Katsuo (岡崎勝男 ), secretary of Yoshida Shigeru, a
meeting also arranged by Ho.828 However, in a 90-minute meeting between Yoshida
821 “Gen. Ho Ying-Chin Here on Visit from Taipei,” January 6, 1951, Nippon Times.
822 “Shao Yulin to the Executive Yuan,” July 28, 1951, IMHArchives, 11-01-02-19-04-007.
823 “Summaries of Dong Xianguang’s Report,” December 14, 1950, Guoshiguan,
002-080106-00056-015.
824 “Chiang Kai-shek to MacArthur,” April 12, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-007.
825 “Dong Xianguang to Chiang Kai-shek,” April 23, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00056-021;
Dong Xianguang, Dong Xianguang Zizhuan (董顯光自傳) [The Autobiography of Dong Xianguang]
(Taipei: Duli Zuojia, 2014), 268.
826 DHSL, April 26, 1951.
827 DHSL, April 28, 1951.
828 “Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek,” April 18, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-080106-00064-017.
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and Dong on April 30, Ho was not present, nor did he organize the meeting.829 In his
report to Chiang written on May 24, Dong summarized his conversation with Yoshida,
including details of Dulles’s visit to Japan, the possibility of concluding the peace
treaty, as well as information about the Korean War, which reflected the fact that
Dong’s mission in Japan had overlapped with Ho’s. This fact can be proven by the
change of the recipients of Chiang’s telegrams to the Chinese mission, which changed
from “Chief Ho” to either “Chief Ho and Comrade Dong Xianguang” or “Chief Ho
and forward to Mr. Dong Xianguang”.830 While Dong and Ho had been working
together quite amiably in Tokyo, they did not exchange opinions on the tasks that they
had been assigned by Chiang individually. For instance, Dong did not inform Ho
about his meeting with General Willoughby before returning to Taipei on May 12. Ho
came to know of this only after being told by Willoughby that afternoon, which he
believed that “Dong seems disloyal and dishonest for not mentioning the meeting to
me this morning. Even if I ask him directly, he gives the excuse that there was not
enough time to tell me.”831
After Dong’s return to Taipei, Yu Dawei（俞大維）, who had just resigned from
the Minister of National Defense, paid another four-day visit to Tokyo from May 16th
to the 20th, during which Ho accompanied him on his visits with several SCAP staff
members.832 The secret mission brought by He Yingqin, Dong Xianguang, and Yu
Dawei was certainly causing discomfort on Ho’s part, as he believed his honor had
been offended. In his meeting with Ye Gongchao on May 28, Ho said “I am certainly
not interested in my job in Japan.”833 The next day, Ho told Chen Cheng that “the
situation in Tokyo is unsustainable.”834 Ho then insistently offered his resignation to
Chen Cheng and Wang Shijie. Wang tried his best to convince Ho to stay and
proposed three solutions:
829 “Wang Shijie to Chiang Kai-shek,” May 7, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-020400-00053-035.
830 “Chiang Kai-shek’s Instruction,” April 13, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-008; “Chiang
Kai-shek to Ho Shailai and Dong Xianguang,” April 23, 1951, Guoshiguan, 002-010400-00017-012.
831 DHSL, May 12, 1951.
832 DHSL, May 16 to 20, 1951.
833 DHSL, May 28, 1951.
834 DHSL, May 29, 1951.
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1. In the case that you continue to lead the Chinese mission, your term of office
should not be limited, or else you will have difficulty in leading your staffs.
2. Since we would like to have you return to office, the head of our government
should extend to you its full trust and endow you with full authority. It must
not willfully dispatch people to Japan to do their own jobs without letting
you know. If it is necessary to send someone to Japan, we must first inform
you, and the person should be supervised by you.
3. With regard to the Japanese question, we must clearly inform you about our
policies, and must not send people there to do whatever they want wantonly.
Wang’s suggestions were a clear reflection of Ho’s concerns; Ho replied that he
would consider staying on in the post if these three conditions could be met.835 Four
days later, Chiang Kai-shek invited Ho to his residence on Jiaoban Mountain (角板山)
for a 150-minute talk, which Ho regarded as the “longest and frankest talk with the
President in my life.” According to Ho’s diary, he first offered his resignation to
Chiang, but was immediately rejected. Chiang told Ho that his accomplishments in
Japan were extraordinary, and that he had not found any suitable person to replace
him. “I feel that the President is very satisfied with my job in Japan,” summarized Ho.
“He mentioned the abundance of our mission’s accomplishments a full three or four
times.”836 Chiang was certainly not referring to the progress of the treaty with Japan,
but rather to Ho’s efforts to cultivate relationships with MacArthur for the purpose of
defending Taiwan. In Chiang’s words, Ho must maintain his position due to his great
accomplishments. However, another factor, which Chiang did not tell Ho, played a
significant role as well. At this moment, General MacArthur had just returned to the
US, where he had been succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway, with whom the
Nationalist government was not familiar. Chiang certainly did not want to loosen his
ties with SCAP and Ho was the only suitable person to handle this job. As a
consequence, after applauding and convincing Ho to stay, Chiang immediately
inquired him about the methods of approaching General Ridgway, to which Ho
replied, “This person is a natural soldier and strong-willed. It will take some time to
835 DHSL, June 10, 1951.
836 DHSL, June 14, 1951.
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obtain his sympathy.” Ho then underscored that “if we act impulsively, it might cause
unexpected problems.”837
After returning to Tokyo, Ho continued to cultivate relationships with SCAP and
Japanese politicians. Not only did he periodically fete Okamura Yasuji and Ogata
Taketora (緒方竹虎 ), an influential Japanese journalist, but he also broadened his
circles at the same time. For instance, Ho befriended Kuhara Fusanosuke (久原房之
助 ), a significant entrepreneur and politician, and Akao Bin ( 赤 尾 敏 ), an
extreme-right Japanese politician.838 In the meantime, many people in Taiwan could
not comprehend Chiang’s insistence on having Ho remain in Japan. They believed
that Ho was not suitable for leading the Chinese mission because of his unfamiliarity
with Japan, the same issue that Cao Shicheng had satirized in his earlier report. Zhou
Hongtao (周宏濤), a secretary of Chiang, also pointed out that “although Ho has an
extraordinary relationship with General MacArthur, he lacks political acumen and
thus is not well-regarded by the Japanese politicians.”839 Facing strong criticism, as
well as Ho’s reluctance, Chiang eventually found a middle ground and decided to
have Ho remain in his position until the conclusion of the peace treaty. On September
13, Chiang informed Ho about this decision. Ho later grumbled in his diary, “I
expressed my unwillingness to stay in Japan, but the President adamantly insisted that
I go back, and I cannot reject it.”840
HO’S EFFORTS IN TOKYOAFTER THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE
CONFERENCE
Ho returned to Tokyo on September 15, six days after the conclusion of the
Treaty of San Francisco. The Republic of China was excluded from the treaty because
837 DHSL, June 19, 1951.
838 DHSL, July 16, 1951; DHSL, July 27, 1951.
839 Zhou Hongtao and Wang Shichun, “Zhongri Shuangbian Heyue Tanpan Neimu (中日雙邊和約談
判內幕) [Inside the Sino-Japanese Bilateral Peace Treaty Negotiations],” Zhuangji Wenxue, Vol. 80-6,
38.
840 DHSL, September 13, 1951.
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the dispute between the UK and US on whether Communist or Nationalist China
should represent China had yet to be resolved.841 As a consequence, the US urged
Japan to deal exclusively with Taiwan after the conclusion of the San Francisco treaty.
The exclusion of the ROC into the conference disappointed Chiang, who went on a
private hunger strike to express his fury.842
Thus, Ho’s assignment now became extremely important. News media in Japan
and China paid significant attention to Ho’s return, and believed he brought new
instructions from Taipei to Tokyo.843 As an English radio program in Japan revealed,
“The General further said his home government will accept the Japanese
government’s bid for direct peace treaty negotiations if the proposed treaty is similar
to that signed in San Francisco. He said his government is not opposed to the reported
Japanese rearmament.”844 On September 22, Ho said that “his government was
hoping to conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan soon.”845 On September 25, Ho
told an AP journalist that the peace treaty between Japan and China could definitely
be concluded, but it was difficult to predict when this would be. Ho also revealed that
the Foreign Office of Japan had yet to contact the Chinese government concerning the
treaty.
The Foreign Office’s impassivity reflected the Japanese reluctance to sign the
peace treaty with the Republic of China after the conclusion of the treaty of San
Francisco. To overcome this hurdle, Ho actively propagandized the necessity of
signing the treaty in Japan as well as its meaning to the perpetual peace between
China and Japan. For instance, Ho expressed his wish to restore the normal and
friendly relationship between China and Japan in a Double Tenth Day ceremony.846
But Ho’s efforts could not alter Japanese public opinion, and the Japanese government
decided to put off negotiations with Taipei as long as it could. As Okazaki told Dong
841 Rana Mitter, “the Postwar Reconstruction of Asian Order and the Legacy of the War of Resistance
in Contemporary East Asia,” 9.
842 Lin Hsiao-Ting, Accidental State, 178; Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek, September 9, 1951.
843 “He Shili Fanren Xieyou Xin Xunling (何世禮返任攜有新訓令) [Ho Shailai Returns with New
Instruction],” September 16, 1951, The Kung Sheung Daily News.
844 “Japanese-Chinese Nationalist Peace Talks,” UK National Archives, FO 371/92603.
845 “Peace Treaty Sought,” September 23, 1951, The Spokesman-Review.
846 “Gen. Ho Shai-lai Speaks at Double 10th Rites,” October 11, 1951, Nippon Times.
230
Xianguang,
Our government’s policy for now is just to wait, and we will take no action at
least until the treaty is ratified. We will do research on when and with which
Chinese government shall we sign the peace treaty as long as our country regains
its autonomy. While our country deeply respects the Nationalist government, it is
regrettable that its territorial possessions are limited to Taiwan.847
This conversation, also recorded by Ho Shailai and Wellington Ku, was regarded
as clear evidence in support of Japan’s desire to procrastinate while dealing with the
Nationalists.848 On October 29, Yoshida further divulged that Japan had “the right to
choose which country to sign the peace treaty with.”849
Dulles was once again entrusted with the mission to pressure the Japanese
government to compromise. As usual, Ho was attentive to Dulles’s activities in Tokyo,
this time even secretly investigating the conversations between Dulles and Yoshida
and immediately reporting them to Taipei. The Nationalist government also secretly
advised Willington Ku and Ho Shailai to “keep close ties with Dulles and other
persons who will be departing to Japan immediately.”850 Besides concentrating on
Dulles, Ho also paid enormous attention to the United Kingdom’s attitude.
“According to our secret investigation,” wrote Ho, “the UK government secretly
cabled its ambassador in Japan, informing him to keep silent on the peace treaty. The
UK undoubtedly put political and economic pressure on Japan. This information is the
most reliable and sufficient attention should be paid to it.”851 On December 13,
Dulles handed Yoshida a memorandum, which asked the Japanese to recognize
847 Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaowenti Yanjiuhui (中華民國外交問題研究會), Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri
Heyue de Guanxi (金山和約與中日和約的關係) [The Relationship between the San Francisco Peace
Treaty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty] (Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui, 1966),
170.
848 DHSL, October 26, 1951. Gu Weijun, Guweijun Huiyilu, Vol. 9, 260.
849 Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaowenti Yanjiuhui, Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri Heyue de Guanxi, 174.
850 Gu Weijun, Guweijun Huiyilu, Vol. 9, 252-253.
851 “Chao Zhuri Hetuanzhang Sishinian Shieryue Shiwuri zhi Yebuzhang Han (抄駐日何團長四十年
十二月十五日致葉部長函),” in Liu Weikai ed., “Zhongri Heyue Qianding qian He Shili yu Wang
Shijie Ye Gongchao Wanglai Handian Zhuanji (中日和約簽訂前何世禮與王世杰、葉公超往來函電
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Chiang Kai-shek’s government as the legitimate Chinese government.852 The effects
of this were immediately recognized by Ho, as he wrote to Ye Gongchao reporting
that after December 13, “the tone of the Japanese newspapers has sharply
changed.”853 Ho clearly recognized the changes affected by Dulles and adjusted his
tone when delivering speeches. At a banquet on December 17, Ho not only stressed
the importance of the cooperation between China and Japan, but also added that “the
United States has an important responsibility to nurture the intimate Sino-Japanese
relationship.”854 “The future of Sino-Japanese cooperation has much to do with the
United States,” said Ho at another banquet, “and it would be very helpful if our
American friends could give assistance to both countries.”855
Dulles’s pressure on Yoshida was effective, as William Sebald wrote in his
memoir, “little was accomplished on the matter of a China peace treaty” until Dulles’
visit to Tokyo.856 On January 16, 1952, the US government published the Yoshida
Letter, which was written to Dulles on December 24, 1951, signifying that the
Japanese government would negotiate the peace treaty with Taipei rather than Beijing.
On the same day, Shimatsu Hisanaga (島津久大 ), secretary general of the Foreign
Office of Japan who later served as Japanese ambassador to the ROC between 1966
and 1969, handed the copy of the letter to the Chinese mission. To Ho Shailai, this
letter also marked the happy ending of his mission in Tokyo, as he wrote in his diary,
“I have been staying here for nearly two years; at least I know have something to
show for it.” That night, Ho held a celebration banquet with Okamura Yasuji, Ogata
Taketora, Fujiyama Aiichiro (藤山愛一郎), and Koizumi Shinzo (小泉信三), during
852 Hans van de Ven, “The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan,” in Hans van de Ven, Diana
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which they exchanged their opinions on the Yoshida Letter. Ho noted Fujiyama’s
opinion, which apparently echoed his, in his diary. “Since signing the peace treaty
with Taipei is inevitable, it would have been better if Yoshida had published this letter
before Dulles’s arrival, because this would have demonstrated that Japan was taking
an active initiative in signing the treaty.” “Publishing the letter now,” Fujiyama went
on, “makes people feel that the Japanese government does so simply under the
Americans’ pressure.”857
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN TOKYO
While the conclusion of the treaty would be a fait accompli, the arrangement of
the Japanese delegation group to Taipei remained a convoluted task for Ho Shailai.
On January 26, the Japanese government secretly informed Ho that Kawada Isao (河
田烈) would be the head of the Japanese delegation to Taipei and asked him to have
Taipei keep this information top secret.858 Ho then cabled this information to Taipei
on the same day.859 However, when reading a Japanese newspaper the next morning,
Ho found that the speeches delivered by Yoshida in parliament had deviated from the
principles of the Yoshida Letter. For instance, Yoshida said the treaty was a friendly
treaty rather than a peace treaty, and the Nationalist government could not represent
China. Ho immediately conferred with his colleagues in an effort to understand
Yoshida’s motives. As Ho wrote in his diary, “the cunning of the Japanese is
predictable, but it is difficult to understand why Yoshida dares to take this tone before
the US parliament ratifies the peace treaty.”860 In the meantime, Ye Gongchao asked
Ho to make enquiries to the Japanese about the essence and the title of the Japanese
delegation to Taipei.861
The next morning, Wajima Eiji (倭島英二) replied to Ho that the mission of the
857 DHSL, January 16, 1952.
858 DHSL, January 26, 1952.
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delegation was to dispatch Kawada Isao as plenipotentiary in charge of concluding the
peace treaty, and to terminate the wartime status quo based on the principles of the
treaty of San Francisco. Foreign Office staffs were to accompany them to provide
assistance.862 Ho informed him that the Taipei government would welcome the
delegation, provided they fulfilled three prerequisites: the purpose of the delegation
must be conclusion of the peace treaty, Kawada Isao must be the plenipotentiary, and
the treaty must be immediately implemented, as long as the Japanese parliament
ratified it.863 On January 30, Wajima brought Ho a letter with the signature of
Okazaki Katsuo. After reading the letter, Ho asked why the Japanese omitted the word
“peace”, instead using the word “bilateral treaty”. Ho then proposed a number of
conditions: that the Japanese use the term “bilateral peace treaty”, that Isao Kawada
use the title of plenipotentiary, that the Japanese promise that the treaty could be
implemented, provided the Japanese parliament ratified it, and that the treaty have
Yoshida’s signature. The negotiation reached a stalemate, and both sides had to inform
their respective superiors.864 It should be noted that when Wajima received Ho’s
proposals, he grumbled to Ho that the Taipei authority was not “as stubborn as the
Chinese mission”. This detail reflects the fact that when Ho Shailai was arguing with
the Japanese in Tokyo, some compromises had already been made between the
Nationalist government and the Japanese Overseas Office in Taipei. Ho immediately
cabled Taipei to protest. “We do not know anything about the negotiations between
Taiwan and Japan, and if there is any mistake in the future, our mission will not be
responsible.”865
On January 31, Wajima brought a letter with Yoshida’s signature to Ho, replying
that the Japanese had agreed to his proposals, except for the provision that the word
“peace” be added into the treaty, as the Taipei authority had already agreed not to use
the term “bilateral peace treaty.” Ho was convinced, but that night he received a call
862 DHSL, January 28, 1952; “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” January 28, 1952, Guoshiguan,
002-090105-00012-288.
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from Ye Gongchao, who informed him that Taipei authority had not consented to
letting the Japanese omit the word “peace”, and ordered him to express this to the
Japanese. “Based on Ye’s tone,” Ho speculated in his diary, “there must be someone
who told the Japanese that it would be fine if they do not use the word ‘peace’, but
this person definitely does not belong to the Foreign Office.”866 In the meantime, Ho
conferred the difficulties he had been facing with William Sebald, who applauded
Ho’s efforts and suggested use of the term “treaty of peace” in place of “peace Treaty”.
Sebald also revealed to Ho that “we hope the peace treaty can be concluded as soon as
possible, since our country has given enormous assistance already.”867
Ho not only stuck to principles in his negotiations with the Japanese, he also
sought assistance from SCAP. However, being sandwiched between the Chinese and
Japanese governments, Ho inexorably became a scapegoat. Ho was already angry at
the compromise made by the Taipei authorities and the Japanese, of which he had not
been informed. However, what intrigued Ho was that his private complaint about
Wajima’s shrewdness to the Foreign Office in Taipei was transmitted to the Japanese
Overseas Office in Taipei by Hu Qingyu (胡慶育 ), vice Minister of the Foreign
Office.868 Ho expressed his anger in his diary on February 2,
The Foreign Office has indebted me to Wajima, and I can share no secrets with
the Foreign Office anymore. To make matters worse, I cannot get a good
foothold in Tokyo, because the Foreign Office acts like the good person, while I
become the pariah. As far as I am concerned, I plan to leave this job, and I do not
care if my country could benefit from my efforts. China’s future might be
hopeless if the Foreign Office does not change its behavior.869
This passage reflects Ho’s dissatisfaction with the Foreign Office, accumulated
over the course of two years, and it is also the sharpest criticism of the Foreign Office
found in Ho’s diary during his service in Tokyo. However, Ho did not make his
866 DHSL, January 31, 1952; ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 774.
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complaint public. On February 4, Ho replied to Yoshida that the Chinese government
would recognize the bilateral treaty mentioned by the Japanese government as the
peace treaty between the two countries. Based on this understanding, the Chinese
government agreed to the appointment of Isao Kawada as penitentiary.870 After
replying to Yoshida by letter, Ho believed that his mission in Tokyo had come to an
end. “My accomplishments with regards to my dealings with GHQ and the affairs of
overseas Chinese might be ignored,” wrote Ho in his diary on that day, “but I know
that I truly made great contributions in this affair.”871 Over the next few days, Ho felt
relieved, and attended several events in Tokyo. The negotiations between Taipei and
Tokyo seemed all settled. However, Ye Gongchao then changed his mind. While Ho’s
letter to Yoshida had expressed agreement that both the Chinese and Japanese
governments could have their own interpretation of the term “bilateral treaty”, Ye
insisted that the name of the treaty be confirmed before the departure of the delegation.
On February 11, Ye wrote a memorandum to Kimura Shiroshichi (木村四郎七). Ho
believed the memorandum was not tactful enough and had caused embarrassment to
the Japanese.872 On February 12, Ho held a banquet at his residence to celebrate the
departure of Waseda’s delegation. The attendants were Okazaki Katsuo, Ishihara
Kanichiro (石原幹市郎), Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤謙吉), Wajima Eiji, and Hayashi
Joji, who Ho frequently met in Tokyo. Due to Ye’s inopportune memorandum to
Kimura, Ho noticed that Okazaki was not happy during the banquet, and wrote in his
diary that “our mission is lucky because the Foreign Office did not order us to write
such a memorandum.”873
On February 13, Ho delivered a copy of the memorandum to Sebald, who replied
that both the Japanese and Chinese governments should be silent and discuss all
details in Taipei. Sebald also told Ho that they “could feel relief after Waseda arrives
870 Zhonghuaminguo Waijiaotenti Yanjiuhui, Jinshan Heyue yu Zhongri Heyue de Guanxi, 191-192;
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in Taipei.”874 Many problems would be alleviated if the battlefield could be moved to
Taipei from Tokyo, as Sebald wrote in his memoir:
This did not settle the differences between Tokyo and Taipei, however, and I was
increasingly in the middle of these complicated problems until the end of
February, 1952, when the negotiations were transferred to Taipei. Washington
asked for my advice at this time and I replied that the two nations could
themselves resolve the question. The Chinese, I said, were old hands at
diplomacy and would take care of their own interests. The Japanese, I added,
would carry out their commitments under the Yoshida-Dulles letter of December
24, 1951.875
However, Ye still insisted that the Nationalist government would not receive the
delegation unless the Japanese compromised on the word choice of the treaty. Once
again, the Nationalist government hoped Sebald would put pressure on the Japanese.
Sebald believed that the Japanese would eventually accept adding the term “peace”,
and had yet to do so simply to prevent it from attacks in the parliament. Karl L.
Rankin transmitted Sebald’s opinion to Ye, who was eventually convinced.876 On
February 15, the Executive Yuan appointed Ye Gongchao as penitentiary to the
negotiation with Waseda. “I feel very comfortable because the negotiations have been
entirely transferred to Taipei,” wrote Ho in his diary.877 Later, Ho offered his
resignation again, but was immediately rejected by Ye, who asked him to stay until
the peace treaty was concluded.878
Ho’s prediction that the negotiations could be wrapped up in Taipei, and that the
move to Taipei would serve to solve many of the issues that had been plaguing the
negotiations, very quickly proved to be wrong. As the Waseda delegation arrived in
Taipei, both the Chinese and Japanese representatives once again bickered over issues
related to the treaty. On February 29, Ho discussed this issue with Sebald. Sebald told
Ho that he believed the Japanese would definitely come to terms with the treaty, but
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that they must continue to wheel and deal for now. “This is the third time that he has
told me the same thing”, Ho summarized in his diary. “If our government remains
stubborn, the consequences are difficult to imagine.”879 On March 1, Ho paid his first
visit to Okazaki and found his attitude toward the negotiations optimistic.880 Ho’s
thoughts were deeply influenced by Sebald. They believed that the conclusion of the
treaty was only a matter of time, and that the Nationalist government should not be
too sensitive to the wording of the treaty.
Ho returned to Taipei on March 4, just at the moment when the negotiations
reached a stalemate. A newspaper commented that “newspapers in Japan are paying a
great deal of attention to Ho’s sudden departure to Taipei, and believe he has been
entrusted with a special mission in the negotiations in Taipei.”881 On the same
evening, Ho held a private meeting with Waseda. Waseda told Ho that he was well
received by the Chinese, and the negotiations were proceeding “slowly but surely.”
Although neither side could find a consensus at that time, their attitudes were
benign.882 Ho also told Zhang Qun and Wang Shijie that the Nationalist government
should agree with Waseda’s request to meet Wang Shijie and Chen Cheng, so as to
avoid embarrassing him. Furthermore, Ho promised to serve as head of the Chinese
mission until the conclusion of the treaty.883
Ho’s strenuous efforts to have Sebald pressure Yoshida were effective. As Sebald
wrote in his memoir,
Early in March, 1952, I made one final call on Yoshida in relation to this problem.
I thought he should know that in some Washington circles there was growing
belief that the Japanese were not negotiating in good faith with the Chinese and
would break off the discussions when the United States Senate had ratified the
peace treaty. After hearing this, Yoshida replied with a chuckle: “We are not that
clever!” However, he promised to instruct his negotiator, Isao Kawada, to be
more reasonable in the Taipei discussions.884
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Besides ordering Waseda to be more rational, Yoshida also sent Wajima Eiji to
Taipei “with more liberal instructions.”885 In early March Rankin confirmed that the
Japanese had “accepted title “Peace Treaty” and have agreed to recognise in principle
that Nationalist Sovereignty includes continental China although in practice
provisions will at present only apply to territories actually controlled by
Nationalists.”886 It was under this circumstance that Wajima Eiji, Chief of Asian
Affairs Bureau of Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, visited Taipei on March 8
“allegedly with fresh instructions from his Government.”887 Wajima paid a visit to Ho
on March 10, informing him that the Japanese had already agreed on the name of the
treaty and hoped Minister Ye could have a formal meeting with Waseda on the next
day.888 On March 11, Ho invited Waseda, Wajima, Kimura, and Ye to a banquet in his
residence. “During the banquet, Minister Ye asked Waseda whether they hoped
General Ho would stay in Japan for the long term,” wrote Ho in his diary. “Waseda
replied that the Foreign Office certainly wished General Ho to stay.”889 Cleary, Ho’s
resilience and thoughtfulness had won support among the Japanese politicians.
LAST EFFORTS IN TOKYO
The negotiations remained at an impasse and experienced no significant
breakthrough since Waseda’s arrival on February 18. Although Yoshida had promised
Sebald in early March that the Japanese would eventually conclude the peace treaty
with Taipei, Waseda was still haggling over minor details with Ye. The frustrated Ye
pinned his last hopes on Ho, asking the Americans to pressure the Japanese
government to accept the draft written by the Chinese government.890 At this moment,
the Nationalists had come to realize that the only way to have the Japanese
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compromise was to have SCAP pressure the Japanese, and any effort used in Taipei
was futile. On March 20, the US Senate ratified the Treaty of San Francisco and the
Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, which concerned the
Nationalists because it might give the Japanese an excuse not to conclude the peace
treaty in Taipei.891 As a consequence, Ho consulted with Niles W. Bond of SCAP,
who believed that the Japanese would not reverse the decision after the Treaty of San
Francisco came into effect. Furthermore, Bond told Ho that the relationship between
Rankin and SCAP would be very helpful to Taiwan.892
Unlike people in Taipei, who were speculating on whether the Japanese delegates
were sincere or not, a pragmatically minded Ho saw no reason to worry and believed
that the conclusion of the peace treaty was only a matter of time. Ho’s opinion was
confirmed by a British report, in which Dening wrote that Wajima “told a member of
my staff on 1st April that Japan was definitely prepared to have a treaty but would not
give way to any unjustified Chinese demands.”893 In his diary on April 9, Ho
complained,
Whether the Japanese are sincere or not does not have anything to do with the
conclusion of the peace treaty, unless our country takes a wrong step. I do
believe if our country’s diplomatic policy is adequate, the US Senate should have
approved the Treaty of San Francisco after the conclusion of the peace treaty
between China and Japan. I do believe that our country’s mission in Washington
D.C. is not good enough.894
Ho’s complaint reflected the embarrassing fact the Chinese mission in Japan and
the Chinese Embassy in Washington had been operating largely independently of each
other, without central direction or coordination. In his diaries, Ho never mentioned his
contact with Wellington Ku during his two years of service in Tokyo. On the other
hand, Wellington Ku did not mention Ho Shailai’s efforts in the negotiation of the
peace treaty his in his memoir, either. Wellington Ku believed it was his strenuous
efforts to establish a relationship with Dulles in Washington since the outbreak of the
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Korean War that led to the conclusion of the peace treaty, while Ho Shailai was of the
opinion that the conclusion of the treaty was in great part due to his arduous
cooperation with Sebald in Tokyo. Both of them seemed to ignore the fact that the
victory could not have been achieved without the work of either men, and most
importantly without the efforts of the United States government.
The last issue Ho encountered in the debate over the treaty was the significant
“and” or “or” question. The debate was over which word should be used in the
sentence “all the areas and all the territories under Chinese sovereignty which are now
or may hereafter be under the control of the government of the Republic of China.”895
The Japanese, based on the principle of the Yoshida Letter, favored the word “or”,
while the Chinese insisted on the word “and”.896 The Chinese Nationalist refused to
use the term “or” so as to avoid admitting the fact that the ROC territory was limited
to Taiwan, Pascadores and several offshore islands such as Quemoy. By using the
term “and,” not only could the ROC claimed its legitimacy of representing China but
paved the way for its future military campaigns to retake the mainland. It was against
this background that when being asked by Wajimia Eiji in Tokyo on April 18 about
this debate, Ho Shailai simply replied that “the word choice does not concern your
government, but it is extremely important to my government.” When Wajima retorted
by implying that the Yoshida Letter had already been publicized and could not be
amended, Ho refuted, “your government has already benefited a lot on issues outside
of the Yoshida Letter, so why can you not make some concessions inside the
Letter?”897 Ho’s stubborn reply demonstrated that despite he disagreed with the
Nationalist’s strategies during the negotiations, he always defended the principles of
the Nationalist government at all costs.
Ho returned to Taipei on the morning of April 20 and immediately went to Ye
Gongchao’s residence to have breakfast. Ho noticed that Ye was pessimistic about the
outcome of the negotiations and asked Ho to try his best to control the situation in
895 Hans van de Ven, “The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan,” in Hans van de Ven, Diana
Lary, and Stephen R. MacKinnon eds., Negotiating China’s Destiny in World War II, 234
896 Tang Yan, Ye Gongchao de Liangge Shijie, 316-317.
897 DHSL, April 18, 1952.
241
Tokyo.898 But Ye’s worries did not become reality, since US pressure on the Japanese
government had already come into effect. On April 26, Ogata Taketora told Ho that
Yoshida had informed him two days’ prior that all questions had already been
settled.899 On the next day, Ho received the news that “a significant piece of
information will be announced tomorrow.”900 Chiang Kai-shek also wrote in his diary
on that day: “we are able to sign a Treaty of Peace with Japan as one of the victors.
Doubtless this is a major blow to the bogus Communist organization, although of
course this cannot erase my responsibility for the defeat of the revolution.”901 As
news of the conclusion of the peace treaty reached his ears, Ho concluded, “While the
peace treaty was concluded, I believe the two countries’ relationship has become
unpleasant due to the speeches given by Yoshida and Okazaki.” Ho added, “What I
wish to do is to facilitate the friendship between the two countries.”902
CONCLUSION
As Esler Dening, head of the British Mission in Japan, recounted in his book
published in 1961,
Although Japan was therefore at liberty to choose between the two Governments
claiming to be the Government of China, in the event, as a result of strong
pressure by the United States before the Peace Treaty came into force, the
Japanese Prime Minister gave an undertaking to enter into negotiations for the
conclusion of a peace treaty with the Nationalist Government of Chiang
Kai-shek in Formosa.903
Bystanders such as Esler Dening witnessed the situation took place in Tokyo
insightfully, so did General Ho Shailai. This chapter examines Ho’s role in the course
of the negotiations of the peace treaty between Nationalist China and Japan, with
intense focus on the first few months of 1952. Despite the miscellaneous resources on
the negotiations in Chinese and Japanese led to fruitful studies on this subject, by
898 DHSL, April 20, 1952.
899 DHSL, April 26, 1952.
900 DHSL, April 27, 1952.
901 Hans van de Ven, China at War, 268.
902 DHSL, April 28, 1952.
903 Esler Dening, Japan, 207-208.
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utilizing the diaries of General Ho Shailai, this chapter seeks a different angle to
explore the stories behind the curtail. Through the lens of Ho Shailai, one could sense
the different understandings toward the negotiations. While the KMT’s upper
echelons were worried about the attitude of the Japanese government toward the
peace treaty, Ho was insightful in observing that it was in the US interests to have
Japan sign the bilateral treaty with Nationalist China. As long as the US continued to
hold its ground, Japan would have no choice but yield.
To a great extent, Ho’s sober judgement came from his earlier contacts with the
Japanese politicians. As he assumed the head of the Chinese Mission in Japan in June
1950, Ho frequently feted several significant Japanese politicians, so as to exchange
opinions. These individuals can be categorized into three groups: Japanese
administrative politicians (Yoshida Shigeru, Ashida Hitoshi, Hayashi Joji, Hatoyama
Ichiro, Fujiyama Aiichiro, Ogata Taketora, and Ota Ichiro), Japanese who involved in
Manchukuo and the Sino-Japanese War (Okamura Yasuji, Yamazaki Motoki, and
Takasaki Tatsunosuke), as well as former Japanese ambassadors to China (Yoshizawa
Kenkichi and Yada Shichitaro). These contacts helped shaped Ho’s views in
understanding situation in Japan and paved the way for future contacts. Additionally,
in the course of the Waseda delegation to Taipei, Ho kept close contact with Okazaki
Katsuo and Wajima Eiji. While these connections had little to do with the final
outcome of the peace treaty, Ho was clever enough to see through Japanese tactics
and assured the Chinese that the treaty would eventually be concluded. Ho’s abilities
in dealing with the Japanese and SCAP officials in also earned applauses in Tokyo.
During the negotiations in March 1952 in Taipei, Hu Qingyu said to Kimura that if the
San Francisco Treaty came into effect before the Sino-Japanese treaty, the function of
the Chinese Mission Japan and the Japanese agency in Taipei should remain their
status quo for a transitional period. Kimura replied that Ho Shailai had managed to
establish good rapport with his government in Tokyo and it would face no difficulties
for him to handle the status quo.904
Second, behind the curtain of the negotiations of the peace treaty stood a thorny
904 ZHMGZYSLCB, Series 7, Vol. 4, 922.
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dilemma to Chiang Kai-shek. The interior struggle in the Chinese Mission represented
a debate over whether the head of the Mission should be America-oriented or
Japan-oriented. More specifically, the appointment of the Chinese mission reflects
Chiang’s dilemma regarding whether allying with Japan, or with the United States and
SCAP should be its priority. Without Ho Shailai’s diaries, people might never know
that Chiang Kai-shek had been contemplating the issue of who should head the
Chinese Mission for several months. While Chiang mentioned his anxiety about the
dearth of people capable of handling diplomacy with Japan in his diaries, not much
details were given. Coincidentally, the diaries of Chen Cheng and Wang Shijie, both
of whom were significant decision-makers in that period, lacked contexts in the year
1951.905 Furthermore, another key policy-maker Dong Xianguang did not mention
this detail in his memoir either. Ho’s diaries not only offer an enormous amount of
details about this process, but also reveal his grumblings over the fact that “the
Foreign Office was always the good person, and the Chinese mission in Japan the
moron.”
Third, the cooperation between the Chinese Mission and SCAP proves to be
significant in affecting the conclusion of the peace treaty. Ho had been cultivating
personal relations with SCAP officials, notably William Sebald, in Tokyo. Ho put
massive efforts into developing relations with them and securing their support, not
least to pressure the Japanese government to sign the treaty in Taipei, for the benefit
of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Ho’s opinions on the peace treaty were deeply
influenced and shaped by SCAP as well. Ho held the belief that the Chinese
government should not bargain with the Japanese on the wordings in the treaty, for the
conclusion of the treaty was already a fait accompli. Besides, according to Ho’s
diaries, Chiang once told him that if the peace treaty could not be concluded, the
Chinese Mission in Japan should oppose the dismissal of the Allied Council for Japan
in Tokyo. This detail has likewise not been found in previous records.
905 Chen Cheng, Chen Cheng Xiansheng Riji (陳誠先生日記) [The Diaries of Mr. Chen Cheng]
(Taipei: Academia Historica, 2015); Wang Shijie, Wang Shijie Xiansheng Riji (王世杰先生日記) [The
Diaries of Mr. Wang Shijie] (Taipei: Insititute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990).
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CONCLUSION
On April 28, 1952, the same day the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force,
negotiations for the separate Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty were concluded in Taipei.
With the treaty in place, a relieved Ho Shailai looked to depart Japan at the earliest
opportunity. The agreements finally nullified the state of war previously existing
between the allied countries and Japan, and they were the signal for the restoration of
official Embassies over the foreign Missions which had operated in Japan since soon
after combat ceased in 1945. As Esler Dening wrote, “It was only after April 28th,
1952, that foreign Ambassadors and Ministers were received by the Emperor to
present their credentials, whereupon the missions of countries represented in Japan
resumed the status of Embassies and Legations.”906 On May 1, thirteen foreign
envoys were received by Japan’s Foreign Minister. Some of the newly-appointed
ambassadors were previously the head of their respective Missions. Amongst their
number were the French Ambassador, Maurice Dejean, the British Ambassador, Sir
Esler Denning, the Spanish Ambassador, Francisco J. del Castillo, the Italian
Ambassador, Marquis Blasco Lanza d’Ajeta, and the Canadian Charge d’Affaires, A.
R. Menzies.907
By the same token, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty also signified the resumption
of the formal relationship between the ROC and Japan, but this process could only be
undertaken after the ratification of the Treaty by the Japanese Diet. During this period,
both governments had consented to the fact that the temporary status of the Chinese
Mission in Japan, as well as its Japanese counterpart in Taipei, should be maintained.
As the Nippon Times noted, “Meanwhile, the Government also recognized tentatively
the status of the Chinese Mission in Japan in response to the same measure taken by
the Nationalist Chinese on the status of the Japanese Government overseas agency in
Taipei.”908 According to Ho Shailai’s account, following the conclusion of treaty
negotiations, the Japanese government wished to “upgrade” the Chinese Mission to a
906 Esler Dening, Japan, 195.
907 “Okazaki is Named Foreign Minister; Meets Diplomats,” May 1, 1952, Nippon Times.
908 “Korean, Chinese Missions Granted Temporary Status,” May 1, 1952, Nippon Times.
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Chinese Embassy and the Japanese body in Taipei to a Japanese Embassy, but the
suggestion was rejected by the Chinese government on the grounds that this step
could only be taken after the ratification of the Treaty. During the interim, people
were left to speculate on whom would become the first postwar Chinese ambassador
to Japan.
Although the ROC’s international eminence had dwindled sharply in the course
of only a few years, the post of ROC Ambassador to Japan was still appealing to
many Chinese officials. Among them, Dong Xianguang and Zhang Qun, both of
whom possessed close relations to Chiang, were considered the most likely candidates.
As chapter eight has demonstrated, in 1951 both figures visited Japan for a special
purpose and were both active participant in Sino-Japanese affairs. In May of 1952,
Foreign Minister Ye Gongchao told Ho that Chiang would select either Zhang or
Dong for the ambassador role, but “it would not be a strange thing if Chiang selects a
third option.”909 The potential third candidate, according to Ye’s assumption, was
Shao Yulin, the former ROC ambassador to South Korea who served in the post
between 1949 and 1951. Before his appointment to South Korea, Shao had been vice
head of the Chinese Mission in Japan. Wang Dongyuan (王東原), who had succeeded
Shao as the ROC ambassador to South Korea in 1951, recommended that Shao be
selected to serve as the Chinese ambassador to Japan because he was familiar with the
country and had years of experience working as a diplomat in South Korea, which
was a background that made him suitable for conducting a three-way alliance between
the ROC, Japan and South Korea in their anti-communism campaigns.910
Up until July of 1952, Chiang Kai-shek had still not made up his mind on who to
dispatch to Japan. Rumors about Dong’s or Zhang’s impending appointment
continued to swirl around Taipei and Tokyo.911 According to Cai Menjian’s account,
Chen Cheng was in a strong position to have Dong replace Zhang to become the
909 DHSL, May 17, 1952.
910 “Wang Dongyuan to Chiang Kai-shek,” June 23, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00015-254.
911 “Liyuan Linshi Huiyi Bianlun Zhongri Heyue (立院臨時會議辯論中日和約) [Interim Meeting of
the Legislative Yuan to Debate the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty],” July 16, 1952, The Kung Sheung
Daily News.
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ambassador in order to strengthen his political faction.912 Eventually, Chiang came to
a decision, selecting Dong as the first post-war Chinese Ambassador and dispatching
Zhang Qun as his special envoy to Japan for a short visit.913 The Japanese
government was satisfied with Dong’s appointment. On August 9, Okazaki replied to
Liu Zenghua that:
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of August 8, 1952,
asking the Japanese Government about its opinion with regard to the appointment
of Mr. Tung Hsien Kwang (Hollington K. Tong) by the Government of the
Republic of China as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Japan. I
am happy to inform you that the proposed appointment will be agreeable to the
Japanese Government.914
In his capacity as special envoy, Zhang Qun published an article called
“Relationships between China, Japan and the United States (Zhongri Guanxi Yu
Meiguo 中日關係與美國 )”. And before heading to Japan, Zhang established the
Sino-Japanese Cultural and Economic Association (Zhongri Wenhuajingji Xiehui 中
日文化經濟協會). Zhang also spoke to the news media:
“now that my country and your country have restored normal diplomatic relations,
the cumulative, unfortunate events in history have come to be matters of the past.
Whatever remaining psychological effects in the hearts of the two peoples as a
result of these unfortunate incidents should also be all forgotten. Heretofore the
relationships of friendly cooperation between the nations must enter an entirely
new stage.915
During his four-month stay in Japan, Zhang not only contributed to reestablishing
the Chinese Embassy in Japan, but dealt too with ongoing issues of cooperation
912 Cai Mengjian, “You Zhongri Heyue Tandao Dong Xianguang Shiri Jingwei: Qinshan Dashi Koubei
jiqi Youqu Zhanggu (由中日和約談到董顯光使日經緯：「親善大使」口碑及其有趣掌故) [From the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty to Dong Xianguang’s Appointment to Japan: The Reputation of “Goodwill
Ambassador” and His Interesting Stories],” Zhuanji Wenxue, 42:2, 69-75; Cai Mengjian, “Chen Cheng
Fandui Zhang Qun Shiri Qiaojian Dong Xianguang zhi Neimu (陳誠反對張群使日巧薦董顯光之內
幕)[Inside Story of Chen Cheng’s objection to Zhang’s Appointment as Ambassador to Japan and
Recommend Dong Xianguang Instead],” Zhuanji Wenxue, 66:2, 31-36.
913 DHSL, July 16, 1952.
914 “Okazaki Katsuo to Liu Zenghua,” August 9, 1952, IMHArchives, 11-38-03-00-055.
915 “Taipei Goodwill Mission Head Calls for Sino-Japan Amity,” August 3, 1952, Nippon Times.
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between the ROC and Japan, as well as advising Japan on setting up the Committee of
Economic Development between Japan and China (Rihua Jingji Cujin Weihuihui 日
華經濟促進委員會).916 Zhang also visited Nobusuke Kishi (岸信介)，who had just
been released from prison and was apparently at a low ebb. Surprised and touched,
Nobusuke thereafter regarded Zhang as his lifelong friend.917 Zhang also met with
Okamura Yasuji and his family in August.918 Besides, Zhang also met Lin Xiantang
and brought him greetings from Chiang Kai-shek. According to Lin’s diaries, Zhang
inquired information on the Taiwanese independent movements.919 This episode
indicated that although the Sino-Japanese relation had been restored, Chiang was still
skeptical of simmering Taiwanese Independent Movement in that country.
During this transitional period, when the Chinese Mission was being converted
into a new Chinese Embassy, many arrangements remained to be settled. Many staff
members, for example, were eager to know whether they could continue in Japan and,
if so, what salaries they would receive. Staff of the Chinese Mission also had to pay
their own rent, so Ho requested that the Ministry of Foreign affairs increase their
salary. The Foreign Ministry agreed that, from May of 1952, the staff of the Chinese
Mission would receive an increased salary commensurate with that of an embassy
employee. Ho, however, believed that this would not resolve the issue satisfactorily,
and he urged Taipei to send representatives to supervise the transformation of the
Mission in to an Embassy or else “people’s mentality would be difficult to
maintain.”920 In the meantime, items of the Chinese Mission were being transferred to
the Embassy, as those of the Chinese Mission’s branches were relocated to the
Consulate. For instance, the list of items to be transferred from the Chinese Mission’s
branch in Nagoya and Osaka to the Consulate in Osaka included a list of archives, one
stamp, six stamps for visa approval, furniture and property, two secret archives, and
916 Shen Jinding ed., Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji, 22.
917 Shen Jinding ed., Bainianlai Zhongri Guanxi Lunwenji, 238.
918 Barak Kushner,Men to Devils, Devils to Men, 219.
919 Lin Xiantang, Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, Vol. 24, 313.
920 DHSL, May 6, 1952.
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some vehicles. The vehicles included one Dodge and one Jeep.921 With the effect of
the Sino-Japanese Treaty on August 5, Liu Zenghua served as the temporary Chinese
Ambassador await the arrival of Dong Xianguang.922 Three days later, Lin Xiantang
paid a visit to the Chinese Embassy and found out that Chen Qingwen, a counsel to
the Chinese Mission, lost his job due to the restoration of the Chinese Embassy and
was ready to depart for Taiwan.923
In Taipei, Chinese officialdom paid close attention to the restoration of the
Japanese Embassy. As the British Consul in Taipei wrote in his report, “The Chinese
have made available to him, one of the most handsome houses in the city, and the
Japanese Embassy is thus the most impressive in appearance of all the foreign
missions in Taipei. This is another example of the Nationalist’s eagerness for Japanese
friendship.”924 On September 24, Dong arrived at Tokyo and told newsmen that
cooperation between the two countries would govern “the future stability and peace in
East Asia.”925 The Chinese Embassy, like its Japanese counterpart in Taipei, stood as
a new, firm, and tangible manifestation of the relationship between the ROC and
Japan until 1972, when it was replaced by the PRC’s Embassy.
HO SHAILAI’S DEPARTURE
In Tokyo, Ho spent his final days in office observing international developments.
He expressed no willingness to compete for the Chinese Ambassadorship to Japan
because, having been involved in the Sino-Japanese Treaty negotiations over the
previous months, he felt the burden on the new ambassador would be colossal. When
asked by other diplomats about whether he was going to become the Chinese
Ambassador, as many countries had appointed the head of their Missions to the post,
921 “Yijiao Qingce (移交清冊) [Transfer List],” September 4, 1952, IMHArchives,
11-01-02-08-02-012.
922 Lin Xiantang, Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, Vol. 24, 305.
923 Lin Xiantang, Guanyuan Xiansheng Riji, Vol. 24, 309.
924 “E.H. Jacobs-Larkcom to C.H. Johnston,” October 15, 1952, UK National Archives, FO 371/99264.
925 “Nationalist Diplomat Arrives for Japan Post,” September 25, 1952, The Los Angeles Times.
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Ho replied that he was only a “caretaker.”926 Even though the Japanese Diet ratified
the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty on June 7, a matter that Ho cabled Wang Shijie about
on the same day, the appointment of the ambassador continued to drag on for two
more months.927 In his diaries, Ho frequently expressed dissatisfaction about the
delay.
Despite not participating in the competition to become postwar ambassador, Ho
nevertheless worked earnestly to conclude his duties in Japan. On Labour Day, May
1st, 1952, a few days after the Peace Treaty came into force and Japan regained her
independence from the occupation administration, the Japanese Communist Party
took part in demonstrations which turned violent in the plaza in front of the Imperial
Palace, burning a number of cars apparently belonging to Americans. This proved to
be a grievous tactical error, for the essentially conservative Japanese were both
shocked and alarmed at this behavior and public opinion turned against the
communists.928 Upon hearing the news of the unfolding violence, Ho brought his
staff to visit the scene and they witnessed police beating up the rioters. “We met
Denmark’s charge d'affaires,” recounted Ho in his diaries, “who was so shocked that
he could not speak.” Ho also concluded that this incident, occurring just “four days
after the San Francisco Peace Treaty” was signed, would give the Americans a sense
of the xenophobia mentality of the Japanese since they were not “fully
democratized.”929
Writing in the 1970s, Marius Jansen stated that, “After 1952 Japan’s diplomatic
and economic ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan emphasized its separation
from the People’s Republic in Peking.”930 Even so, the Japanese government had no
intention of abandoning the opportunity presented by doing business with mainland
China. On June 1, 1952, a Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was signed in Beijing, in
which both sides agreed to export cargo worth some 30 million British pounds by the
926 DHSL, May 1, 1952.
927 “Ho Shailai to Wang Shijie,” June 7, 1952, Guoshiguan, 002-090105-00012-294.
928 Esler Dening, Japan, 114.
929 DHSL, May 1, 1952.
930 Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894-1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally
College Pub. Co., 1975), 448.
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end of 1952.931 This agreement was regarded as the first breakthrough in PRC-Japan
relations after the Sino-Japanese Treaty had been concluded and is frequently
mentioned in scholarship on PRC-Japan relations.932 On the following day, Ho
convened a meeting to evaluate its reception among the Japanese public. A staff of the
Chinese Mission was of the opinion that “a portion of small-scale merchants might
dream of this agreement, while large entrepreneurs regard it as unfeasible, and the
Japanese government, especially, believe there is no hope for this plan.”933 As the
Chinese Mission had anticipated, this trade agreement was a failure, but it did,
nevertheless, sow the seeds for opening semi-official economic cooperation between
Japan and the PRC in the period which followed.
In the meantime, Ho was frequently invited to attend banquets organized by
newly-appointed ambassadors to Japan from other countries, as well as farewell party
organized by those who, like Ho, were going to leave. For instance, on May 2, Ho
attended the banquet held by US Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.934 On May 5, Ho
met General Ridgeway, who was about to depart for Europe to succeed General
Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to discuss Taiwan’s problems.
According to Ho’s diaries, it was the first time that the General exchanged views on
Taiwan with him.935 Five days later, Chiang Kai-shek recorded in his diaries that
General Ridgway asked Ho “are there any alternative leaders who could lead China
and are there any outstanding generals adept at coordinating field operations?”
Believing that Ridgway had inherited Marshall’s prejudice on him, Chiang reminded
himself that he should be aware of the “Marshall’s clique” within the US Army that
was seeking an opportunity to overthrow him.936 A while later, on June 9, Ho
attended the farewell party organized by Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander for US
931 Lin Daizhao, Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxishi, 55; Lin Yunhui (林蘊暉), Zhongguo Ershishiji Quanshi
(中國二十世紀全史) [The Complete History of 20th Century China] (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian
Chubanshe, 2001), Vol. 7, 555; Mayumi Itoh, The Making of China’s Peace with Japan, 16-17.
932 Qing Simei, From Allies to Enemies, 276.
933 DHSL, June 7, 1952.
934 DHSL, May 2, 1952.
935 DHSL, May 5, 1952.
936 L  Fangshang ed., Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian (蔣中正先生年譜長編) [A
Chronicle of Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2015), Vol. 10, 55.
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Naval Forces Far East. A report in the Nippon Times covered the event:
A large group of friends mostly from army, navy and diplomatic circles were at
the pier to see them off. Among these were Air Marshal Bounchier, Vice-Adm.
Robert P. Briscoe, Lt. Gen Weyland, Lt. Gen. Bridgeford, Lt. Gen. Doyle O.
Hickey, heads of most of the United Nations Liaison Groups, heads of most of the
Diplomatic Missions including U.S. Ambassador Robert Murphy, Head of the
Chinese Mission, Lt. Gen. Ho Shail-lai, Danish Minister Lars Tillistse, Apostolic
Delegate, Archibishop Maximilian de Furtenburg and Swiss Reprentative Charles
Weibel.937
After returning from the party, Ho complained in his diary that Admiral Joy and
his wife failed to shake hands with their guests, offending many and leaving them
unhappy to the extent that some commented that “next time we will not attend
farewell parties organized by the Americans.”938 On July 25, French Ambassador told
Ho that most foreign envoys were affable to him and hoped the ROC could “retake
the mainland as soon as possible.” On July 26, Ho attended a “sayonara” cocktail
party organized by Philippine Ambassador Jose P. Melencio at the Philippine
Embassy.939 On July 29, Ho took the plane back to Taipei, and his two-year service in
Japan came into an end.
FROM VICTORYTO DEFEAT
The Chinese Mission in Japan’s changing status symbolized the ROC’s wider
decline during the postwar era. At the beginning of the postwar years, China was
deemed one of the big four powers. Several years later, the ROC bore little
resemblance to any of the other three powers with which it had shared the wartime
stage. The political collapse of Nationalist China as the civil war was lost led to
foreign countries’ losing respect for Chiang and the ROC – a phenomenon embodied
by the disregard Esler Denning demonstrated for Ho Shailai with which this
937 “Adm. Joy Heads for U.S.,” June 10, 1952, Nippon Times.
938 DHSL, June 9, 1952.
939 “Society,” August 3, 1952, Nippon Times.
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dissertation began.
Following that introduction, the main focus of this dissertation has been the
Chinese Mission in Japan from 1946 to 1952. These were years of struggle, of
shattered hopes, of collapse, and, finally, disillusion and dismay. This period began
with the ROC regarded as one of the Big Four Powers poised to share responsibility
in enacting postwar policy in a defeated Japan, and ended with the signing of a peace
treaty between Taipei and Tokyo and the ROC’s territory confined to Taiwan along
with a number of other smaller islands of the southeastern coast of China) and with
little in the way of substance supporting its claim to be the legitimate government of
the Chinese polity. Very few people in 1945 would have foreseen such a rapid
dissolution of Chiang’s Nationalist regime. The changing role of the Chinese Mission
in Japan was, in many ways, an encapsulation of this process.
Apart from delving into its relatively limited roles in the Allied Occupation of
Japan, in this dissertation I have illustrated how the Chinese Mission fitted the ROC’s
demands as events and sometimes crises developed. The history of the Chinese
Mission constitutes an important part of the prism through which China sees its
postwar history. At the inceptive stage of the postwar period, when the ROC had just
reached its apex on the international stage, the Chinese Mission envisaged a grandiose
blueprint for postwar Sino-Japanese relations. That blueprint included: dispatching an
occupational force to Japan, trying Japanese war criminals, and obtaining appropriate
reparations from Japan. However, things did not develop well as the Chinese Mission
and its backers had optimistically anticipated.
The outbreak of the Chinese Civil War had a significant impact on the tasks of the
Chinese Mission. For the Chinese, the plan to dispatch a military force to occupy
Japan was suddenly no longer practical, and Zhu Shiming, the first head of the
Chinese Mission, began to seek out MacArthur and try to convince him to provide
assistance to the KMT. From the Nationalist’s perspective, by the end of 1949, only
the repatriation of Japanese left in China after the war and the Tokyo Trial were
proceeding anything like satisfactorily, but neither contributed to aiding their decline
as the CCP grew exponentially in strength. With the reparation and restitution
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programs ending in general disappointment for Chiang and the Chinese people, the
KMT continued to “lose face” – just as they were lost far more damagingly to the Red
Army on the battlefield.
As Chiang’s regime crumbled in 1949, the Chinese Mission assumed short-term
importance as a base of operation for the KMT in Tokyo. After the CCP set up its new
regime on October 1, 1949, the KMT’s quest to secure the support of MacArthur
became its number one priority. Although now based on the island of Taiwan,
Chiang’s Nationalist government still wished to be recognized by the world as the one
and only legitimate Chinese government. At the same time, the KMT leadership
needed to settle the lingering dispute over the island’s status, a problem which had
been brewing since the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. Ultimately, the survival of
the Nationalist Chinese was premised on solving these two key issues. Only if Chiang
could first settle the Taiwan problem, could he then at least make a claim to
legitimately represent the Chinese people. The dispute over Taiwan’s fate ceased
temporarily after President Truman made his famous speech in regard to the status of
Taiwan in January 1950. Although the Chinese Mission in Japan did not play a
determining role in pressurizing Washington to support the KMT’s claim to Taiwan, it
did, as previous chapters have suggested, exert influence on MacArthur to help secure
American support for Chiang Kai-shek – support which eventually led to his
estrangement from Truman after the outbreak of the Korean War.
Ho Shailai’s years as head of the Chinese Mission in Japan saw the body take an
entirely different strategy and attitude towards relations with SCAP from those of
Ho’s predecessors. Zhu Shiming and Shang Zhen had long grumbled about the
authoritarian character of SCAP, and both men held opinions about the American-led
occupation shared by representatives from the other allies. MacMahon Ball, for
instance, wrote about one occasion when during a lunch appointment, the Soviet
representative Derevyanko “took me aside and said ‘We must, of course, believe
SCAP that Japan is now fully democratic but there is not yet any democracy in the
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Allied Council.’”940 Ho, though, never complained about this aspect of the
occupation in his diaries or in his telegraph messages to Taipei. As a sharp-witted and
dyed-in-the-wool Chinese diplomat and patriot, Ho regarded obtaining benefits for his
country as his prime objective. He knew what he was supposed to say and when to
say it – something he demonstrated when he stepped in to support the US
representative in the debate on the repatriation issue with the Soviet member. Ho’s
efforts contributed much to at least arresting somewhat the irreversible decline of the
Chiang regime, and especially during the Korean War and the negotiation of the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.
To a great extent, Ho Shailai’s service in Tokyo represented the essence of the
American-led Occupation of Japan. Ho spoke fluent English but had no knowledge of
Japanese, nor did he ever try to learn it. Because of this, Ho had faced scepticism
from both within the Chinese Mission and Taipei about whether he was capable of
leading the Chinese Mission in Japan. Some Japanese politicians revealed their
dissatisfaction towards Ho to their Chinese friends on the grounds that “Ho only
knows how to yield to the Americans and reports everything to them.” As a result,
some Japanese not only afraid of having deep conversations with him, but not dare to
approach him.941 After his visit to Japan in 1951, He Yingqin also revealed that some
Japanese frequently asked him why did the Chinese government dispatch a
“foreigner” to Tokyo to represent China.942 Many people believed that only a Japan
specialist could conduct the operations of the Chinese Mission, while failing to
understand that English fluency and cultivating a positive relationship with SCAP was
the key if China was to see any benefit from the relationship. It was perhaps his
acknowledgement of this fact that led Chiang Kai-shek to insist on dispatching Ho to
Tokyo and having him stay there until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Ironically,
despite his loyalty to China being frequently questioned due to his Hong Kong
940 W. MacMahon Ball, Intermittent Diplomat, 64.
941 “yu Lifa Weiyuan Wang Xinheng Tanhua Jianyao Jilu (與立法委員王新衡談話簡要紀錄) [Record
of a Conversation with Legislator Wang Xinheng],” June 27, 1951, IMHArchives,
11-01-02-02-01-070.
942 “yu He Jiangjun Jingzhi Tanhua Jianlue Jilu,” July 4, 1951, IMHArchives, 11-01-02-02-01-070.
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background and foreign appearance, Ho was the only one of the three heads of the
Chinese Mission to remain loyal to the ROC during his lifetime. Zhu Shiming never
returned to Taipei despite being urged by the government there to do so; he died in
1965 in Tokyo.943 Shang Zhen also stayed in Japan after his retirement in 1948 and
refused to go to Taiwan. In 1974, he paid a visit to Beijing to express his views about
the cooperation between the KMT and CCP as well as the unification of China, which
deeply embarrassed Taipei authorities.944 After death his ashes were placed in the
Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery (Babaoshan Geming Gongmu八寶山革命公墓)
in Beijing. The decisions of Zhu and Shang were not unique among the staff of the
Chinese Mission and the overseas Chinese in Japan, many of whom shifted sides to
the PRC as the international situation became less favorable to the ROC in the
decades after 1952.
CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE
The legacy of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Treaty continues to resonate. This treaty
forbade formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan until 1972, before
which the PRC could only vie for commercial relations with the Japanese while
facing strong opposition from the ROC. The PRC labels its formalization of a new
diplomatic alliance with Japan in 1972 as the “normalization of Sino-Japanese
relations,” a definition implying that the “Sino-Japanese” relations led by the ROC
between 1949 and 1972 were illegitimate. Anyone who is familiar with CCP
historiography and ideology will not, of course, be surprised by this interpretation.
According to its own historical narrative, from October 1, 1949 onwards, the only
legitimate representative of a Chinese nation-state was the PRC. From that moment
onward, all diplomatic ties with the ROC were deemed illegitimate by Beijing. The
CCP refutes the interpretation of “Two Chinas” co-existing for a period during which
943 Huang Renyu, Huang Renyu de Dalishi Guan, 270.
944 Lin Xiaoting, Jiang Jingguo de Taiwan Shidai: Zhonghuaminguo yu Lengzhan xia de Taiwan (蔣經
國的台灣時代：中華民國與冷戰下的台灣) [The Chiang Ching-kuo Era: The Republic of China on
Taiwan in the Cold War] (Taipei: Yuanzu Wenhua, 2021), 430.
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the CCP gradually achieved dominance as recognition was earned from other states.
This uncompromising interpretation of history has led the CCP to unilaterally rename
the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1952 the “Japanese-Taiwan Treaty,” a term which has
never appeared anywhere outside of CCP historiography. Despite the PRC’s
“normalization” of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 and the growth of economic
cooperation and cultural exchange, mutual misunderstanding remains a constant of
the relationship, with issues such as history textbooks, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
by Japanese politicians, and clashes over island territories claimed by both countries
frequently reigniting hostility between them.
Taiwan, still formally using the appellation ‘Republic of China’, retained a
semi-official relationship with Japan after 1972 by way of an envoy known as the
Zhuri Daibiao (駐日代表 ), “ROC’s representative to Japan”. Taiwanese national
identity then began to develop and become more prominent as the consequence of a
series of democratic movements occurring in the 1980s. As that decade wore on, most
Taiwanese and mainland Chinese no longer shared common memories of a shared
past with regard to episodes like the Nanjing Massacre or the Manchurian Incident.
While in recent years, there has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the 1952
Peace Treaty in Taiwan because it theoretically supports claims of Taiwan’s national
identity and independence from the mainland. The Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) has interpreted this treaty in a way which supports Taiwanese identity with the
claim that Taiwan’s status after 1945 was unsettled (Taiwan Diwei Weidinglun 台灣
地位未定論 ), and that therefore the ROC’s seizure of control of the island had no
legal basis. With the political success of the DPP, this viewpoint began to gain ground.
In their view, the ROC regime merely occupied Taiwan instead of possessing
sovereignty over the island. The KMT, on the other hand, believes that Taiwan’s
return to the embrace of the motherland under the ROC is something that will occur
fait accompli, so any efforts made by the DPP in support of Taiwanese independence
are absurd. However, this once-compelling idea began to lose support. In recent years,
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disputes over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands (Diaoyutai 釣魚台), claimed by
Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC, have surfaced. Accusing the DPP of tolerating Japanese
activity in the areas around the Diaoyutai, the KMT goes so far as to chastise Taiwan’s
representative to Japan, appointed by the DPP, as representing the interests of Japan
(Zhuri Daibiao 助日代表) over those of the ROC. This case vividly illustrates how
the legacy of the Sino-Japanese relations continues to remain a contested issue in
contemporary Taiwanese politics. At a press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office
in Beijing on May 12, 2021, when asked about its attitude toward the claim that
Taiwan’s status remained unsettled, the spokesman answered that the San Francisco
Peace Treaty was “a piece of illegal and futile historical waste paper.”945 In turn, the
DPP utilized Beijing’s reaction to embarrass, even mock, the KMT’s viewpoint that
Taiwan had been a part of the ROC since 1945. The DPP further undermined support
for the KMT’s position regarding the 1992 Concensus (Jiu’er Gongshi 九二共識)—a
political term which has been favored by the CCP. The Concensus stipulates that
Taiwan is a part of China and that its name is either the PRC or the ROC; however,
the CCP has denied the KMT’s legitimacy since 1949. Although the San Francisco
Peace Treaty and Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty enable the KMT to support its political
viewpoint, some of which are in essence favorable to the CCP, the CCP has had no
intention to revise its standpoint. In its eyes, official CCP ideology can never be
challenged.
It is indeed not at all farfetched to say that some of today’s most controversial
issues in East Asia, such as Diaoyutai and the fate of Taiwan, are rooted in or shaped
by the events of the initial postwar period between 1945 and 1952. As this dissertation
demonstrates, nearly all these issues had, at one time or another, involved the ROC’s
Chinese Mission in Japan. For instance, the Chinese Mission raised the problem of
Japanese textbooks in an ACJ meeting, contained the movement of Taiwanese
945 “Guotaiban: Minjindang Dangju Chaozuo Feifa Wuxiao de Jiujinshan Heyue Zhongjiu shi Tulao
(國台辦：民進黨當局炒作非法無效的「舊金山和約」終究是徒勞) ,” May 12, 2021,
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202105/t20210512_12351717.htm.
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Independence in Japan, defended its seat in the ACJ from being challenged by the
PRC, and vied for the hearts and minds of overseas Chinese in Japan with the same
opponent. The recent death of Chen Kunwang (陳 焜 旺 ), a prominent overseas
Chinese figure in Japan, once again brings up this memory. Chen was born in Taiwan
in 1923 and resided in Japan after graduation, where he became deeply involved in te
affairs of overseas Chinese associations. After 1949, he joined the PRC side. In its
official eulogy for Chen, the PRC praised him for “protecting the dignity of his
motherland, striving for the rights of overseas Chinese, prompting the establishment
of overseas Chinese associations, promoting the peaceful unification of China, and
increasing the friendship among Chinese and Japanese nationals.”946 In sharp contrast
to Taiwan’s oblivion toward Chen’s passing, the way that mainland China
propagandized Chen’s career and accomplishments reveals the CCP’s ideology of
defining history.
In a nutshell, stories playing out in the years of Japan’s occupation in which the
Chinese Mission in Japan was a participant were the prelude to important events
happening in later decades. The history of the Chinese Mission in Japan serves as a
unique lens through which to interpret the contemporary political order in East Asia.
946 “L ri Zhuming Qiaoling Chen Kunwang Yiti Gaobie Yishi zai Qingdao Juxing (旅日著名僑領陳
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